

DECEMBER 1959

An End To Appeasement

by M. R. Masani

THIS morning, I read in one of our national dailies the thought that:

"The Government is heading towards the greatest failure in that on an issue which should so easily compel solidarity, it is incapable of an appeal that the nation will hearken to as the authentic call to united action."

I came to this House, hoping against hope that the lead given by the Prime Minister would be such that this pessimistic thought would be disproved. But as the Prime Minister's speech unfolded, I felt more and more depressed, not because he seemed to be more angry with my quiet, innocent smile than even with the entire aggression of the Chinese and their murder of our people, but because his whole speech was a divisive speech which antagonised different opinions in this House that, if he had wanted them to go along with him, would have gone along with him very happily. He has in fact provoked those of us who came to offer our support to go into Opposition against him even on broader policies with which we are in agreement. I will not imitate the Prime Minister in his prejudice and his passion. I do not think this is the time when we can retaliate at that level. I want to say nobody in this House questions the patriotism or the integrity of the Prime Minister. Not even those whose integrity he takes the liberty to question. But we do question his soundness of judgement, and in whatever is going to be said now, it is not the Prime Minister's *bona fides*, it is not his desire to save the country and serve it, which we all accept, but the lack of wisdom which has been shown by Government policies to which attention will be sought to be drawn.

The Prime Minister's speech has won him the support of the Communist Party. I hope he enjoys it. I am reminded of a similar situation in 1924 when the first British Labour Government came to power. Then the British Communist Party asked Moscow—in a fashion that still prevails—"What shall we do? What is our attitude to the MacDonald Government?" And Lenin's answer is historic: "We shall support Mr. MacDonald", he wrote back, "as the rope supports the hanged man". That is the value of Shri S. A. Dange's support to the Prime Minister's policy, and I

am quite sure that my hon. friends over there know what value to attach to that support.

Another thing I would like to make clear definitely is that I do not wish to open here an academic discussion, despite the Prime Minister's provocation, on the principles of foreign policy. On those we are all agreed, and in spite of his attempt to draw a red-herring across the trail, let me read only one sentence from the only speech I made in this House on this matter in a very similar situation on December 6 and 7, 1950, when we were discussing the brutal Chinese attempt to conquer and occupy Tibet, when I said: "I believe that the foreign policy of India based on independence of judgement is a sound one." I repeat that sentiment today. I part company with the Prime Minister—and many of us in an increasing number in this country are doing so today—in the way that policy is being implemented or carried out. So there is no question of questioning the non-alignment policy. The question is whether non-alignment, as Acharya Kripalani has rightly pointed out, is being correctly and detachedly carried out.

Now, going through the White Papers and the correspondence, three or four impressions are left on one's mind, which I am sure many hon. Members must have shared. The first is that the Chinese actions right from 1954 onwards, almost from the time that we signed the *Panchsheel* agreement, have shown a grand design. They are all facets of the same mind at work. There is nothing erratic, playful or irresponsible about it. It is a consistent mind running like a thread right through their entire conduct.

On the other hand, on our side, we find a sad failure to react to this consistent policy of probing and trying to find out how much nonsense we would stand. We went on giving in, as Acharya Kripalani has said, we wrote apologetic notes, always asking: "Do you really know what your people are doing?", as if after the first or second incident there was any doubt on the subject as to what the Chinese Government was telling its troops to do. The Chinese, on their part, accused us of aggression, of planning military action against them from "land, sea and air". That is the second impression one gets. It is a desire to avoid a clash, putting that above even the defence of India's territory.

The third impression I got was a sad one about the suppression of facts from this House over a period of as long as two years. Acharya Kripalani also dealt with that. The Prime Minister has written to Mr. Chou En-lai that he did it because he hoped to settle this without letting the people know so that they did not get excited. Whatever the intention, the result

ater the
ru-Chou

ober 21.

kick up
ave not

n Times
ober 21.

ebate on
unedif
o add to
ian terror
damental
on non-
are now
lves!
tober 17

acy, Mr.
aking the
: spine of

tober 22

he United
behalf of
alignment
ppression
Express
tober 21

a in terms
ps also in

tober 17

bed shop-
n we treat
capitalism
ar Patrika
tober 11

t Party in
the Con
newspaper

zar Patrika
October 11

itic Research

was exactly the opposite. Mr. Chou En-lai was very encouraged when he found that Shri Nehru was not taking the people into confidence. He was encouraged when he found that the Parliament of India was being denied facts to which it was entitled from the Prime Minister. The result was exactly the reverse, and Shri Nehru should have known it, considering the party with whom he was dealing. This suppression is a grave act. I do not know if the full consciousness of its implications has sunk into the mind of our country yet, but I do say this in all humility that the Prime Minister will have a heavy responsibility before the Bar of history for this action of which he has been guilty.

The fourth thing that comes out of the White Papers is our neglect to raise the boundary issue in time. Mr. Chou En-lai explains in his letter to Shri Nehru on January 23 of this year why they did not raise it. It makes very good sense. He says that conditions were not "ripe" for China to raise the boundary issue with us. Certain proper preparations had to be carried out first. He said: 'We are now proceeding to take certain steps in making preparations.' We know what those 'preparations' were—to lull us into a false sense of security and then to nibble at our territory, to bring their forces up to the frontier armed in a way superior to our own. Those preparations were made all the time. We understand their tactics. What about ours? Why did we not from 1950 onwards raise the matter of our frontiers? In 1954, we signed a treaty selling out the independence of Tibet. We cheerfully allowed a buffer State, a valuable buffer State, that separated us from China to disappear. In fact, we did that in 1950, in 1954, we put our signature to that deed. What kind of diplomacy was it that, when you agreed to a buffer State being removed between an expansionist Power and yourself, you did not take the elementary precaution of saying, 'All right, we will give you Tibet. But you agree to the line that now divides you from us'?

No Quid Pro Quo

I say it was criminal negligence on the part of our Government at least not to get a *quid pro quo*. I will not argue on moral grounds. There was a time when our Prime Minister was fond of saying that freedom and peace are indivisible. He said it about Czechoslovakia, but he forgot to say it in the case of Tibet. Let that pass. But on the point of sheer national interest and cold-blooded foreign policy, when you sold out Tibet, should you not have asked in return for a guarantee of the McMahon Line and Ladakh frontiers before you accepted the conquest of Tibet, thereby removing a valuable buffer? Why was that not done? I do not want to be uncharitable. I hope it is not too unkind to suggest that it was not done because the people of India would not have tolerated this policy of appeasement any longer if they had known the facts. In other words, the Prime Minister put a particular policy to which he was wedded above the vital interests of this country, and he has not served it well in that regard. If they had

known in 1956 or 1957 about the aggression that was already perpetrated, *Panchsheel* would have "lost its lustre" in the eyes of the Indian people earlier—here Shri Nehru's words may be quoted—and that would have done the country a great deal of good. We would have been forewarned; we would have been forearmed; we would have deployed our troops and equipped them. All this we were not able to do because, instead of drawing our attention to the real menace which they knew was there, our Government turned our attentions to the frontiers of Pakistan rather than the frontiers of China, and let our troops be caught off guard.

The story goes back to 1950. Ever since the Chinese Communist revolution, a policy of sentimental misreading of history has been inflicted on this country. For ten long years we were told that China was always a peace-loving country. Now the Prime Minister says, 'No, for 2000 years they have been expansionists'. Why did he not say it earlier? Surely the Chinese have not changed their history in the last few months? Chinese history and communist history is always expansionist; it is always imperialist. We should have known this from the time that Mao Tse-Tung seized power in China. But we ignored all the warnings.

Warnings Ignored

In this very House in the debate on December 6 and 7, 1950, to which I referred at the beginning, 19 hon. Members spoke. Out of them 10 hon. Members warned the Prime Minister that the invasion of Tibet was the first step to the invasion of India. Among those who gave this warning were Acharya Kripalani, Shri Frank Anthony, Shri Ranga, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, our Speaker, Shri M. A. Ayyangar and myself. There were ten hon. Members who warned the Government that the attack on Tibet was only the first step to the attempt to dominate India. The Prime Minister called us alarmists and brushed us aside. If we were alarmists, he was an escapist. He refused to face a fact which has now become recorded in history—that the invasion of Tibet was only one step towards domination of this country on which the Chinese communist regime is set.

There was another warning. We were humble people, Sir, but Mao Tse-Tung warned him and said in 1948, soon after taking power: "To talk of neutrality is a fraud. . . . There is no third force." Still Shri Nehru persisted in being neutral and being a third force. Our Prime Minister was called the 'running dog of the Anglo-American imperialists' in the official Press agency of the Chinese Government, the *New China News Agency*. That agency again issued a statement saying that the "Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army will hoist the Red Flag over the Himalayas". Mao sent a message of greetings to Ranadive, the then General Secretary of the Communist Party. He sent a message to the Party after the Calcutta Resolution when the communists

(Continued on page 9)

India's Amazing Unpreparedness

by S. Sharangpani

THE Chinese aggression in NEFA as well as in Ladakh has exposed the dangerous complacency on the part of the Government of India with regard to the problem of the security of our northern strategic frontier. The great Himalayas became a live and sensitive border in 1950-51 with the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Even Mr. Nehru in 1950 showed his awareness of this fact when he warned in his speech in Parliament on December 6, that the "magnificent frontier" of the Himalayas cannot be allowed "to be penetrated" or "to be crossed or weakened because that would be a risk to our own security". But this brave resolve was soon forgotten. Hypnotised by the deceptive spell of Sino-Indian friendship, the Indian Government came to consider the northern frontier as a "frontier of peace and friendship" that did not need to be defended. As a result, our northern border never figured as a possible source of danger in our defence thinking. China, on the other hand, joined in the "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" chorus, but at the same time rolled her armies over Tibet, fortified the border towns, constructed frontier roads and began probing operations along the 2,500 mile long Indo-Tibetan border. Even then the Indian Government persisted in its suicidal policy of keeping the frontier unguarded and for five years even withheld the information about the Chinese aggressive activities along our border from the public hoping to settle the problems by "peaceful negotiations". It criminally wasted all these five years and misled the public with the slogan of India-China friendship. The result is that when China launched an open, systematic and violent campaign of border violations, Indian Government as well as the public found themselves unprepared, psychologically as well as militarily, to meet the Chinese threat.

This failure was not accidental; it was an inevitable result of the calculated bias imparted to our foreign as well as defence policy. In the past we continuously groaned over bases built in Pakistan, forgetting that on our northern border similar posts were springing up. We violently denounced the military aid to Pakistan, but nobody bothered about China getting similar aid in cash and equipment. A violation of Indo-Pak border was always a signal for the booming of guns and it was always provocation enough to send our Defence Minister into tantrums against Pakistan. But in Ladakh, the Chinese have been sitting pretty occupying about 2,000 square miles for years with impunity and still it was only an act of "stupidity" on the Chinese part, according to our Defence Minister who has been all the while busy, in his own words, "trying to make the Chinese look respectable to the rest of the world". (*Times of India*, October 31, 1959)

Secondly, there was the deliberate policy of the military personnel engaging in tasks best performed by civilians—policy against which even the Army Commander-in-Chief was once constrained to raise his voice. Similarly there was the policy of Defence running civilian enterprises. In recent years, the Defence Ministry's industrial establishments have been encouraged by a deliberate policy to drift into various miscellaneous lines of production not primarily connected with the arming and equipment of Defence Services. This wasteful diversion of Defence capacity into channels of civilian production and activity has also affected adversely the physical and moral equipment of our Defence Services.

Our defence policy was thus never attuned to the hard realities of our frontier problems. In fact, we substituted the Panchsheel for any realistic defence policy and treated the slogan of India-China friendship as a magic *mantram* which would safeguard our Himalayan border by bringing about a change of heart on the part of the aggressive Chinese communists. The extent to which this unilateral and blind reliance on Chinese friendship had gone on India's part can be gauged from the Government of India's note to China sent on November 4, 1959. Replying to the Chinese contention that the fact that the Indian Government never raised any objection to the construction of the Sinkiang-Tibet road across the Aksai-chin Plateau in the past was itself a proof that the territory belonged to China, the Indian Government wrote: "This area is extremely difficult of access from inhabited areas in western and southern Ladakh and the Government of India had no reason to suspect that the Government of China, with whom they had friendly relations, would trespass into the area and construct a road". In essence, the same logic held good for other parts along the 2,500 mile India-Tibet border. We left the whole Indo-Tibetan border unguarded because the Government of India "had no reason to suspect" that the Government of China "with whom they had friendly relations" would commit aggression along our border!

This is all about India's defence policy. Naturally, when the Chinese Communist Government beared its fangs, the Government of India found itself totally unprepared to meet the military challenge from across the north. The Chinese incursions have established that the Government of India has no means of keeping itself informed of all that is happening on our northern border as well as of expelling the aggressor from our territory.

From newspaper reports it is obvious that in Ladakh the Police force was quite unaware of the presence of Chinese in such strength. It is apparent from the fact that the Chinese memorandum or

protest was received at the same time as, or perhaps before, direct news of the incident reached New Delhi, that Chinese communications are better than India's. It is now similarly obvious from armed clashes in Ladakh, that the Chinese have been carrying on probing actions and seizing territory at will on no better claim than that no Indian opposition was met. We are now thus faced with the knowledge that even to find out how much more of Ladakh the Chinese are in possession of will mean the sacrificing of more lives.

At Longju as well as in Ladakh, it was the same story: our patrol police were overpowered by superior Chinese detachments.

These are some of the results of our amazing unpreparedness and masterly inaction through five years of known Chinese aggression on our border. But to understand and appreciate the magnitude of our unpreparedness, the following facts are worth noting:

1. Even after 12 years of independence, we have not even properly surveyed our border areas and have no detailed maps of those regions. In the NEFA region, for example, the survey parties of the Eastern Circle intensified work to prepare detailed maps of the area only after the Chinese incursions took place. On the other hand, the Chinese surveyed the border between NEFA and Tibet in 1956-57. (and during the survey crossed illegally into Indian territory to obtain local evidence in their support!) Because of the absence of detailed survey maps, Indian Government sometimes has not been able even to locate the places mentioned by the Chinese in their memoranda and in one place it was even placed in a false position. (For example, it had to vacate its checkpost at Tapaden, some miles east of Longju, as a close examination of the McMahon Line at this point revealed that it was not within Indian territory.) It has also not been able to reply definitively to the Chinese charges of occupying their territory at some other points. In Ladakh, the less said the better. Here the Government of India does not seem even to know how much of Indian territory the Chinese have occupied till now.

2. The lack of regular road communications in the frontier region is something amazing. Along the 2,500 miles of India's border with Tibet, practically all the frontier areas are inaccessible by land routes. This has rendered the problem of the defence of our border very difficult. It is almost impossible to station troops along the deserted wild territory of our frontier regions. In many places the terrain is such that men stationed at one outpost cannot patrol more than ten miles of the border. To station troops in this mountainous territory, which has no roads nor landing grounds, safe supply and communication lines are very necessary.

(i) In NEFA even the divisional headquarters are not connected with the plains of Assam by jeepable roads.

(ii) In Ladakh, the situation is more serious. Even the capital of Ladakh can be approached only by air, as there is no jeepable road to Leh. Ponies are normal

means of transport in this region and distances measured in terms of days' march. Ladakh is at present connected with the rest of Kashmir only by the Shrinagar-Kargil road. The work on the construction of the road from Kargil (110 miles from Leh) to Leh commenced *three years ago*, and although two sets of engineers were suspended for inefficiency and corruption, so far not even a sizeable distance has been covered.

(iii) The same is the case in Himachal Pradesh and the Punjab. Himachal Pradesh has a long border with Tibet in Chini Tehsil and the area below lacks means of air and road communications. The Hindustan-Tibet road (from Kalka to the Tibetan border) has been under construction for nearly the last *ten years*. But it has shown very little progress despite heavy expenditure. Heavy traffic on this road runs only upto Rampur and jeepable trucks upto Chrauh. Another strategic road for defence purposes under construction is Rohru-Rajban road. Progress on this road is also not satisfactory.

(iv) In U.P. while good road communications have already been developed upto the Manna and Niti passes in Garhwal, brisk activity to connect Tehri town in Tehri-Garhwal with Nilang Pass area through a motorable road has recently been started.

Thus the absence of road communications with frontier regions has greatly hampered the security arrangements along our borders. This places great obstacle in our border being reasonably well-manned. Naturally in the vast mountainous expanse of Ladakh, the Government of India cannot set up many checkposts and has little or no knowledge of what is going on in some of the remote areas such as the Aksaichin Plateau. This can be easily seen from the fact that the existence of the Sinkiang-Tibet road, which passes for nearly 100 miles through Indian territory in Ladakh, came to the knowledge of the Indian Government only when the Chinese announced that it was *completed* in September 1957. Indian checkposts in Ladakh are consequently some distance from the international border. Even in NEFA, where our border is reasonably well-manned, India has left vast areas along the border unguarded. Along the 850 miles Sino-Indian border in NEFA, there are only 8 Indian outposts and some of them are far from the McMahon Line.

India's lack of proper road communications is in sad contrast to the vigorous measures taken by the Chinese to open up Tibet and connect it with the Chinese mainland by roads right upto India's frontier. In Ladakh, the Chinese have been reported to have built many roads between Rudokh (their base in Western Tibet) and Ladakh. The Sinkiang-Tibet road, besides, runs upto Takhalkot, which is only 10 miles from U.P. border.

Even in NEFA, the Chinese, as soon as they captured Longju, took vigorous measures to strengthen occupation forces at Longju and to build up a secure supply line. The Chinese were reported (in October) to be widening the track from Longju northwards

(Continued on Page 6)

Burma Moves Toward The West

by Gilbert Jonas

THIS past July, the Burmese Government announced its readiness to accept American economic grants. The United States simultaneously revealed its offer of \$37 million in assistance over the next four years. Behind this significant—and to many, surprising—reversal of policy are all the elements of a dime-store novel of international intrigue.

For a decade since its independence, Burma has walked an international tightrope, skirting alignments between the big power blocs. With Communist China poised menacingly on its vast northern frontier, the leaders of this rice-rich, but under-developed, South-East Asian nation had decided that any act of provocation toward the communist world was a luxury their country could not afford. Even the acceptance of U.S. economic aid was regarded as potentially "provocative," and in 1953 Burma decided to decline further American assistance. Military alignment with the West was, of course, ruled out from the start.

Inside Burma the Government has been fighting armed communist bands almost from the day Britain granted independence in 1948. Guerrilla warfare in the countryside has made internal security Burma's major problem for a decade. Gradually the Army has whittled down the communist forces to a few thousand men, but the problem remains. Various nationality groups have also challenged the Government's authority with arms. In recent months, the remnants of these groups are believed to have joined forces with the communists.

The Chinese monolith, which shares about 1,000 miles of common border with Burma, is another serious threat. Depredations by Chinese communist troops on Burmese soil are common. For example, on May 31, a Chinese army patrol crossed the border at Namkham and fired on 10 Kachin peasants, wounding five; as usual, no provocation could be ascertained. Chinese communist propaganda, in the form of books, pamphlets, newspapers and broadcasts, is flooding the country. The infiltration of Chinese agents is a grave threat—so grave that the Burmese Government last April ordered the registration of all Buddhist monks and nuns to prevent further infiltration of the cloth by the communists. The Government declared, in ordering this registration, that communists were donning the saffron robes of the Buddhist holy men for purposes of subversion.

Perhaps the most enduring blow to communist prestige was Red China's brutal repression of the Tibetan revolt, which deeply stirred the Burmese, who are racially and religiously close to the Tibetans. After a brief period of shock, the Burmese overwhelmingly condemned the Chinese action. As many Burmese noted publicly, it proved that Asians could crush fellow Asians as cruelly as Europeans had exploited Asians.

With the cards already stacked against them, one would have expected the Russians and Chinese to proceed cautiously until the Tibetan affair had been quietly forgotten. But a new storm was unleashed in late April that may have cost the Soviet Union—and the entire communist world—an irrevocable setback. It demonstrated that the Russians are capable of enormous blunders which the fairy-tale fiction of *The Ugly American* vintage ascribes exclusively to American diplomats.

The incident began with a front-page news story in the respected pro-Western daily newspaper, the *Nation*, perhaps the best-edited English-language daily in Southeast Asia. On April 24, the *Nation* published a dispatch noting that an Indian journalist—the *Delhi Times* correspondent in Rangoon—had accused the West of trying to force or bribe Burmese newspapers to abandon neutralism in favour of Western alignment. Specifically, the report charged that U Law Yone, editor-in-chief of the *Nation*, had accepted a \$34,000 bribe from the American Embassy in Rangoon to carry out this policy. Other respected Burmese papers—the *Guardian* and the *Reporter*—were similarly accused. Shocked Rangoon readers learned at the end of the dispatch that the report had emanated from Tass, the official Soviet news agency.

The *Nation* replied with angry dignity: "There is no such person as the *Delhi Times* correspondent in Rangoon, and Tass is a miserable liar." The storm broke with all the fury of a tropical hurricane. The complete fabrication of the Soviet charges became immediately apparent to almost every newspaper in Burma, pro-West or neutralist. The following day, banner front-page headlines carried the story to virtually every Burmese who reads a paper.

The editor of the *Nation* immediately announced that he would sue the Tass correspondent in Rangoon for criminal libel. Editors of the other accused papers followed suit. Refusing a demand for a public apology, the correspondent, Evgeny Kovtunenکو, fled to the Soviet Embassy for sanctuary.

An editorial in the *Nation* set the tone for what has been a front-page story almost every week since. After denying the specific charges made by Tass, the editorial stated: "In this country, no one questions the integrity of the *Nation* without being made answerable to it. . . . For Mr. Kovtunenکو's benefit, we will point out that in Burma, unlike in Russia, truth is a complete defense. If therefore he can substantiate what he has made public, he has nothing to fear. Otherwise, let him get a very, very good lawyer."

"Tass has its sinister side," declared an editorial in the *Guardian*, "whenever Soviet policies triumph or are placed in jeopardy. When either. . . happens, Tass singles out what it considers to be its enemies for furious attacks. In such attacks truth is never a

primary consideration... In Hungary where the Soviet policies failed and in Iraq where they paid off, enemies of Soviet communism were vilified as reactionaries in the pay of the Western powers. Newspapers which advocate freedom and democracy in opposition to communism are Tass' special enemies."

As a result of the controversy, Burmese public opinion began shifting significantly against the Soviet Union. Fuel was added to the outcry when the Soviet military attaché in Rangoon attempted to seek political asylum in Burma. When the escape was discovered, the errant comrade was publicly dragged back to the Russian Embassy by Soviet police. He later attempted to commit suicide and failed. Subsequently, in mid-May, he was escorted under Russian military guard to Rangoon airport, where he was summarily shipped back to the Soviet Union for disciplinary purposes.

Under an incessant barrage of publicity, the incident roused strong local sympathy for the Soviet officer. The Burmese Journalists Association, enraged by the Tass attacks on the three Rangoon newspapers, found a channel for their anger in the affair of the unfortunate military attaché. They stormed the Soviet Embassy, protesting the deportation of the colonel by pelting the building with rotten fruit and eggs. Soviet Embassy police retaliated by manhandling several journalists and confiscating a photographer's camera. Another demonstration was staged at Rangoon airport. The reaction was unusually strong for such an incident; most observers explained its intensity as a continuation of the Tass incident.

As if the plot were not thick enough, on June 26 the American Embassy announced the defection of a 27-year-old Soviet information officer in Rangoon. In a scorching written statement issued from the temporary asylum of the U.S. Embassy, Aleksandr Urevitch Kaznacheev accused the Soviet Government and its Embassy in Burma of using "terror, subversion and police state methods to achieve its aims." He frankly admitted to spying on the Burmese people and a few days later provided the Burmese military authorities with a list of Soviet and Burmese spies coordinated and supervised by the Embassy in Rangoon.

On June 29 the Burmese Government permitted the defector to leave Burma under American auspices after the Soviet officer stated that he "left the Soviet Embassy of his own free will." Three months ago such Burmese-American cooperation would have been unthinkable.

In 1957, the Burmese agreed to resume acceptance of American loans in dollars and local currency for economic and social development, and last April, the largest sum under the new programme was allotted to Burma. The Burmese have always regarded loans as a totally different breed of animal from outright grants. The former are supposedly consistent with independence. Grants, on the other hand, are regarded as a compromise with independence and theoretically imply "political strings."

On July 6, after careful negotiation, Burma and the

U.S. announced a new aid agreement. Burma will not only accept an American gift of \$37 million to build a major highway from Rangoon to Central Burma and to construct dormitories and classrooms at the University of Rangoon; more significantly, it will also permit U.S. Army Engineers to carry out the surveys and engineering for the highway.

The final outcome will not, however, be decided by U.S. or Soviet assistance, though the availability of either can help to tip the scales. Much of Burma's future depends on the results of the factional strife between the two wings of Burma's major political party and by the efforts of the recently-inaugurated Army-controlled government under General Ne Win. In a few short months, Prime Minister Ne Win has acted more decisively and with more visible results than the U Nu Government was able or willing to do during the entire preceding decade.

Burma is a nation of enormous importance to the fate of Southeast Asia. Her two-million-ton rice surplus this year is viewed with a covetous eye by the hungry million of Red China. Thanks in large measure to the heavy-handed blunders of the Russians (and the ruthlessness of the Chinese against the Tibetans), communist stock in Burma has plunged drastically. This does not necessarily mean the Burmese will openly align themselves with the West. It does mean that they are less vulnerable to the communist love calls that seem to have entranced so many Asian neutralists during the past decade.

(INDIA'S AMAZING UNPREPAREDNESS—From page 4)

about 20 miles deep into Tibet. It is expected that they would eventually develop the track into a motorable road.

3. The Chinese attack on Indian guards in Ladakh on October 20 revealed that the Chinese soldiers were equipped with grenades, mortars and automatic weapons, while our patrol police were armed only with rifles. This lack of adequate equipment is not confined to Ladakh alone, as can be seen from the following extract from a report by Dom Moraes who visited Sikkim-Tibet border some time ago: "The guards (at the Sikkim frontier) report that all the Chinese troops are equipped with sten guns, revolvers and binoculars. This is in sad contrast to the Indian frontier posts. The Sheratung garrison is unequipped with automatic weapons or proper radio transmitters and unsupplied with binoculars so that they are unable to see what transpires on the Nathu La Frontier." (Dom Moraes, *Indian Express*, Sept. 25, 1959)

The problem of communications in Ladakh is aggravated by our woeful lack of planes that can function adequately at heights of about 20,000 feet. Most of Ladakh lies at an average height of 11,000 feet. Besides we do not have even helicopters which would fly at that height and help in keeping a constant supply line to our border outposts. It is only after the Chinese attack in Ladakh, that we woke up and started making efforts in Western markets to secure suitable helicopters for army use.

Communist Vulnerability

by Bertram D. Wolfe

VULNERABILITY implies an alert and determined opponent, ready to take advantage of every weakness and every opening. Only then do weakness and inconsistencies become vulnerabilities. But this determination and this readiness are today lacking in the free world.

The communists know that they are engaged in what Professor Robert Strausz-Hupe and his associates at the University of Pennsylvania's Foreign Policy Research Institute have called "a protracted war." They know that they are engaged in a war to the finish, a war for the world. Every separate issue, every negotiation, every conference, every utterance, they regard as a move in that war, whereas for us in the West each is treated as a separate concrete issue to be settled once and for all in order that we may relax.

We aim to persuade our opponents that our intentions are friendly. We aim to "reassure" the Soviets as to their "security." We aim to trade concessions, which in practice means only to give away positions we possess, so that the other side, which offers nothing in exchange, can renew the battle from a more advantageous position.

Edward Gibbon once wrote, "Persuasion is the resource of the feeble; and the feeble can seldom persuade." We are not feeble. Actually, America and the free world are at this moment stronger economically and militarily than the opponent that is determined to destroy us. But we are acting as though from feebleness, thus endangering peace by making the communists underestimate our strength and luring them, without intending to do so, into the folly of an attack. Thus, the very moves we make to preserve peace are moves which profoundly endanger the peace.

Insofar as we act as if we were weak, as if our task were to persuade the unpersuadable and to settle what cannot be settled, instead of to win the war the Kremlin is waging against us; insofar as we have permitted the communists to divide the world into their "peace" zone, where we may not and do not intervene, and our "war" zone, where the entire world and the United Nations and they also may intervene—to that extent it is not they but we who are vulnerable. We are proving vulnerable because of our incapacity and unwillingness to use the openings which their system has provided, does provide and will continue to provide.

What we need, first of all, is an understanding of this universal, unitary, unending war to the finish. Second, we need a revolutionary strategy, to put the revolutionary forces of our time at our disposal and deny to them their use and exploitation. Only then will their system prove more vulnerable than ours, as potentially it is.

The Russian Revolution is now over 40 years old.

In the four decades that this new power has existed and become total, all of its original promises have turned into their opposites. Here is where an alert opponent would find more vulnerabilities than he would know what to do with if he were really on the job.

1. It promised "land to the peasants." But in the end it took away even the land which the peasants had under the Tsars, and it herded them into a new state-owned serfdom.

2. It promised "perpetual peace." Instead it has produced a totalitarian state which forever wages a two-fold war—a war on its own people to remake them according to its blueprint, and a war upon the world. And I don't mean the word "war" figuratively but literally. When it wages war on its own people, it is a real war, a war of nerves, a war of quarantine (the Iron Curtain), a war of propaganda, of agitation, of conditioning, of psychological warfare, of physical warfare, of prisons, of concentration camps, of bombardment by loud speakers and press and movies and all the means of cultural conditioning and, when necessary, a bullet in the base of the brain. At the same time it has used this war upon its own people to keep them mobilized for unending war to win the world.

3. It promised "production for use," that is, for the sake of the consumer and consumers' goods. Instead it has set up production for production's sake, for the sake of expanding the oppressive power of the producer-owner state.

4. It promised "plenty," and it has produced perpetual scarcity of all the goods that make life gracious, pleasant, easy, cultured, rewarding, full of promise and possibility.

5. The state that was "to wither away" has expanded to totality. Lenin promised that "every cook is to become master of the affairs of the state." Now the state is the master of the affairs of every cook.

6. It promised "freedom," and it has abolished all freedoms.

7. It promised "the workers' paradise," and has immured its people behind an impenetrable wall and turned their country into a prison for their thoughts and for their very lives, which cannot be penetrated by learning what happens on the outside, nor by the freedom to discuss what is happening to themselves on the inside.

8. It has raised the banner of "national self-determination" and "anti-imperialism," but it has become the most aggressive, the most oppressive, the most rapidly expanding imperialist power in the history of man.

Thus—and I have named only a few of these potential vulnerabilities—all the revolutionary slogans which Lenin sought to use and which the Kremlin

(Continued on page 11)

Review

Socialism in South-East Asia

by Saul Rose; Oxford University Press, 1959, Price Rs. 17.50; pp. 278.

SOcialism, as it exists today, had travelled far away from the days of the communards whose battle cry "egalite, fraternite, liberte" sent a shiver through the royal spines of 19th century Europe. In 1895, the then Prince of Wales had the audacity to say that "now-a-days we are all socialists." With the passage of time Rousseau and Voltaire, Saint Simon and Proudhon became only echoes from the past; before Europe could size up the humanitarian concepts of these and other thinkers, she was haunted by a ghost, communism. And when the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) floundered under the onslaught of Bolshevism, Democratic Socialism in Europe lost half its battle.

In Asia, Socialism, like Nationalism, was imported from the West and soon became the hand-maid in the struggle for national liberation. The masses of workers and peasants who swelled the ranks of nationalist parties had their eyes fixed on the prospect of refashioning society on the anvils of socialism. Saul Rose, in this documentary record of the socialist movement in South East Asia during the last two decades provides something comparable to the biography of an *enfant terrible* who did not outgrow infancy. In India, socialist movement grew within the womb of Indian National Congress and became its main driving force. The Congress Socialist Party under the leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan and the blessings of Mr. Nehru succeeded in organising the peasants and workers of the country and the educated youth into class organisation and appeared to be well-set to take over the task of transforming the society as soon as independence was achieved. This hope however remains yet to be fulfilled. With the advent of freedom, it languished like a Samson shorn of his locks. Mr. Masani had, by that time, reconsidered socialism and rejected it. Achyut Patwardhan had found release from political frustrations in the arcadian atmosphere of an ashram. Jayaprakash seemed to be torn between the charms of Sarvodaya and longings for socialism. And Dr. Lohia, the stormy petrel of socialist movement, got lost in the labyrinths of equidistance. While the leaders were plunged in-

to ideological confusion their followers chose more revolutionary paths. In the first General Election, the Praja Socialist Party put up 255 candidates for Lok Sabha and 1805 candidates for State Assemblies but could only secure 12 seats in the former and 190 seats in the latter. Its performance in the second General Election was still worse, securing only 10 per cent of the total votes polled. These crippling setbacks have driven the party into a state of frustration, in which it has abandoned all restraints and entered into opportunistic alliances with the communists.

In many respects it is the same story with the socialist movements of South East Asian countries. In Burma, under the able leadership of U Ba Swe and U. Kyaw Nyein, socialist movement achieved hegemony in the AFPFL. But its later performance belied the expectations thus aroused. The communists, both red and white went into the jungles to fight a protracted civil war. The Burmese Socialists had the best opportunity at hand to mobilise the people and build up a socialist society. But the same tactical blunders of Indian socialists were repeated there, with the addition of corruption and jobbery, high lighted in the scandal, involving U Ko Gvi, the Socialist Minister of Commerce. It is a tragic reflection that its wrong policies finally led to the summoning of an army General to head the administration. Socialism did not fare any better either in Indonesia or Pakistan. In the former, internal dissensions and immature formulations of the socialists led the way for consolidation of communist movement. In the latter, the edifice of religio-political nationalism did not give any room for the growth of socialism.

Saul Rose's account of the failures and fumbings of socialists in one country after another in South East Asia is painful reading. It conjures up only a gloomy vision for the future. He does not analyse the causes of the debacle, but one can read them between the lines. It is documented with authentic information, and written without passion or prejudice. It however brings a sense of urgency to those who genuinely wish for the victory of democratic socialism as a proposition to save Asia from the menace of totalitarianism. The two Asian Socialist Conferences did make efforts to chalk out a plan for rehabilitating the movement, but the divergence of views and the clash on religious and communal questions which came to surface only created further cleavage.

Socialist movement in Asia has more varied and in some cases basically different problems than Western socialism. Western socialism was a product of Industrial Revolution. In Asia it originated in the struggle against colonialism. Again in the West the immediate objective is to achieve the equitable distribution of wealth whereas in Asia the problem is how to increase wealth in order to distribute it equitably. To these fundamental differences are added the problem of religion and the mass appeal of communism. To find solutions to all these is a formidable task, yet it is urgently needed if democratic socialism has to be the alternative to communism.

ADAM ADIL

KERALA UNDER COMMUNISM A Report

Prepared by the Research Staff of the
Democratic Research Service

Pages 176+viii Price Rs. 4

Available from:

POPULAR BOOK DEPOT
Lamington Road, Bombay 7.

(AN END TO APPEASEMENT—Continued from page 2)

were in arms against our own Government in Telen-gana. In that message, he said:

"Relying on the brave Communist Party of India India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators"—(that is Mr. Nehru)—and India, "like free China will one day emerge in the socialist and People's democratic family."

If that is not a blue-print of Chinese conquest of India, I do not know what it is and what more proof we want. Yet all these warnings were blatantly ignored by the Prime Minister who kept on telling the Indian people that there were 2000 years of Indo-Chinese friendship. I have never heard a bigger untruth. There has been neither friendship nor enmity between the Indian and the Chinese people because there was no contact. Somebody has rightly said that, by the same token, there has been unbroken friendship between the Indian and the Eskimo people for the last 2000 years because we never went to war! That is not friendship.

Lesson Learnt?

Lenin also gave us another warning. He said that "the road from Moscow to Paris lies through Shanghai and Calcutta". When Shanghai fell to Moscow, instead of welcoming the regime, instead of welcoming Russian expansion and instead of being its salesman in the United Nations and introducing it to the Bandung Club, we could have taken the lesson. We did all this without realising that Calcutta was the next. I say here again that one of the purposes of the present Chinese activities is that it has an eye on Calcutta and the fact that there was a demonstration there to which the Prime Minister referred this morning is not an accident.

I would never have gone into all these if there had been any evidence from the speech of the Prime Minister today that he has learnt his lesson. If I may say so, all the arrogance and the intolerance is still there. Instead of coming to the House and admitting that he has made a blunder, which is both Himalayan in its location and magnitude, he comes and starts throwing stones at others even before they open their mouths. It is time, therefore, we faced the question: Has the Prime Minister learnt the lesson? Judging from his speech this morning, I wish I could say that.

Anyway, on 21st October, the Prime Minister said at Calcutta that he did not think there was any "major idea" behind the Chinese incursions on our territory. Does this show any greater awareness as a result of the last nine years of harsh experience? If there is no major idea, what are the Chinese doing? What is it? Whims and fancies of Mr. Chou En-lai? Or is it like the British who occupied India in a fit of absence of mind that the Chinese want to occupy us in another fit of absence of mind? I do not care what it is, but one fit of absence of mind was enough for us. Along with Mr. Nehru, many of us here went

to prison in the Quit India movement and took part in many campaigns to end that fit of absence of mind by which Britain had conquered India. Are we, after ten years, to surrender our freedom to a more ruthless, more brutal gang of people?

May I now come to the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Chou En-lai? The Opposition amendment which has been moved by Acharya Kripalani and others, which we support, has already given the grounds why we are opposing the acceptance of the letter. But since this amendment was drafted, giving fresh thought to the matter, it appears to me that there is an even more important ground which was not mentioned in the amendment. There is a proposal for mutual withdrawal of forces and negotiations. Negotiations take place between two parties who have faith in each other's *bona fides*. They can only take place where one party believes that the other will carry out his word. Let us consider what is to happen in Akasai Chin. The Chinese are supposed to withdraw 100 miles and we about 20 or whatever it may be. How do we know that the Chinese will withdraw? How do we know that they will not break one more agreement like all the agreements they have broken in the past? Our own offer is: no patrols. We will not try to find out. How are we to find out? In this House the Prime Minister, about a week ago, was not in a position to tell us whether an air-field has or has not been built in that area. Many good reports are there that say that it has been built. Assuming he does not know, how is he going to know a month or two from now whether or not these people have withdrawn to the line he has demarcated? Suppose we withdraw and they do not. Are we then going to make ourselves a laughing stock for another time? Is the Chinese Communist Government a Government whose word is worth anything? Let us go back to history and our own experience. Let us forget Korea, Indo-China and all the rest.

Breach of Faith

In 1950, after assuring our ambassador and our Government that the Chinese forces would not enter Tibet, the Chinese forces entered Tibet. Our Government sent diplomatic notes of protest against that breach of faith. In 1959, Tibetan autonomy was violated although we were promised that it would be respected—a second breach of faith. The White Paper shows a consistent course of breach of faith of every one of the Five Principles of *Panchsheel*. Are we, after all this, going to accept the path of a diplomacy that starts by an assumption of the good faith of the Chinese Government? What kind of realism will that be? I am not saying that there should be no agreement with the Chinese Government, but an agreement with the Communist Government is worth anything only to the extent that you are able to enforce it by physical force. First occupy the line and then agree to the line. To agree to a line which you have not occupied will invite repeated breaches of

faith. Are you going to continue that illusion and continue with that faith which by now must be abandoned?

There are people who say—I think the hon. Defence Minister said at the United Nations—that the Chinese were stupid. I do not know. Perhaps we have been stupid in not understanding what they are about. The international communist movement has a very definite objective of world domination about which they make no bones at all. The domination of Tibet was the first step to the domination of India and the present activity is to get into a position from which the domination of India can commence.

Now, Mao is not, like our Prime Minister, a lover of peace. Let me quote one sentence from him—one pronouncement of Mao. He says: "Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun". That gun has come across the Himalayas. There is a Fifth Column in India ready to help those on the other side, and to link up with them is the first objective of the Chinese communists' presence on our frontiers and across the border. They want to occupy dominating heights from which they can threaten to invade this country, from which they can give moral aid and material aid and also arms to the guerilla forces fighting against our own Government.

Consider the contrast between Malaya on one side and Viet Nam on the other. Why is it that in Malaya the guerilla warfare conducted by the communists had been defeated after several years of fighting? Why is it that in North Viet Nam, we have a satellite Government of the Chinese communists and why is it that that country is divided? The one and the only reason that makes for the distinction is that there is a common frontier in the case of Viet Nam and there is no common frontier in the case of Malaya. After giving the Chinese on a platter a common frontier with ourselves by the betrayal of Tibetan freedom, now let us realise that any further encroachment, any occupation of points of vantage is a dagger planted at the heart of Indian security and that this is the first objective of the communist Chinese armies in what they are doing.

Psychological Warfare

There are other objectives: the destruction of the morale of the Indian armed forces. That is another objective. Slap the Indian armed forces and make them realise that they could not stop the Chinese and thus destroy their self-confidence in defending the country. That is by itself a moral and psychological victory for the Chinese and the Chinese know all about psychological warfare.

The third objective is the destruction of the morale of our small neighbours in the Himalayas: the Governments and the peoples of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. If these people find that we are not able to defend our own frontier, what faith are they going to place on our assurance that we will defend theirs? Even today you will find in the attitude of the Nepalese Government undertones which do not make us very

happy. Just as we have been neutral between different peoples, they are neutral between the Chinese and us. And we feel hurt. Have we any right to be hurt? If we are not able to defend our own soil, why should all the people of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim believe us when we say that we will go and defend theirs?

Finally, the Chinese attack on India is a beginning and an attempt at demoralising the countries of South and South-East Asia. Let me quote from a very valuable report from Professor Samar Guha of Calcutta, who is a member of the Praja Socialist Party, and who recently visited these countries. The report says:

"Prof. Guha has been frankly told by many highly placed leaders of these countries that they look upon the Himalayas as not the frontier of India only, but of the whole of the free and democratic Asia."

'Ship Without Compass'

It goes on to say that they do not understand why Shri Nehru is not defending this strategic frontier:

"A few very important leaders of the neutral countries felt compelled to compare, rather in a mood of dismay, the leadership of Shri Nehru to that of a captain of a ship without a compass".

Therefore, this is not a small matter. There is a very definite major thought behind it in spite of what the Prime Minister may say. This attack on our frontiers is one step in the Chinese communist attempt to dominate the whole of South and South-East Asia. They have chosen us, India, because, we are the strongest. When the strongest cannot fight, everyone else capitulates. They have also chosen us because for four years now we have encouraged their aggression by the pusillanimous and supine attitude which we have shown in not resisting their activities, a thing Acharya Kripalani has very well described.

I have not suggested anything now which is inconsistent with the policy of non-alignment. Let us remain non-aligned. But what does non-alignment mean? Acharya Kripalani quite rightly answered the charge of war-mongering. To defend your own territory is not to wage a war. I have never known of this suggestion before, that if you throw out bandits from your territory, you are engaged in an act of war! It is not an act of war. It is just police action in your own territory. Let us certainly abide by non-alignment. I do not for a moment suggest anything against it.

But by non-alignment, is it meant that we cannot repel any attack on our own territory? Is it non-alignment against ourselves also? Are we neutral against India? What is the meaning of non-alignment when we are being attacked by another power? Non-alignment certainly involves defence of one's own territory, if you like, by oneself.

Secondly, non-alignment does not mean that we cannot equip our forces adequately. Shri Nehru said many years ago in Washington that when aggression was there, "we can not and shall not be neutral". He

said: "We have to meet aggression and resist it; and the force employed must be adequate to the purpose". Can anyone who has read the White Paper say that at any moment in the last four years the force employed has been adequate to the purpose of defeating aggression? Every time, we were outnumbered and outmanoeuvred and captured and humiliated by superior detachments. So, equipping our army with arms obtained from other countries is completely consistent with non-alignment.

Acharya Kripalani rightly gave the example of Yugoslavia. I give two more examples—Sweden and Switzerland. Both these countries are neutral and non-aligned. But among the countries of western Europe, theirs are the biggest and the best-equipped land armies. Why? Because they realise that, since they are non-aligned, they will have to fight for their territories themselves.

Thirdly, non-alignment is not inconsistent with the capacity to recognise a dangerous neighbour. I know how, for nine years, a Government which lacked the character of a peace-loving and orderly Government has been glorified and made respectable in our own country and how we have received Mr. Chou En-lai, a man with blood on his hands, and held him up to our people as a lover of peace.

Non-alignment does not mean that we keep our own people in the dark.

Finally, non-alignment does not mean that when our people show some patriotism, the Prime Minister should advise otherwise; he has been scolding our people. Instead of leading them in a crusade, he has been attacking them instead of attacking the outside aggressor. The only crime that some of our people here have committed is that we have reacted more passionately, more emotionally if you like, or less responsibly if you like, than the Prime Minister. But is it fair that the biggest anger of the Prime Minister should be reserved not for those who are trespassing on our soil and killing our people, but for those who want to give more power to his elbow? I want to tell him that the country will be behind him and he can move faster in facing the enemy.

What People Want

There are three definite things our people want. I know that this House, and those who know, will in their bones feel that what I am saying is true. There are three things consistent with the policy of non-alignment. The great mass of the people demand the appointment of a Defence Minister in whom the armed forces and the country have confidence. Secondly, the need is for the construction of roads and air-fields, and the obtaining of equipment wherever it can be found to put our forces on a parity with the Chinese communist army. The third is, if the Chinese do not withdraw in the next few weeks, the third and final step is the removal of all restraints on our armed forces to do their duty of making them withdraw and ejecting from our territory those who have their feet on it and to see that the flag of India flies once again

on the Himalayas and not the flag of the "Chinese People's Liberation Army".

Many of us have worked together in the past. As Acharya Kripalani said, we may be a motley crowd today, but in a democracy we should be a motley crowd. We have pulled together during the great struggle for Independence in which we all participated. In 1942, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Acharya Kripalani and I and many others took part in the "Quit India" campaign to eject from this country the British who had been here for many years. If, today, the Prime Minister will start a 'Quit India' campaign against the Chinese, I can assure him that the whole country, barring the China Lobby, will be behind him.

*Speech delivered in the Lok Sabha on November 25, 1959
in the course of the debate on China.*

(COMMUNIST VULNERABILITY — from page 7)

uses today against all peoples, governments and institutions, could easily be turned by a determined opponent, in tune with our age and ready to use revolutionary strategy, into weapons in our hands.

We, not they, are today the advocates of genuine agrarian reform and the right of each man to till his own land. There is no country in the world more badly in need of agrarian reform than the USSR itself.

We, not they, are the champions of the rights and freedoms of working men, the freedom of movement, the freedom to change jobs, the freedom to build organizations of their own choosing under their own control, the right to elect their own officials, to formulate and negotiate their own demands, the right to strike, the right to vote for a party and a program and candidates of their own choice.

We, not they, are able to call the armies to "fraternize across the trenches," for it is they who must cut off their armies from the news of what is happening in the West, and we who must make our armies and theirs understand what is happening in their land.

We, not they, are the champions of the freedom of the human spirit, of the freedom of the arts and sciences, freedom of conscience, freedom of belief and worship, freedom from scarcity and want, and from the tyranny of irresponsible and omnipotent officials. Though in all these things the free world has its own imperfections and lapses, these are the things that the free world stands for and in good measure realizes, and these are the things which totalitarianism completely destroys and makes high treason even to think upon.

In the battle for the future shape of the world, all the creative and explosive weapons are in our hands if we have the wit and the understanding to take them up. If we do not, then there are no psychological or ideological vulnerabilities of communism. If we do, the communists are vulnerable on every front and at every moment and in every layer of their society. Whether the answer to this question is Yes or No will determine the outcome of the protracted war that is likely to occupy the rest of our lives and the rest of our century.

—Condensed from *The New Leader*

With Many Voices

Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world."

—Tennyson.

In the process of winning the Nehru Line, India stands in danger of losing the McMahon Line.

—*Indian Express*, November 19.

There is no meaning in discussing India's non-alignment between East and West any longer. It has automatically been terminated by the East.

—C. Rajagopalachari, *Hindu*, November 15

Is there a country in the world whose frontier has not been violated at some time or another?

—V. K. Krishna Menon, *Current*, November 25.

China has opened our eyes by attacking our territory.

—G. B. Pant, Minister for Home Affairs, *Hindustan Times*, November 23.

There is no room for non-alignment any longer. It would only be another name for preferring peace at any price.

—C. Rajagopalachari, *Hindu*, November 15

For 2,500 years, no Chinese had come across the Himalayas except to understand our country.

—V. K. Krishna Menon, *Current*, November 25.

The fact of our cultural relationship with all Asian countries, including China, should not be stressed much to create the belief that there was a traditional amity between China and India through the ages. On the contrary, the real history is that China has always been aggressive towards her neighbours whenever she had some power.

—Dr. Harekrishna Mahtab, Chief Minister, Orissa, *Indian Express*, November

The only vested interest in the country today is that of politicians in office and the bureaucrats and businessmen who hang on to the coat-tails of Government.

—M. R. Masani, M.P., *Times of India*, November

In fact, Nehru has adopted Marxism to the last nuclear epoch.

—R. K. Karanjia, *Blitz*, November

The Chinese communists are Chinese and the Russians are Russians, but I do not know if the Indian communists are Indians.

—Mrs. Indira Gandhi, *Indian Express*, November

In the event of an organised military operation against a communist country against India, it is very likely that the Indian communists would be on the side of our enemy.

—G. B. Pant, Minister for Home Affairs, *Indian Express*, November

Mr. Nehru has occasionally castigated communists but we have yet to hear Mr. Krishna Menon denounce them.

—*Indian Express*, November

The Delhi State Communist Party is reported to have decided not to hold any public meeting in the capital "in view of the people's mood" on the Himachal border troubles with China, according to a source close to the Party.

—News item in *Hindustan Times*, November

Surely, Nehru must appreciate the emergence of nationalist-socialists like Nambudiripad and Desai as his ideological colleagues.

—R. K. Karanjia, *Blitz*, November

ENCOUNTER

Literature • Arts • Politics

Editors: STEPHEN SPENDER & MELVIN J. LASKY

THE LEGEND OF KRISHNA
Marguerite Yourcenar

THE GERMANS AND THE ENGLISH
Terence Prithie

JACOB BURCKHARDT
C. V. Wedgwood

December 1959 **75** Annual Rs. 12

For members of the I.C.C.F. Rs. 10/-