

DECEMBER 1961

Non-Alignment Reconsidered

by S. Sharangpani

WITH a remarkable degree of unanimity, newspapers in India and abroad have characterised the Minister Nehru's recent visit to the United States as a success. There was, of course, no reason it should have been otherwise. India and the U.S. are two great countries in the world, have much in common. Both are wedded to democratic way of life and share in common many aspirations and ideals as basic to their way of life. Prime Minister Nehru and President Kennedy, besides, resemble each other in many respects; both have a philosophic bent of mind and, being serious students of world history, are inclined to view international problems from a wider perspective of human history. As such, there was no reason for the apprehension about the outcome of the Prime Minister's visit. The fact that the apprehension to this effect was widely felt, in India as well as in the U.S., and that it was in no way ordinary or exaggerated was the measure of the damage done to the goodwill and understanding between the two countries by the controversial utterances and intemperate behaviour of the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon.

As a non-aligned country, India's role in world affairs is always a difficult one and is often bound to please one or the other great powers. Differences of views between India and other democratic countries on various issues of cold war are inevitable in the present condition. They arise not so much out of fundamental differences in outlook, but because of differences in geographical and other factors which shape the policies of every country. These differences, though vital at times, can easily be understood and appreciated. But when utterances and behaviour of a loudspeaker spokesman of our country in international gatherings will be likely to give rise to doubts about the bona fides of our policy of non-alignment, there is a serious cause for concern. During the few weeks prior to Mr. Nehru's visit, it was precisely such misgivings about India's non-alignment and had caused deep hostility towards India in the U.S. and other Western countries. Mr.

Menon, by his perverse performance as the leader of the Indian delegation to the U.N., had totally distorted the image of India as a non-aligned country and had earned the invidious reputation for himself of being the spokesman of the communist camp on the issue of the unilateral resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union. The passionate zeal with which Mr. Menon tried to defend the Soviet Union on the issue and the twisted and tortuous logic he employed to equate the U.S. with the Soviet Union naturally evoked serious suspicions about India's motives and gave the gravest setback to the Indo-U.S. relations. Mr. Menon's performance was all the more annoying and irritating as the Kennedy administration, which has been very friendly and sympathetic to India from its inception, had publicly supported India's non-aligned attitude and the U.S. liberals were hoping that Mr. Nehru's visit would help the President to counter the increasing Republican criticism of Kennedy's friendly attitude to non-aligned countries, and especially India.

Thus on the eve of the Prime Minister's visit, the Indo-U.S. relations were unduly strained, thanks to Mr. Menon's knack of annoying people and irritating friends. In fact, Mr. Menon became the only problem between India and the U.S. and the question was naturally raised by many whether and how far he represented the Indian Government's policy. Mr. Nehru had thus a very delicate task to perform. He could not obviously repudiate his colleague, Mr. Menon, but he had to assuage the feelings of the Americans who were hurt by Mr. Menon's prejudiced utterances and to restore India's image as a really non-aligned country. It is to the Prime Minister's credit that he succeeded, to a remarkable degree, in this task and undid much of the damage done by the Defence Minister.

On the question of the unilateral resumption of nuclear tests, Mr. Nehru, unlike Mr. Menon, put the blame squarely on the Russians and expressed his understanding of the U.S. position on the issue. More important than this was Mr. Nehru's support to the right of "legitimate and necessary access to Berlin" and "importance of choices of the people directly concerned". There is now thus a basic agreement between India and the U.S. on the vital issue of Berlin. This was another significant gain for democracy achieved by Mr. Nehru's visit.

But far more important, and more significant in its implications, was Mr. Nehru's admission that the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe is nothing else but colonialism, though of a different type from the old

Goldwater
al" and sa
o would h
proposal. F
t be Russia

ptember 2

symbol. Th
o stand in

, October

it without
I still fe
but I can
has made
Christianity.
October 196

communis
to resist.
October 196

which ever
applying fo
chs. Beside
ne Assemb
stimated

amount
te organiz
Madras an
these State
early Rs.

plication fe
inued in th
o have bee
h the eme
" might nigh
until now.
ciated. But
loudspeake
will be ult
it is learn
are likely
's needs f
ed at 5.00
ptember

ratle Researc

form of colonialism. So far the Prime Minister had studiously refused to admit the fact of Soviet colonialism on one reason or other. Every time, whenever he was confronted with the question of Soviet colonialism, he had evaded the issue by giving various plausible explanations and reasons. But, in a televised interview with Mr. Stevenson in New York, Mr. Nehru agreed that the people in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe should be given an opportunity for self-determination. He further said that the Soviet domination was "not colonialism of the old style, but it is different," and added that "it sometimes is even worse from the human point of view than the other." This admission, coming as it did from Mr. Nehru, is significant and reveals the measure of disenchantment of the Prime Minister with the so-called "progressive" professions of the communist bloc. It, besides, restores one more missing element in our non-alignment to make it more balanced in its judgment. So far, the refusal of the Prime Minister and other non-aligned leaders to admit the fact of Soviet colonialism had tended to make our anti-colonialist professions rather one-sided and distorted. Now that Mr. Nehru has spoken out the truth and given a bold lead, it should not be difficult for other neutral leaders to shed their blinkers and call the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and elsewhere for what it is.

But to make our policy of non-alignment really non-aligned and consistent, Mr. Nehru will have to draw logical conclusions from his own admission, which he still seems reluctant to do. The Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe is not an isolated phenomenon, or a momentary aberration of the Soviet foreign policy. It stems directly from the basic expansionist goals of the international communist movement, with its headquarters in Moscow, which is bent upon enslaving the whole world. In fact, the cold war is the inevitable and direct result of the expansionist aim of the communist movement. No country can, therefore, remain aloof from it, howsoever keenly it may so desire. The task of the non-aligned nations is therefore to realise this fundamental fact of inter-national situation and adjust their policies accordingly. Instead of hypocritically decrying the so-called cold-war mentality, it would be better if the non-aligned nations face the fact of the cold war in a realistic manner and shape their non-alignment in the light of this fact. To accept this is not to give up non-alignment, but to give up the double-standard of value judgment which has so far vitiated the policies of most of the neutral countries. It is, no doubt, in India's interest not to align herself with any of the existing military blocs. India, in that sense, is and should remain an uncommitted country. But as a democracy, it is in India's interest to see that the communist movement does not succeed in subjugating the whole world. Thus ideologically, though not militarily, India is committed to the democratic or free world with all its imperfections. Prime Minister Nehru expressed the same view when he said in the U.S. that he would not like India or South-East Asia to go communist. Thus the basic aims

of the foreign policies of both the countries are the same; only their methods for achieving those objectives are different. This is but natural as there is a difference between India and the U.S. in their background, geography and the stages of economic development. Or as Mr. Nehru put it, "The President and I found a great deal of common ground. Perhaps where it was not common ground, it was not so much of opposing viewpoints as different aspects of the same thing."

Thus the Prime Minister has returned from his U.S. visit with this refreshing discovery which should help to strengthen the already existing bonds of friendship and understanding between the two great democracies of the world. But to help this process, it is necessary that India should have, as its spokesman abroad, a person who is temperamentally more suited for the job and whose ideological affiliations are beyond doubt. Mr. Krishna Menon is utterly devoid of both these qualifications and that is why he always succeeds in misrepresenting India's policy and distorting India's image in international gatherings. The sooner the Prime Minister realises this, the better it is for the country.

PANDIT NEHRU & KRISHNA MENON

No less serious is the position which Mr. Menon took (in the U.N. General Assembly) on the eight-Power resolution against the explosion of the 50-megaton bomb by the Soviet Union. He had left explicit instructions to the Indian delegation to oppose the resolution. When he went home, the delegation had doubts about the advisability of Mr. Menon's stand.

The acting leader of the delegation, Mr. Chakravarty, made inquiries from the Government of India. Mr. Nehru reversed Mr. Menon's instructions and asked the delegation to support the resolution. But for this timely change, India's position in Western eyes would have been greatly affected.

Before leaving New York, Mr. Nehru had an animated discussion with Mr. Menon.

Mr. Menon feels that Mr. Nehru has receded under pressure on a number of issues. The upshot of it all, however, is that Mr. Menon will henceforth have to work under a stricter discipline than before so that the gain made by Mr. Nehru's visit is not easily lost.

—H.R. Vora, New York correspondent,
Times of India, October 14, 1961

De-Stalinisation Versus Communism

by Adam Adil

IN his speech on the opening day of the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Mr. Khrushchev spoke brave words: "As a mighty tree with deep roots does not fear any storm, so that new socialist world does not fear any adversary or shock." From what followed at the Congress itself and subsequently, one can safely conclude that Mr. Khrushchev's assertion was more in the nature of wishful thinking than a statement of fact. For the first time in its history the communist world has begun to show up, more pointedly and more abjectly, its internal contradictions, its political and psychological stresses, clash of its personalities and their mutual rivalries and bickerings. It is obvious that the "socialist" world is no longer a mighty tree (if ever it was) with deep roots and it has to contend with its own problems as much as with the external ones.

The de-Stalinisation process which Mr. Khrushchev set in motion with his speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and his world shocking admissions about the Stalin regime, (those were no revelations as they were known throughout the world for a number of years), has been apparently going on still; and this itself has divided the communist world into two hostile camps: one represented by the Soviet Union, which decries Stalin and talks about "co-existence" and the other by China, which extols Stalin and speaks about the inevitability of war between capitalist and socialist nations with the ultimate destruction of capitalism. Russia enjoys the support of most East European Communist countries and China has the backing of Albania, the tiny Muslim country on the Mediterranean. The communist parties in the various non-communist countries are generally divided into factions, which owe their loyalties to one or the other camp within the communist world. All this indicates that what was claimed to be the 'monolithic unity' of the communist world has received a shattering blow.

The removal of Stalin's mummified body from Lenin's Mausoleum in the Red Square and its burial at an obscure place, and the changing of the names of the cities, towns or streets which were, for over two decades called after Stalin, represents the dramatic finale of the efforts of the present Communist rulers of Russia to extricate themselves from their past and put on a new garb of legitimate successors of Lenin. Is it not a fact that each one of the present leaders of the Soviet Union was closely associated with Stalin's regime and abetted and helped in the imposition of a reign of terror and death over the Russian people for nearly three decades? It is rather intriguing that none of these Soviet leaders has given expression to a sense of guilt or repentance

for his own role in the perpetuation of Stalinist tyranny and in the cold murder of thousands of their own innocent comrades.

In the context of the recent events in the Soviet Union, certain pertinent questions could be asked: does de-Stalinisation suggest the emergence of spirit of liberalism and tolerance in the Soviet Union; does it mean that democracy is slowly yet irresistibly taking roots in the nerve-centre of the communist world, does it signify that Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues would really liquidate the personality cult and build up collective leadership based on, as it is claimed, the Marxist-Leninist principles?

An objective assessment of the internal situation in Russia at the present moment would compel one to answer these questions in the negative. To see a shift towards liberalisation and democratisation in Mr. Khrushchev's pronouncements would amount to a betrayal of ignorance with regard to the nature, theory and practice of communism and hence to a confusion of issues involved in communist strategy.

It is true that the present regime in Russia is not as harsh and crude as it was under Stalin and the heads of those who were denounced as the "leaders of the anti-party group" have not rolled as it would have happened under Stalin's supremacy. (The leaders of the anti-Party group were, however, publicly humiliated and disgraced in Stalinist fashion, all the same!) But this fact, in no way, warrants the belief assiduously spread by the communists, their apologists and fellow-travellers, that Stalinism has given place to liberalism, intra-party democracy, collective leadership and genuine comradely feelings amongst the communist party members and Russian people. What has actively happened is that while retaining the basic apparatus of Stalinism both on party and state levels as well as its philosophical and ideological foundation, Mr. Khrushchev has, sought to remove Stalin's name only.

In other words, Stalinism remains while Stalin is knocked out! This fact is amply substantiated by a number of instances which have happened since Mr. Khrushchev took over. Notable, indeed, is the Pasternak affair and the fate his associates met. Also, the lavish eulogies which Mr. Khrushchev receives in right Stalinist fashion also points to the same fact.

Stalinism cannot be eradicated unless the philosophical and ideological foundations of the Bolshevik revolution, in other words Marxism-Leninism, is itself repudiated. Stalinism was only the logical extension of Marxism-Leninism.

It is true that Marxism arose as a moral protest against the degradation of human beings brought about by the feudal-capitalist society of the early 19th

century. Its moral essence also lay in its concept of a society as an association in which "free development of each is a condition for the free development of all", "a society in which the full and free development of every individual became the ruling process"..... and a society which would offer "from each according to his ability to each according to his needs." But, as a philosophy of political action, Marxism is ambiguous. And because of this ambiguity, a fatal contradiction exists between Marx's ethical aims and values on which is based his vision of good society and the historical process by which, he thought, they would be realised. In Soviet Russia, the historical process was to a great extent worked out as Marx predicted it would. But the main reason why Marxism reached its tragic fate at the hands of the Bolsheviks, culminating in Stalinism, is the fundamental dichotomy between Marx as a moralist and Marxism as a guide to political action. Marx himself made the process significant rather than the values. Stressing the fallacious concept of class struggle, forcible overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the landmarks of his historical process Marx paved the way for the rise of Bolshevism and its ultimate perversion into Stalinism as the logical extension of Marxism.

Lenin only modified the Marxist concept of proletarian dictatorship into the dictatorship of the Communist Party and Stalin developed Leninist norms into totalitarianism of one party state. Lenin in his struggle for power, made the forcible seizure of power the fundamental aim of Bolshevik activity. He developed, in accordance with that aim, the concept of "professional revolutionaries" and the Communist Party as the vanguard of the proletariat, thus, arrogating to a small determined minority the right to rule in the name of the proletariat. The Marxist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was thus transferred into that of the dictatorship for and over the proletariat.

The main ideological weapons in the Bolshevik arsenal were, thus, the concepts of relentless class struggle, forcible seizure of power and the establishment of the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The natural result was that the idea of power became the fundamental basis of Leninism. The revolution, to Lenin, was nothing but a way to power. The use of force or violence for achieving these ideals and perpetuating the power of the party thereafter was not the question of tactics with Lenin. Leninism mainly relied on force and violence as a matter of principle, rather than tactics. Marx had proclaimed violence to be the midwife of history and Lenin prophesied that the coming dictatorship of the proletariat would be "power won and maintained by violence of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie." Thus terrorism and violence were integral parts of their ideological basis.

From Leninism to Stalinism was a step further. Even during Lenin's time the dictatorship of the Communist Party had become, to all intents and purposes,

the dictatorship of one leader: Lenin. The Central Committee was drained of all its real power and it became just a rubber stamp to approve Lenin's decision. Stalin with his peculiar savagery and ruthless mentality manoeuvred his way to absolute power, using all the terrorist apparatus of the state apparatus which Lenin had built — to destroy his opposition. Stalin, thus, only brought the monolithic logic of totalitarian power, initiated by Lenin, to its bloody conclusion. But for Leninism, Stalin would not become the phenomenon he turned out to be.

The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that so long as the idea of power and the state under communism is the highest value in itself, communism will always tend to degenerate into Stalinism. Stalinism can be eradicated only through the repudiation of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. If Mr. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders are not prepared to do this, they are only pretending to be other than Stalinists.

KHRUSHCHEV ON STALIN—IN 1949

The current anti-Stalinist campaign led by Premier Khrushchev has resulted in the removal of Stalin's body from its public resting place next to Lenin to a grave beside the Kremlin wall. This represents a complete reversal of the sentiments expressed by the Soviet Premier when the late dictator ruled. What follows are excerpts from an article written by Mr. Khrushchev in 1949:

"All the peoples of the Soviet Union * * * are observing a precious occasion, the 70th birthday of our genius, leader and teacher, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Millions * * * turn to Comrade Stalin * * * because he enriched Marxist-Leninist theory and raised it to a new and higher level.

"Comrade Stalin, the genius leader * * * of our party * * * rallied the peoples of our country and led them to the triumph of socialism * * *. Stalin stood at the cradle of each Soviet republic, protected it * * * and paternally helped it to grow and flourish. * * * This is why all the peoples of our country, with extraordinary warmth and filial love, call the great Stalin their dear father * * * and genius teacher.

"Today the peoples of the great Soviet Union and all advanced progressive mankind wholeheartedly greet our dear Comrade Stalin, inspirer of the indissoluble friendship of peoples.

"Glory to our dear father, * * * the genius leading the party, the Soviet people, and the working people of the whole world, Comrade Stalin!"

Hitler And Khrushchev

by G. F. Hudson

A STUDENT of modern history reading the recent notes and discourses of Nikita Khrushchev on peace and disarmament must frequently have the feeling that he has heard it all before. Nor will it be difficult for him to recall when and where. Reference to the speeches of Adolf Hitler in the period before he plunged the world into war reveals striking similarities of tactical method, rhetorical appeal and even phrasing.

Hitler's proposals for world peace and disarmament are almost forgotten today. The historical image of Hitler as the maker of war has made all his earlier reassurances seem empty and futile. But they were taken seriously enough at the time in the Western democracies, not only by the popular press but also in official circles and by leaders of serious political opinion. Those who, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, clung to the belief that Hitler was really a man of peace and good will, with whom it was possible to reach a reasonable settlement, took up every favourable hint in his speeches as a promise on which a new world could be built; the general public awaited the speeches as events of far greater importance than anything that Germany under Hitler was actually doing.

Hitler himself instinctively understood this worldwide longing for peace and craving for words of hope. He knew only too well how to exploit it in his pursuit of a policy designed to gain for Germany a position of military superiority that would enable him to impose his will internationally. The circumstances were indeed different from those of 1961 in that Germany was rearming in defiance of the unilateral disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, whereas there have never been any restrictions on the right of the Soviet Union as a sovereign power to arm as much as it pleases. Nevertheless, there is a similarity between the two situations: Hitler did not seek merely to regain for Germany equal rights with other states to military conscription and arms of all categories; he sought to obtain a lead over the Western democracies by playing on their hopes of a disarmament treaty and thus delaying their rearmament until it was too late for them to catch up for a long time. In the same way, Soviet peace propaganda is certainly aimed at causing the West to reduce its armaments or abandon certain strategic positions without imposing in practice any parallel restrictions on Soviet power.

When Hitler came to power in 1933, the hopes of the world were set on the Disarmament Conference then meeting in Geneva. On May 16, President Roosevelt urged the total abolition of "offensive weapons," defined as bomber aircraft, heavy artillery and tanks. In his speech to the Reichstag the next day,

Hitler put himself forward as a rival champion of peace and disarmament. Germany, he said, "is ready to renounce all offensive weapons if the armed nations on their side will destroy all offensive weapons."

But in the autumn, on the pretext that the French were demanding a transition period of eight years before Germany should have complete equality of armament rights, Hitler abruptly withdrew the German delegation from the Disarmament Conference and announced his country's resignation from the League of Nations.

Hopes persisted that Hitler would be satisfied with a token demonstration of independent rearmament and would ultimately agree to arms limitation. As long as such hopes remained, no influential political leader in Britain or France was ready to advocate large increases in his country's war-making capacity, which would have to be scrapped if a disarmament treaty was finally obtained. Thus Hitler gained valuable time, for he alone knew that there was not going to be any disarmament.

Hitler, however, continued to talk peace. When he took the decisive step in repudiation of the Versailles Treaty by decreeing the restoration of military conscription in Germany, he simultaneously made a speech to the Reichstag so full of admirably pacific sentiments that it won golden opinions in the press of the countries which would have to fight Germany four years later. Hitler said that his racial theory excluded any wish to subdue or dominate any non-German peoples, for incorporation of ethnic strangers in a national state could only weaken it; that he finally renounced all claim to Alsace-Lorraine and "solemnly recognized and guaranteed" the frontiers of France; that he would "adhere unconditionally" to the non-aggression pact which he had concluded with Poland; that he would not interfere in any way in the internal affairs of Austria or try to annex it; that he was ready to join in an agreement for limitation or abolition of all heavy arms "specially suited for aggression."

A little later, when Hitler violated the Treaty of Locarno by marching his troops into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, he again asserted that, although Germany was determined to "restore the honour of her people," she would now strive "more than ever" for "an understanding between the European peoples." "We have no territorial demands to make in Europe," he declared to the Reichstag. "Germany will never break the peace."

Two years later, when he had seized Austria and worked up the crisis with Czechoslovakia to the brink of war, he told Neville Chamberlain that his claim to the Sudetenland was his "last territorial demand in Europe." So convinced was the British Prime Minister

that Hitler was at last satisfied that he told those who came to meet him on his return to London, "Yes, it is peace in our time."

Hitler's method was simple in essentials, though varied and ingenious in its application. After every repudiation of an agreement he offered fresh guarantees, and every demand was to be positively his last. How successful this policy was is revealed by any study of what was called "appeasement" in the period before World War II. When Hitler made his appeal for peace after proclaiming the restoration of military conscription in Germany, the *London Times* commented editorially: "It is to be hoped that the speech will be taken everywhere as a sincere and well-considered utterance meaning precisely what it says."

Hitler is long since dead, but if his ghost still walks the streets of Berlin, he must recognise that he has a worthy successor. He must certainly see in Khrushchev's conduct of Soviet foreign policy over the last three years a performance worthy of his admiration.

The Soviet campaign for peaceful coexistence and total disarmament has indeed been an improvement technically speaking, on Hitler's projection of himself as the champion of peace among nations. The Soviet Union "struggles" for peace and strives to deliver mankind from the curse of war by complete universal abolition of armaments of every kind. The Western powers are thrown on the defensive when they insist on asking what guarantees there would be that such a plan would be honestly carried out by all concerned if it were to be adopted.

Such queries, according to Soviet propaganda, merely slander Russia's magnificent intentions and reveal the vested interests of monopoly capitalism in the production of arms, and of imperialism in the use of war as an instrument of policy. If, however, the peoples of the West attach so much importance to inspection and control in a disarmament treaty, then the Soviet Union is prepared to make concessions to this prejudice and will call for "universal disarmament under strict inspection." But when Western negotiators try to get down to details of the proposed supervision it develops that all real inspection is espionage, that there must be agreement on disarmament before there is any control machinery, and that in any case

the Communist states must have in one way or another a veto on any inspection of themselves.

Still, Khrushchev presents himself as the man of peace. In the very midst of the crisis he has deliberately created, he tries to kindle hopes of an era of relaxations and good will which will follow if only this one difficulty can be surmounted. If his demands are met, the freedom of West Berlin will be safeguarded by guarantees which will somehow be more binding than the agreements he has repudiated. Moreover, the case of Berlin is held to be unique, and if it can only be got out of the way, there will be nothing else to obstruct the attainment of that happy harmony among nations which is so dear to his heart. In his own words: "Let us seek seriously in good faith a solution to the question of concluding a German peace treaty, so as to arrest in good time the sliding of states into the inferno of a rocket-nuclear war. Then everything will fall into place again. There will not only be no nuclear tests but not even a threat of nuclear war."

The promise of a golden future is thus held out to the nations of the West if they will only yield on Berlin. Just as Hitler would have no more demands to make if he were only given his way over Czechoslovakia, so Khrushchev will never trouble the world again if he is only given what he wants in Berlin. "Everything will fall into place again," and there will be perpetual sunshine after the darkness of the storm. But the Western democracies will convict themselves of incorrigible folly if they believe that. If the West capitulates in Berlin, Khrushchev will only be encouraged to further aggressions. If the West can be intimidated now by nuclear blackmail, why should it not be used again and again to impose Moscow's will on the "hostage" nations of Europe and ultimately on the United States as well? We know what happens at the end of that road. War comes in the year after Munich.

—Condensed from *The New Leader*, New York

INDIAN TRADE UNIONS

A SURVEY by V. B. Karnik

A survey of the trade union movement in India during the last forty years.

Price Rs 15.

PUBLISHERS

LABOUR EDUCATION SERVICE

127, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay 1.

ENCOUNTER

Literature • Arts • Politics

Editors: STEPHEN SPENDER & MELVIN J. LASKY

ENCOUNTER is easily available in India—and at a price (Re. 1/- per copy) well within the reach of anyone's pocket. The sole wholesale distributors for India (except Delhi & Calcutta) are FOUR OCEANS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LTD., 412 Mirabelle Hotel Chambers, 33 Marine Lines, Bombay 1.

Annual Subscription Rs 12

For members of the I.C.C.F. Rs. 10/-

The National Bourgeoisie Under Attack

by M. A. Venkata Rao

IT is of course classical communist doctrine that the bourgeoisie should be displaced by the proletariat as the governing class if the era of capitalist exploitation is to be terminated and the new era of communist "earthly paradise" is to be inaugurated. And so we find the entire set-up of bourgeoisie institutions in Russia—banks, factories, transport and so on were nationalised at one fell stroke in the October Revolution of 1917. The peasants in the countryside led by the returning soldiers of the defeated Czarist armies relieved the large landholders of their holdings and distributed them among themselves which was duly confirmed by Lenin.

But finding that the revolution led to economic chaos, Lenin had the courage and commonsense to effect a return in his New Economic Policy to partial restoration of private capital leadership.

And when Soviet armies streamed into East European States displacing the occupation regimes of the Nazis after the German collapse of 1945, Soviet administrators found that it was expedient for a time to follow the NEP principle and permit the continuance of the bourgeoisie in key positions in the national economy. Moreover, a pretence of democratic forms had to be kept up owing to the promise that Stalin had given to the West in the Potsdam and Berlin treaties.

A distinction was made between the international bourgeoisie (or that part of the commercial and industrial class that cooperated with the occupying Nazi imperialists) and the national bourgeoisie, the smaller capitalists, shop keepers, small-holders in land and so on. The former fled the country on the approach of Soviet forces and those who remained or were caught were liquidated as the enemies of the people.

Communist ideologists found a place for this temporary and tactical tolerance of the middle capitalist class or national bourgeoisie (or national capitalism) under the name of People's Democracy. It was a half-way house on the road to full proletariat democracy or dictatorship of the proletariat under the guidance of the advance guard of the communist party. The communist party in East European States—Hungary, Czechoslovakia and others—was in a minority. Liberal and agriculturists' parties held the centre of the political stage and commanded majorities.

The national bourgeoisie was recognised to have revolutionary significance since they too were opposed to imperialist exploitation and cooperated with communists in getting rid of foreign rule. But it was premised also that the national bourgeoisie, being bourgeois, that is, a class living by the use of private capital and the consequent exploitation of labour in

industry and agriculture had divided aims and were not totally reliable as allies of communism and the proletariat.

Communist doctrine therefore envisaged only a *transitional toleration* of the national bourgeoisie during their usefulness in holding the stage pending the readiness of the proletariat to take over in full the economy and direction of the country in all spheres.

Hence we find the period 1945 to 1948 occupied by the Soviets in effecting a transition from bourgeois democracy under coalition governments with communist ministers in a minority status to full proletarian democracy or dictatorship through a process of liquidation of bourgeois elements through force and fraud, faked popular risings and secret police action.

Then followed full nationalisation of the economy and forced collective farms in agriculture.

A similar pattern of People's Democracy has been deliberately followed by Mao Tse Tung in China since 1949.

Mao Tse Tung laid down the lines of his New Democracy as a tactical measure the essence of which is a coalition of existing right and centre parties with the party of the proletariat under the lead of the advance guard.

Membership in the governing councils of the New Government was accorded to leaders of collaborating parties but without the reality of power. International bourgeoisie, what Mao calls the comprador class, i.e. elements who lived by facilitating foreign capitalists as agents and suppliers and salesmen to them, disappeared with Chiang Kai Shek.

The national bourgeoisie, middle capitalists in industry and urban commerce and transport, were allowed to remain for a time. Meanwhile agriculture was "cooperativised" over the immense Chinese countryside after liquidating (with exemplary revolutionary zeal and unparalleled cruelty and class war) the feudal elements or big landlords who lived solely by ownership without working on land themselves.

The other classes, rich peasants, middle peasants and small peasants were herded into "cooperatives" by stages until no individual holders were left.

In 1956 the national bourgeoisie were taken into partnership with the State and were given places as agents of their own concerns.

And later communes displaced cooperatives in the countryside.

In India, Soviet ideology began with a condemnation of the Gandhian movement of national liberation as only "reactionary and pro-imperialist and pro-feudalist" and in 1948 accordingly word was given to the CPI to start a frontal violent attack on the

(Continued on page 11)

Nation Against Aggression

The following are excerpts from editorial comments that appeared in leading Indian dailies on the question of the recent Chinese aggression in Ladakh.

"Not an Inch"

It is perhaps something to be thankful for that New Delhi is apparently maintaining a precise account of all that the Chinese have been doing on Indian territory. Such documentation will no doubt be useful one day when the historian will be thankful for the meticulous detail with which we have been informed that the Chinese invaders wore uniforms that were sometimes blue and occasionally khaki. Meanwhile, the unpalatable and brutal fact is that an additional 2,000 square miles in Ladakh have been occupied and consolidated by the Chinese communists. This is a fact which cannot be evaded or minimised away by referring to Chinese aggression as "misbehaviour", or by acknowledging that the territory involved is so extensive that "every inch cannot always be surveyed." If appropriate vigilance in this critical area cannot be maintained, why did Government spokesmen repeatedly assure the people of this country that "not an inch" of Indian territory would be surrendered to the Chinese?

The point is not that New Delhi has failed to prevent such incursions but that its entire attitude is evasive, complacent, ridiculously secretive and totally ineffective. Why must New Delhi persist in describing Chinese aggression as "misbehaviour" and invoke the so-called five principles when it has been apparent for everyone to see that Peking is not in the slightest degree interested either in these principles or in maintaining even the semblance of friendly relations?

The loss of further territory is the upshot of a policy that has persistently played down the border question, allowed the Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry to seek an interview in Peking when he was plainly not wanted, and prevented the re-occupation of Longju when this post was evacuated by the Chinese. Moreover, the so-called Nehru-Chou agreement which Peking itself has regarded with the utmost disdain can now be seen for what it is even by those who refused earlier to regard it as an obvious piece of duplicity.

—*Times of India*, November 22.

A Shocking State of Affairs

Throughout the summer, Indian newspapers have carried fugitive items on such Chinese activities from all manner of outlandish sources. They were not always reliable sources and newspapers took some risks in publishing them. But they took the risks primarily because they distrusted the Government's willingness to keep the country informed. In the result they have

been fully justified. The extent of Chinese military activity on our borders as now revealed is far worse than has been suggested by the wildest of the newspaper report — reports which were consistently denied as being without foundation by Government spokesmen.

As late as the night of Sunday last, the official spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry was pleading complete ignorance of new Chinese incursions into Ladakh in reply to pointed queries from the *Hindustan Times*. We preferred to disbelieve him and ran a cautious account in Monday morning's paper based on a source we assumed to be more creditworthy than the External Affairs Ministry. A few hours later Parliament met and the truth was out.

One might have thought that this Government had learnt its lesson after its sorry plight for keeping the country in the dark for years while the Chinese overran thousands of square miles of Indian territory. Obviously, it still needs to be reminded that it has a thoroughly dishonourable record in this matter which, in all conscience, it ought to be at pains to live down.

There has always been strong suspicion that our troops on the northern front are under orders not to open fire except in self-defence. The country must be told if this is true. Of course, it cannot be if our energetic Defence Minister, Mr. Krishna Menon, has stated, as he is quoted to have done by Mr. Asoka Metha in Parliament, that the Chinese would not be allowed to take one more inch of our territory. But doubts persist, principally because, as the Prime Minister has reminded us, Mr. Menon is a perpetual victim of misquotation. Indeed, there is such an extensive conspiracy to misrepresent Mr. Menon that we must also allow, it seems to me, for Mr. Menon's orders being misquoted by the commanders in the forward areas.

But whether the absence of resistance to Chinese inroads is a matter of policy or is just one more cross that the much misunderstood Mr. Menon has to bear, what we must give serious thought to is the kind of conclusion that our percipient friends in Peking must draw from our behaviour.

And, as if we have some fear that the right conclusion may elude them in Peking, our note tells China that we still consider ourselves "a neighbour bound to her by the Five Principles of Co-existence."

Appeasement could, perhaps, go further, but could fatuity? Throughout the seven years of this meaningless vapid Panchsheel treaty's life China has responded towards us with nothing but treachery and menace and we have let ourselves be paralysed in the defence of our national interests and self-respect rather than face the reality of the complete failure of our policy.

—*Hindustan Times*, November 22, 1961

Chinese Menace

What is the sense in claiming that a certain area is Indian territory when the Government has apparently neither the means nor the will to control this territory and safeguard it against aggression? If the territories involved are vast and inaccessible, as the Government claims, the impediments must be applicable to the Chinese as much as to India. If the Chinese are able to overcome these impediments, cut roads and establish communications and check posts in these areas under the very nose of the Indian Army, all that it means is that our defences are inefficient, our engineering is non-existent and that we do not have the means of guarding our territories while the Chinese have superior military and engineering skill. This unpalatable fact should have made any government alive to its responsibilities to undertake fresh thinking regarding the country's defence potential and mobilise all its resources to meet and halt aggression. The Government has palpably failed in its primary duty of defending the country's borders. Whatever excuse it might have had when it was caught unaware by Chinese intruders in the early stages of this sorry episode, it can have none today five years after the aggression was first committed and three years after the fact was made known to the public. While India bleeds, the Indian Army defends the integrity of the Congo! These are aspects of a policy whose failure is now self-evident.

It is time that New Delhi realised that words are of no avail against the Chinese and that action is called for. What action does the Government propose to take to meet the Chinese menace? A Government that has failed in its elementary duty of protecting the integrity of the nation does not deserve to remain in office. Governments have resigned for less reason than the inability to defend a country against aggression. What explanation does the Government have for clinging to office when it is so demonstrably unequal to the primary tasks of Government?

—*Free Press Journal*, November 22.

Two Voices

Emerging from his half-hour interview with President Kennedy, Mr. Krishna Menon answering a correspondent's question on the relations between India and China airily observed. "Well, there are differences between us. There are Chinese elements on part of our territory. There is no active hostility." Speaking the day before at the U.N. on the continued Portuguese presence in Goa, Mr. Menon recalled his previous statement that as a state India has not abjured the use of force. "If aggression continues", he declared, "if our people are shot in cold blood, if there is no civil liberty and if the peace and security of our land as a whole are being endangered by the continuance of conquest of our territory, no

one has the right under the Charter, law, morality, ethics or the law of international behaviour to question our right to complete the liberation of our entire territory."

Mr. Menon is resoundingly right in his attitude to the Portuguese in Goa. But why is he, to put it mildly, less forthright in his attitude to the Chinese who militarily and politically constitute a far greater threat and menace to India? In terms of territory the Portuguese possessions including Goa, Diu and Damaun comprise under 2,000 square miles as against the 14,000 square miles of our territory which the Chinese now occupy. Moreover, we share with the Chinese more than 2,000 miles of a common frontier which we once thought was invulnerable behind the screen of the Himalayas. Politically, the Chinese by reason of their proximity, their urge for expansionism and their role as the chief Communist crusader in Asia pose a far more formidable threat than the Portuguese who, however reprehensible Salazar's political beliefs and methods, represent a mere pimple on the face of India.

This tenderness for his communist friends in and outside India is Mr. Menon's most disquieting dangerous characteristic in his capacity as Defence Minister. In no other democratic country could a man of his known political proclivities be trusted with the defence of a country in close propinquity with an expansionist communist regime whose aggression he describes as incursion and towards whom he protests there is no active hostility. This observation made in the known context of Peking's latest infiltration into Indian territory, is inexcusable and intolerable. Mr. Nehru has every right as an individual to cultivate and cherish the personal friendship of whomsoever he may choose but he has no right as Prime Minister to mortgage the country's safety to a man who has proved demonstrably unworthy of such trust.

—*Indian Express*, November 22.

Protests to Peking

There seems to be no end to the number of maps the Chinese can produce to support their audacious and ever expanding claims. More important, they apparently follow their claims with military moves, including the establishment of check-posts on territory earlier recognized as Indian while India appears to send only pained protests to Peking where the documents receive little evident attention. On Monday, Mr. Nehru did indeed refer to India's "diplomatic and military moves", and it is possible that in the forthcoming debate he will have some details to add, though perhaps not many. The hope must have been abandoned long since that China will in the foreseeable future materially reverse her policy towards this country. All indications are that any concession

(Continued on page 11)

Without Comment

THE SOVIET CONSUMER

The average Soviet consumer knows that Khrushchev's public emphasis on consumer output has resulted in an improvement in his lot. But he knows too that it is considerably easier for the Kremlin to tell him that he has to wait another year for that television set than to tell the Red Army that it has to wait another day for that new rocket. He lives in an economy of diminishing scarcity, but an economy of scarcity nonetheless.

Until recently, the daily life of the Soviet consumer was a dark mystery. Statistics on family budgets were almost as top secret as formulas for rocket fuels. Although Soviet economists still do not publish comprehensive statistics about consumers, they have in recent years released a few "average" budgets.

The Bochkov family, says *Izvestia*, the Soviet Government newspaper, is "typical." Mr. Bochkov is married and has three children, one still at school and two who work. His wife does not work. (This is not typical; the social category of housewife is an enviable one.) The three breadwinners earn 280 rubles (\$310.80) a month. Mr. Bochkov, an experienced bricklayer, earns 162 rubles (\$179.82), including incentive bonuses and overtime; Mr. Bochkov Jr., an apprentice crane operator, 50 rubles (\$55.50); Miss Bochkov, a typist, 68 rubles (\$75.48).

If the Bochkovs are really "typical," then Mrs. Bochkov does not have a refrigerator. Only 529,000 were produced last year, and official Soviet statistics indicate that there are only about 2,000,000 in the country. For the housewife, this means a daily shopping trek. She buys what she finds, and her menu is determined by what she brings back to her kitchen.

The lines have become shorter of late, but they still exist—principally, because of an awkward marketing procedure which requires the shopper to wait on three different lines after she gets inside the store: one, at the food counter to check the price of, say, milk, butter or sausages; next, at the cashier's booth to pay for a ticket specifying the exact price of the item she plans to buy; and, finally, back at the food counter to exchange the ticket for the purchase.

The waiting list is a way of life for the Soviet Union's 218,000,000 consumers. Even the elite must wait—as much as seven years for a car; a year for a television set; six months for an appointment with a private tailor.

In Russia, the allocation of new apartments is a Government monopoly. Every year each local housing commission and factory is given a certain number of new apartments to distribute. Need is not the only criterion; the applicant's "contribution to society" is considered, too. This loosely defined term has allowed

a certain amount of corruption to influence the allocation of apartments.

—*New York Times*, October 8.

A CROP OF JOKES GATHER AROUND DE-STALINIZATION

The communist bloc de-Stalinization campaign is the theme of the latest crop of jokes making the rounds of Warsaw's coffee houses.

One of the stories about the recent 22nd Soviet Party Congress concerns the Polish Party leader, Mr. Wladyslaw Gomulka, and the Polish Premier, Mr. Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

The two were sleeping in the same Moscow hotel room when Mr. Cyrankiewicz was awakened in the middle of the night by Mr. Gomulka's shouts: "Down with Khrushchev. Throw him out."

Terrified, Mr. Cyrankiewicz shook Mr. Gomulka awake and asked: "Wieslaw, Wieslaw, what are you saying?"

Mr. Gomulka looked around, blinking, and replied: "Oh, Jozef, I was just dreaming I was at the 23rd Congress."

The Russian's treatment of Stalin's body gave rise to a number of wry anecdotes.

One says the party rules have been rewritten to include a new punishment for erring members—expulsion from the grave.

For their brother Czechs, whose problem now is what to do with the gigantic statue of Stalin in Prague, the Poles have a helpful suggestion:

Cut off the heads of the figures looking up at the late dictator and call it a monument to Stalin's victims.

—*Hindustan Times*, November 22.

CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (U.S.S.R.)

Sir,

I venture to trespass upon your space to launch the national appeal for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (USSR) Committee. The object of the Committee is to organise and to help to finance a demonstration in the Red Square, Moscow, on November 6, 1961, to take place on the day preceding the anniversary march-past that commemorates the 1917 Revolution.

I am hereby authorised to extend a formal invitation to Lord Russell, and to the Committee of One Hundred. Sharing, as we do, their impassioned and heartfelt concern at the terrible peril in which all mankind stands, we would wish them to repeat in Moscow their performance in London of September 12. To facilitate such a venture we would be prepared to help to raise funds for air fares to Moscow and for the necessary tourist arrangements for their

reception on November 5, returning them to London on November 8.

We would also seek to make available appropriate leaflets in Russian, to be distributed in the Red Square on November 6 and 7, describing the criminal nature of the Soviet nuclear tests and explaining fully that Mr. Khrushchev personally is a murderer, exactly as Lord Russell states that both President Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan are murderers.

In the event of any local difficulties, we would wish to contribute towards the cost of legal representation, either by a Soviet lawyer or by some prominent British lawyer such as Mr. D. N. Pritt, Mr. John Platt Mills, Mr. Geoffrey P. or Mr. Sidney Silverman, should any or all of these gentlemen be prepared to act on Lord Russell's behalf.

Finally, as a gesture of our good faith and solidarity of purpose, as part of our international campaign that the great squares of the world should unite, we would propose to hold a comparable demonstration to take place simultaneously in Trafalgar Square, London, offering to match any or all of Lord Russell's movement who would be sitting in Moscow.

Desmond Donnelly,

President Elect,

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (USSR)

—*The Spectator* (London), September 29.

(Continued from page 7)

Nehru government. Hence the sorry story of Telengana which witnessed the murder of over 2000 people in the countryside and took full two years and more for armed forces of the union to scotch. Such a party was forgiven and allowed to participate in elections and pose as a peaceful democratic party!

But in 1956, Khrushchev called in the 20th Congress of the Communist Parties for a recognition of the Indian government as a regime of the national bourgeoisie necessary as a stage on the road to communism. The CPI took the cue and adopted the policy of responsive cooperation to the Nehru government. The articles in the Soviet Encyclopedia attacking Gandhi and Nehru were revised and a more respectful language adopted towards them.

The CPI even made statements declaring that they were in favour of national capital and toned down their campaign against capitalism.

The period from 1951 to 1960 saw this policy of toleration of the national bourgeoisie in force in communist propaganda and Soviet Policy in regard to Asian and African emerging nations.

In 1960 came a declaration from Moscow where in Khrushchev calls for a change of attitude towards the national bourgeoisie from tolerance and responsive cooperation to one of criticism and attack.

It is learnt that leaders of communist parties in India, Burma, Indonesia, Syria, Jordan etc. have written articles in the Soviet press in accordance with the Declaration. Mr. Ajoy Ghosh writes condemning the Nehru Government for not carrying land reforms to their logical conclusion and for not nationalising

foreign concerns and plantations and so on. So Mr. Aidit of Indonesia criticises Sukarno for his halting policies in regard to capitalism and surviving foreign elements in trade and industry.

And so we seem to be moving into a new phase (logically necessitated by communist ideology) wherein we should expect sustained attacks on the surviving elements of bourgeois democracy.

The CPI has been ordered to mount an offensive to effect a transition from national bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy. There is to be an intermediate stage of *national democracy*, that is, a stage of coalition governments with communist ministers in a minority status as in East European states in the period 1945-48.

The moves of communists to infiltrate into Congress in large numbers and their new policy of forging United Fronts among political parties and to effect a split in the Congress party between its Left and Right elements acquire significance in this light of ideological instruction from Moscow.

The fact that there is no bourgeoisie at all in the sense of a property-owning middle class in emerging African states like Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Congo etc. is another factor that motivates Moscow to halt the favour to the national bourgeoisie. In these States, proletarian democracy or dictatorship has to be the *first step* without the intervening steps found necessary in China and East Europe and Asian countries like India, Burma and Indonesia.

The impact of communism, local and international, will therefore become stronger and more ruthless in the coming period on our society and politics. To be forewarned is to be fore-armed.

(Continued from page 9)

made will be grabbed and then further claims staked. Unpleasant recognition of these realities has to be followed not only by massive documents, which perhaps have their uses, but also by military preparedness. It is on this that the country seeks, and deserves, greater reassurances than Authority has so far given. Checking the Chinese is easier said than done. Parliament is still right to insist that all that can be done is in fact being done.

—*Statesman*, November 22.

How Communists Destroy Democracy

A LESSON FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA



Price Rupee One

pp. 43

Available from

DEMOCRATIC RESEARCH SERVICE

127, Mahatma Gandhi Road

Bombay 1

With Many Voices

Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world."

—Tennyson.

On anti-colonialism, Mr. Stevenson asked (in a televised interview in New York) if there should not be "an equal opportunity for self-determination" for Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, Mr. Nehru replied that "that would be an ideal thing", but there was "a difference in the type." It was not colonialism of the old style, familiar in Asia and Africa, that existed in Eastern Europe, he added.

"Now I dislike the second type also, but it is different", he said. "But it may, of course, be, and it sometimes is, that the second type is even worse from the human point of view than the other."

—*Times of India*, November 13.

We have a Defence Minister that had to be defended every now and then by the Prime Minister who had to do it even during the present tour of the United States.

—Acharya Kripalani, *Indian Express*, November 20.

Neutralism is a luxury that some one must be strong enough to defend against the predatory raids of communist aggressors.

—Richard Nixon, *Hindu*, November 20.

The Soviet Union has exploded nuclear bombs in the atmosphere equivalent to a total of about 170 megatons.

The U.S. and Britain together have exploded bombs totalling only about 125 megatons, while France's three tests in the Sahara amounted to less than one megaton.

—President Kennedy, in a press conference,
Times of India, November 10.

Mr. Menon is regarded—not only by Americans, many Indians believe the same—as a Soviet apologist.

—*New York Herald Tribune*, November 5.

No serious socialist takes the Congress brand of socialism seriously.

—P. C. Joshi, *New Age*, November 19.

If they (Soviet Union) do not want Stalin's body let them pass it on to the Kerala Communist Party. We will accord the body the respect and reverence it deserves.

—K. Kalyanakrishnan Nair, Kerala Communist leader, *Hindu*, November 10.

The argument that the United States, because of our military power, is just as great a threat to the peace of the world as the Soviet Union is just plain nonsense—on a nuclear scale.

—Richard Nixon, *Hindu*, November 20.

I don't think he (Mr. Menon) could explain himself.....He does have a fine brain and India has need of fine brains if they further India's policy.

—Mrs. Indira Gandhi, *Indian Express*, November 8.

Albania is Khrushchev's Cuba.

—President Kennedy, *Time Magazine*,
November 17.

We have denounced the imperialism of the great powers only to secrete a miniature imperialism towards our neighbours in the non-aligned group. We have demanded disarmament from the great powers only to transform our countries into arsenals. We proclaim our neutralism but we do not always base it upon a policy of neutrality.

—President Leopold S. Senghor of Senegal,
New York Times, November 5.

Mr. Nehru has every right as an individual to cultivate and cherish the personal friendship of whomsoever he may choose but he has no right as Prime Minister to mortgage the country's safety to a man (Mr. Menon) who has proved demonstrably unworthy of such trust.

—*Indian Express*, November 23.