

A Lesson From Guinea

by Fritz Schatten

WHEN Daniil Semyonovitch Solod was recalled to Moscow in 1950 from his post as Soviet Ambassador in Syria in order to take up an important administrative post in the Russian Foreign Ministry, he was doubly honoured. Western observers in the Near East called him one of the "most skilful Kremlin representatives in the Levant" and hundreds of Syrian notables gave him a well-nigh tumultuous send-off at Damascus airport.

The same Daniil Semyonovitch Solod has just vacated another ambassadorial post, but in contrast to 1950 the 56-year-old Ukrainian's hasty departure from Conakry, the Guinean capital, was not attended by any farewell ceremonies. Solod was accompanied to his aeroplane solely by a few low-ranking Bulgarian and Rumanian diplomats. Of the Guineans who had greeted him so rapturously in January 1960, not one put in an appearance. Furthermore, his return from Africa, which TASS described as a "recall to a responsible post at the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R.", took place at the direct instigation of Sekou Touré, President and government party leader of Guinea. Solod was expelled on what Sekou Touré termed "many important grounds." With that, what had been envisaged as a repetition of Solod's spectacular success in Damascus and Cairo ended in a spectacular failure, and the cool reception given to Soviet Deputy Prime Minister A. Mikoyan's visit to Guinea only emphasises this fact.

The failure of Solod's mission in Guinea takes on a deeper significance when one reviews the communists' original opportunities in that West African state and the general political climate prevailing there. In September 1958 Guinea was the only one of the then French overseas territories to reject de Gaulle's referendum on the formation of a "Communauté Française". Its overwhelming *non* had been organised by a man and a party that had long maintained intimate relations with radical leftist and undisguisedly communist circles. Both Sekou Touré and his Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) unwaveringly espoused the old pro-communist attitude of the since defunct Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, the

first collective political movement anywhere in West Africa.

The rejection of the French referendum in September 1958 and the ensuing proclamation of Guinean independence resulted directly in an acceleration of the leftward trend in Conakry. The French themselves were more than a little responsible in this respect, for they answered Guinea's "no" with stringent counter-measures. In headlong haste, they liquidated their administrative and technical establishments in Guinea, blocked all credits already granted to the new state and refused to take Guinea's bananas—the country's largest export item—at the old preferential price. On the day of its independence, therefore, Guinea was bankrupt and completely helpless.

The country was rescued by the Eastern bloc. Immediate recognition by the various communist states—far preceding that of the Western Powers—relaxed its diplomatic isolation. Delegations from the U.S.S.R., East Germany and Czechoslovakia flocked to Conakry. Agit-Prop material arrived by the ton and was not only sold on bookstalls but distributed by the Party, through its literary outlets, to the 4,000 village cells of the PDG and its youth and trade union organisations. The gendarmerie and army swapped their French uniforms and rifles for Czech equipment and weapons, and hundreds of Guinean trade unionists, students, soldiers, youth leaders and technicians betook themselves to training courses in the Eastern bloc at the invitation of Moscow, Peking, Prague and East Berlin. When Sekou Touré—who according to a report in Prague's *Zemědělské Noviny* had "studied" in Czechoslovakia in 1948/9—undertook his first tour of Eastern Europe in November 1959, communist officials greeted him with universal jubilation and looked upon him already as a "comrade". Nikita Khrushchev made this quite clear during Touré's second visit to Moscow in September 1960 by persistently addressing his African guest as "*tovaritch*" (comrade). In token of his and the Soviet people's "inviolable friendship" he spontaneously presented Touré with the Spiridonovka Palace....

Touré himself was not sparing with proofs of his regard. *Silly* (meaning elephant in Guinea), as his fellow-countrymen call him, was even more explicit in Peking than in Moscow. "In the struggle between justice and injustice," he declared when toasting Liu Shao-chi, "we have taken our place in the camp of those who are conducting a just struggle for the benefit of all peoples." Touré was the first African statesman to support Peking's demand for the "liberation of Taiwan (Formosa)" and railed in approved Party-Member fashion against the "impe-

rialist countries, led by the U.S.A." Whether voting at the U.N., passing resolutions in the Afro-Asian solidarity committee or attending pan-African congresses, the Guineans came down squarely on the anti-West side. Guinea seemed all set to become the Cuba of Africa.

These and many other decisions, measures and actions were bound to be regarded by communists from Peking to Pankow as unequivocal proof that Guinea was, if only by implication, well on the way to a socialism of the Marxist-Leninist stamp—all the more so since many of these revolutionary processes were prepared and set in motion in direct consultation with communist "advisers". The current three-year plan, for instance, was carefully worked out by a group of some sixty Czech and East German "experts." The first steps toward the collectivisation of agriculture were introduced in close collaboration with Red Chinese "specialists". And had not Guinea's Number Two, Parliamentary President Saifoulaye Diallo, declared while attending the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow in the role of *tovaritch* that the decisions of the Congress and the new programme of the Soviet Communist Party were a source of inspiration and encouragement to Guinea, too?

In this lay the seeds of the Russian dilemma which has now been made manifest by Solod's expulsion. The communists greatly overestimated their chances and saw Guinea as a ripe fruit ready to drop into their lap. There is no other possible explanation for the series of errors which they eventually committed in their treatment of Guinea.

Their first and most serious mistake consisted in their almost exclusive reliance on the efficacy of their Agit-Prop consignments and in the fact that, after granting some initial aid, they either refused or bungled the economic and technical support which Guinea so desperately needed. Thus it came about:

(i) that the Russians despatched experts to Conakry to explore potential uses for the credits amounting to 140 million roubles which were granted in the year 1959, but abandoned nearly all the projects "recommended" by those experts at the planning stage;

(ii) that a large-scale printing works planned and built by East Germany had to be closed down at the end of 1961 after only a few weeks in operation because almost all the main technical equipment failed;

(iii) that after months of work Eastern bloc technicians failed to relieve Conakry's water and power shortage;

(iv) that the supplies of basic foodstuffs which had been proclaimed amid such a blare of propaganda never turned up, and that a large Russian consignment of grain arrived in Conakry in a completely rotten and inedible condition;

(v) that the Russian and Czech specialists sent to maintain airport installations proved to be unsuitable and had to be replaced by Egyptian employees;

(vi) that in the end the population and even officials of the government party protested quite

openly about the quality of Russian and other East European experts, achievements and goods; and

(vii) that government finances, which were administered by Eastern bloc specialists, got into an ever increasing muddle and threatened the country — for the second time since its independence — with total bankruptcy.

In view of the disappearance of the "material basis" of "Soviet-Guinean friendship", President Sekou Touré several times intervened personally to ask Moscow's Ambassador Solod for aid. In insistent and ultimately forcible terms, Touré urged the Kremlin emissary to take steps to fulfil Communist undertakings. On the seemingly logical assumption, however, that Guinea's dependence on the East must grow in proportion to the young African state's economic difficulties and that Guinea could expect no assistance from the West because of her leftist leanings, the Communists did little — and in some cases nothing — to remedy the situation.

It may be mentioned that several ultra-left-wing groups within the government party, the trade unions and youth organisation (JRDA) adopted a similar attitude. Having for years been exposed to a Communist influence which was not only tolerated but actually encouraged by the Guinean leadership, they exhibited and still exhibit the effects of Communist training and propaganda. In unison with Communist experts and diplomats, they pressed for a radical solution to the country's immense economic and social problems. Their watch-word was, and still is, that these problems are the result of an over-hesitant "transition to socialism". A trial which ended on November 24th 1961 with the sentencing of five members of the Guinean Teachers Union to heavy terms of imprisonment by Conakry's Supreme Court was the signal for protest demonstrations by school-children, students and young workers. The government reacted with speed and vigour by closing the schools and putting a whole row of "ring-leaders" behind bars, but it was not until December 11th that it could bring itself to publish an explanation and make the sensational disclosure that there had been a "Communist-inspired conspiracy". At the same time, the Guinean Minister of State, Diallo Alpha was promptly despatched on a special mission to Moscow by Sekou Touré. On December 18th, Diallo Alpha was received by Khrushchev and Gromyko. The fate of Solod, the man Khrushchev had hoped would earn the honorary title "Solod of Africa" in Conakry to set beside his existing nickname "Solod of Arabia", was sealed: Khrushchev agreed to a "liquidation of the Solod problem", and his ambassador hurriedly shook the dust of Conakry from his heels.

Since then the Soviet government has been tirelessly endeavouring to efface the blot on its escutcheon. Solod's recall has been painted as promotion to a new and senior job. Meanwhile, in two speeches made in Soussou, a Guinean dialect, Sekou Touré has unmistakably indicated that Solod was expelled from

(Continued on page 12)

Issues In North Bombay Contest

by Acharya J. B. Kripalani

MAY I be permitted to say a few words explaining my decision to contest the Lok Sabha seat from Bombay-North in the coming General Election? I shall come straight to the heart of the question: why I have chosen to seek the suffrage of this constituency. It is because by opposing the sitting Member from Bombay-North, who has been selected by the Congress authorities to stand again for this seat, I hope to bring into focus certain dangerous trends and deplorable aberrations of governmental policies, which have acquired a kind of identification with Shri Krishna Menon. Misgivings on this account are widespread, cutting across party lines, that is, if we except the communists who are all for the Defence Minister. Apart from the communists, therefore, the central issue in this contest is, essentially, not a partisan one. That is why one could see a cross section of the national opinion and feeling represented in the requests that I received from a wide variety of friends in Bombay to enter this particular electoral fight.

As for me, my decision naturally stems from a sense of obligation to my own past, which includes half a century of participation, in one way or another, in the national movement for India's freedom and all-round revival. In this movement, especially after Gandhiji's advent, certain values came to acquire a basic importance in our eyes and we tried, however imperfectly, to build up a tradition of loyalty to those values because we felt that without them neither freedom nor reconstruction could be stable. Also, without them, India could hardly make any truly significant and abiding contribution in the international field. Some of those values are in peril; unless the country woke up and rose consciously in their defence the situation might be irretrievably lost.

The peril is all the greater because of the lots of camouflage that have been in vogue to conceal the undermining. A people can always be better bamboozled by its own government than by any foreign powers. The latter to serve their own purposes will help in the cheating of a people by giving its government chits of bogus praise. The Cold War has given humbuggery scope for achieving unprecedented heights, but it is the people who are as a rule its worst victims.

Foreign and Defence policies of a country are interlinked. In fact they interpenetrate each other. In this two-in-one field, India has been losing. In the past several years we have suffered great setbacks both materially and morally. Aggression has with impunity dispossessed India of thousands of square miles of territory while our policy of non-alliance with either power bloc has been laid exposed to charges of insincerity, pusillanimity and cynical opportunism. On Hungary and Tibet India's official spokesman at the international forum adopted attitudes which were

inhuman and an insult to all that was best in the moral tradition of the Indian nationalist movement. These are not the only episodes that have roused the suspicion that our non-alliance is either a conscious fraud or, though originally of honest conception, it has since been delivered into the hands of a person or persons who are ready at every opportunity to sabotage it for his or their own reasons.

From this sinful birth of *pancha shila* (the statement of the five "principles" constituting the preamble of the India-China treaty on Tibet, which was the first international document to "legalise" the destruction of Tibetan independence by Communist China) to the poetic justice of the Chinese occupation of Indian territories—the whole story was a nauseating one which was by no means improved by our government by concealing for some years the fact of the Chinese aggression against India. The fact was kept back from the Indian public and Parliament—presumably for the benefit of the Defence Minister and the professional "friends" of China, for who else could be benefitted by this secrecy?—until some reports in the Press forced the authorities to speak. But still the Defence Minister would not call the Chinese aggression by its proper name. As the elections come nearer there is some change in Shri Krishna Menon's language as there has been in that of the Communist Party of India. Even so, whenever he has to refer to Chinese presence on Indian territory, Shri Krishna Menon will always couple it with a reference to the Pakistani-occupied part of Kashmir, which is not quite aimless verbosity. Whenever he is asked about the possibility of recovering the Indian territories held by China, the Defence Minister says that India is determined to see Pakistani aggression in Kashmir vacated. But do not statements like these by the Defence Minister tantamount to giving an assurance to Peking that the Chinese can very well stay put where they are without expecting any trouble? Because everybody knows that the Government of India has no intention of forcibly recovering the part of Kashmir now in Pakistani occupation. In fact, New Delhi would not be opposed to letting the present *de facto* division of Kashmir stand indefinitely. In view of this, the Defence Minister's intentions about recovering Chinese-held Indian territories cannot but be characterised as dubious.

Indeed, with India's relations with China as they are and with a man of Shri Krishna Menon's predisposition in office as her Defence Minister, the scene has an extraordinarily Gilbertian flavour, but unfortunately, being Indians, we cannot quite whole-heartedly enjoy it. I am not—and no sensible person can be—opposed to a peaceful solution provided it is a solu-

(Continued on page 6)

On The Horns Of Our Dilemma

by James Burnham

ON our side of the Iron Curtain, most opinions about the world crisis are argued along one of two plainly demarcated lines: one, oriented on the danger of nuclear world war; the other, on the danger of communist world conquest.

A book, article, speech or cocktail conversation of the first type (call it 'Type W') will stress the appalling horrors that may be expected if a nuclear war breaks out: unexampled destruction of physical property; the annihilation of tens of millions of human beings, perhaps of a substantial portion of mankind, or even (given the development of the 'doomsday machine' now said to be technically feasible) of all men; genetic damage to surviving generations, if there are survivors. Type W arguments hold that with the ever greater power of nuclear weapons, simpler methods for their manufacture, and their spread to additional nations ('the N-nation problem'), the nuclear war danger will mount rapidly until it becomes a virtual certainty.

Within the context thus selected and described, Type W arguments assert, as the goal of highest priority, disarmament in one form or another; as a starter, anything from a nuclear test ban on up; ending with at least general nuclear disarmament, usually with total disarmament (except, may be, for a UN or other world-government 'peace force').

Type W arguments seldom pay much attention to the nature, threat or consequences of communism, whatever the professed attitude of the arguer toward its danger.

Type C arguments, articles, speeches and cocktail conversations (i.e. those oriented on the danger of communist world conquest) are less numerous than Type W, especially in academic, foundation, governmental and other Establishment circles. Logically, most Type C arguments are analogous to Type W, granted the change of the key variable. They tend to pass rather lightly, or at least quickly, over the nature and consequences of nuclear war, and stress the appalling horrors that may be expected if communism wins: the annihilation of human freedom, and thus of human civilization; the reduction of mankind to an undifferentiated herd under the rule of a totalitarian tyranny. Type C arguments hold that the danger of communist world conquest, already acute, is rapidly mounting with the continuing communist expansion, and may soon, through a basic shift in the power equilibrium, become all but inevitable.

Within their selected context, all Type C arguments assert, as the goal of highest priority, resistance to the communist advance; carried through, according to many Type C versions, to partial or even total defeat of the communist enterprise.

These two lines of argument, when taken together, have the form of a dilemma. Strictly (logically) inter-

preted, this dilemma presents us with the alternative: either the danger of war or the danger of communism. But psychologically we feel the choice to be: either war or communism. That is, the dilemma forces each of us to choose his enemy: communism or war. We may prefer to phrase the choice "in positive terms": i.e., either Peace or Freedom. But in practice, policy—for an individual as for a nation—is determined negatively with much more precision than by the necessarily vulgar concept of positive goal or ideal.

Both horns in the present dilemma are as hard and sharp as ever a matador faced in the Madrid corrida. It is a fact that nuclear war threatens—and by no means remotely—almost unimaginable destruction. And the close threat of communist conquest, with the consequent destruction of human civilisation, is equally a fact.

With better luck than we deserve, it is conceivable that we could be spared both war and communism. But there is no getting through or around the wider horns of the strict dilemma. Indeed, our dilemma is of that most unhappy kind which does not even permit us to avoid one horn by grasping the other. Whatever we do, we shall confront the acute and catastrophic dangers of both war and communism. We must grasp both horns of our dilemma, or be impaled.

Does this not mean that a prudent man will be equally against both war and communism? Theoretically, yes, perhaps; in practice, no. In practice you must have one main enemy, because your choice of enemy determines your line of action, your programme, your attitude. The programme and attitude of those who choose war as the main enemy are almost totally different from the programme and attitude of those who choose communism. Cf, for example, SANE with NATIONAL REVIEW; or Bertrand Russell with Barry Goldwater.

The attempt to equate the two enemies, to give equal victory, introduces cross currents that make both progress—against war and against communism—ineffectual. This is a potent source of the troubles of the official programmes of the Western nations.

In particular, it is the trouble with President Kennedy's programme. Mr. Kennedy has not chosen his enemy. He is against communism, of course. And he is also against war, of course. But he has not decided which he is more against. And therefore he cannot have a policy. In his UN speech, as in Cuba, Laos and in Berlin on August 13, he gave war the priority. His multiple repetition of the concept, "Mankind must put an end to war—or war will put an end to mankind", expressed a Type W, not Type C, argument. Khrushchev cannot be blamed if he doubts, as Washington complains, "the credibility of our posture."

China's Frontiers In Dispute

(Contributed)

THE signing of a Chinese boundary agreement with Nepal and of a protocol with Burma at the beginning of October last was followed in November by the publication in India of a White Paper containing Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China. In this exchange both Governments accused each other of territorial incursions. Despite repetition of the principles of *panchshila*, and the publication early this year of the report of meetings in 1960 between Indian and Chinese officials, the Chinese attitude on the frontier dispute has hardened. This inflexibility gives no cause for India to modify the statement made by Prime Minister Nehru at a reception in Delhi last July, when he said that China's tendency was "to extend not only her political control but also her culture and civilisation, thinking that she was conferring a benefit on others... Her national tendency was to expand, and Communism must be added to that".

When the Communists acquired power in 1949, China had frontiers with Korea, Indochina, Burma, Tibet, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. Most of these ran through thinly populated regions and had remained undemarcated, though in many cases secured by former treaties as well as by tradition. The eventual aim of bringing both Tibet and Mongolia under Chinese rule had, however, been indicated by Mao Tse-tung; and there were both nationalist and Communist reasons among those put forward by Peking for the military advance into Tibet in October, 1950.

This operation brought Communist China into geographical contact with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, and extended her frontiers with India by some 1,500 miles. Border incidents and map disputes began soon after, but the political and strategic realities of the situation became generally apparent only in 1959 with the Tibetan rebellion and its forcible suppression. Chinese forces operated up to, and in some cases beyond, the Himalayan frontiers; a military road had been driven across Ladakh, and Communist propaganda was disseminated from Tibet towards the neighbouring hill-regions; Peking now abandoned the pretence of explaining that Chinese maps claiming considerable areas from India were out of date and that there had not yet been time to correct them. The Government of India had to take a stand on the frontiers it had inherited from the past, and at the same time agree to discuss minor adjustments. It had also to check Chinese attempts to raise frontier questions directly with Bhutan and Sikkim, for whom only the Indian Government is empowered to act.

The intransigence since shown by the Chinese in their frontier claims on India follows the ideological

line that "aggression" is an exclusively imperialist phenomenon; and further, that rejection of these claims and criticism of Chinese actions in Tibet both spring from the "class-character" of a "national bourgeois" regime. As early as the exchange of Notes in October, 1950, Peking chose to consider the Indian concern "as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet"—an imputation of dependence which Delhi repudiated "with amazement". In the 1959 crisis over Tibet, the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi at one point submitted a "statement" inviting Indian recognition and support of "China's main attention and policy of struggle" which were "directed to the east, to the west Pacific region, to the vicious and aggressive US imperialism". The Indian Government's reply of May 23, 1959, declining "to consider or treat any other country as an enemy country", found this approach and much else in the Chinese Note "discourteous and unbecoming even if it were addressed to a hostile country".

Allegations that Indian policy was influenced by "imperialists and reactionary elements" became the mainstay of Chinese propaganda which portrayed this as the only obstacle to a frontier settlement. In September, 1961, this campaign culminated in a blatant attempt to isolate India from other non-aligned countries when the Chinese gave a distorted account of India's policy at the Belgrade "neutral summit" meeting (see *Asian Analyst*, October 1961, pp. 4-6). On November 20, the Indian Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, said that the attention of the Chinese Government had been drawn to the sustained campaign in the Chinese press "to misrepresent and distort" Mr. Nehru's statements at the Belgrade Conference. Mrs. Menon said that the object of the Chinese propaganda was to create general prejudice against the policies of the Government of India.

A feature of this Chinese propaganda campaign continues to be the deliberate selection of items reflecting normally friendly Indian relations with the United States. For direct attempts to place India "in the imperialist camp" Chinese broadcasts quoted communist newspapers in India and other Asian countries. Thus Mr. Nehru was attacked as having "slandered the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing" during his official visit to the USA; as having "gone to the USA with a beggar's bowl"; and as having "fabricated" a danger of interference from the north in South Vietnam and adjoining areas.

Comparison of the Chinese attitude towards India with that adopted towards Burma and Nepal illustrates Mao's dictum of 1949 that "Neutrality is a hoax. The third road does not exist". Although opinion

in Burma and Nepal had been deeply disturbed by the Chinese Communist actions in Tibet, and alarmed for the security of their own borders, the frontier issues involved were of a much less serious order than the Chinese claims of large territories below the watershed in north east India and her military implementation of similar claims in the north west. Excluding the concept of neutrality, the Chinese have on the one hand treated the unresolved dispute with India as one with an ideological opponent; and on the other attempted to publicise the settlements with Burma and Nepal as agreements arrived at between like-minded nations. Chinese tributes to Burma and Nepal as committed allies in the "anti-imperialist struggle", though studiously ignored by the leaders of those countries, continue to be made (*Asian Analyst*, November, 1961, pp. 11-12).

The settlements themselves, as reached with Burma and Nepal, have been shown to be inconsistent with the position taken by the Chinese Communists in their dispute with India. On the Sino-Burmese treaty, a Note tabled by the Government of India on August 7, 1961, pointed out that the Chinese were "accepting the watershed principle and the McMahon Line in regard to the northern Burmese border, and rejecting the same principle in regard to the contiguous Indian border". Similarly, the Indian Parliament has been told: "India's stand on the boundary question with China had been vindicated by the fact that the Sino-Nepalese treaty affirmed the principle that boundaries should be determined by custom and known geographical features and watersheds".

China's frontiers with Communist States are no more, or less, settled than those of her non-Communist neighbours. For obvious ideological reasons, however, such issues have not so far been taken beyond the cartographical stage with which the disputes with India, Nepal and Burma began.

For example, though China's frontier with North Korea is for the most part well defined by the Yalu and Amur rivers, Chinese maps show the Changpai mountain area and the islands in the Amur as Chinese. Korean maps, however, show both as Korean, and Soviet maps show the Amur islands as Russian. In October and November, 1961, Chinese periodicals carried articles and illustrations describing the opening up of valuable areas "near the Korean border", in which the Changpai mountains and their main peak, Mount Paitou (Paektou in Korean), were clearly stated to be in China. The Korean possession of this mountain is apparently supported by the Soviet Union.

China's frontiers with the USSR in Central Asia are in several sectors shown as undemarcated on Chinese maps, while Soviet maps show them as fully established. The Russian Communists have reacted strongly to efforts to keep alive the memory of Genghiz Khan, whose "predatory campaigns of conquest in neighbouring countries", declares the *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1975), "were of profoundly reactionary character". Russia's eastward expansion under the Tsars, on the other hand, is officially defined as "progressive".

The Chinese aim to incorporate all Mongol territories, though a more formidable project than the absorption of Tibet, finds expression in the Chinese maps which leave undemarcated the whole frontier with the Mongolian People's Republic. Soviet maps allow no such doubt. The admission of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic to the United Nations, achieved under Soviet sponsorship in October, 1961, was barely mentioned in Peking publicity.

Finally, in Eastern Siberia, the Chinese Communists are believed to be preparing claims to the Ussuri Provinces, first colonised by the Chinese but ceded to the Russian Empire in 1860. They include the Port of Vladivostok, terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

(NORTH BOMBAY CONTEST — Continued from page 3)

tion in the sense that India gets back what is justly hers. What, however, cannot be envisaged with equanimity is the prospect of the control of Defence remaining in hands which may not be so willing to defend—in certain circumstances.

As I am explaining here what has mainly prompted my decision to stand for the Lok Sabha seat from Bombay-North, I have referred first to the subject of defence and some international questions. But of course I would like that the voters kindly took some notice of my views on internal affairs, also. In fact, I do not believe that the aberrations of our foreign policy can be corrected without some change in the direction of internal affairs. For instance, some of the vagaries and less moral aspects of our international policies and conduct are directly related to what are called the foreign aid requirements of our Five Year Plans. I am certainly not opposed to international co-operation. The idea that nations which are in a more advantageous position should come to the help of those which are in a depressed or less advanced position is a fine one. But Plans should not be so made that what is called into being in the name of this fine ideal is a rat race among the "underdeveloped" nations towards the aid-givers. Internally, also, the scene developing under our present Plans is not at all a wholesome sight, in spite of some gigantic projects. What can one say of a Planning under which the gap between the rich and the poor goes on widening, unemployment grows, the condition of the weakest section of the community becomes even worse than before? But I shall not go here into the details of this question on which I have spoken repeatedly in Parliament and have also spoken and written elsewhere, indicating how in my humble opinion the Plans may be reoriented for the better service of the masses, which is the only valid objective of planning as far as it is necessary. Among other points which I have stressed in my writing and speeches are the need of an honest administration and decentralisation, wherever it is economically feasible and inductive to promotion of human values both in the political and industrial fields. I need hardly mention in this connection my lifelong association with the attempts to implement Gandhiji's constructive programme.

What Khrushchev Did Under Stalin?

IN their speeches to the recent Moscow Congress, Mr. Khrushchev and his friends have related at length how Molotov, Kaganovitch, Malenkov, Voroshilov and other "anti-Party" Communist officials behaved themselves during that sinister period called that of the Stalinian personality cult, that is, at the time of the dreadful massacres of 1934-38. Those dreadful mass-murders destroyed almost all the political, military and social élites of the Russian Communist Society.

But these same orators have kept absolute silence on their own role during that period. Since the recalling of historic events is in fashion these days in Moscow and since strict silence upon this past is apparently the rule in "THumanité", it is most interesting to consult back issues of "Izvestia" and "Pravda", the two Government newspapers whose credit and influence are still considerable in the Soviet Union.

In 1957, before the General Assembly of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev launched his first heavy attack against the "anti-Party" group. At the end of his speech, turning to Molotov, he exclaimed:

"Your hands are stained with communist blood."

"What about yours?" answered brutally Molotov.

Khrushchev was stricken dumb by this retort.

"The comrades suggest that we render immortal the memory of all the eminent personalities of Party and State who have been the victims of arbitrary repressive measures during the one and only period of personality cult. We approve the suggestion."

Thus did Khrushchev speak, on the 27th October last, at the tribune of the Moscow Congress.

But when, in August 1936, started in Moscow, the first great trial of sixteen "eminent communist personalities" having at their head G. Zinoviev, former Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet and ex-Chairman of the Communist International and L. Kamenev, ex-Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, ex-Vice-President of the Soviet Government and an old companion of Lenin, comrade Khrushchev, without even waiting for the verdict which was to condemn the sixteen to death, declared in *Izvestia* of 23rd August 1936:

"Whoever rejoices in the successes of our country and in the victories won by our Party under the banner of the great Stalin will find only one word worthy of these Fascist mercenary dogs of the Trotsky-Zinoviev gang: death, death by execution. And although Trotsky, the leader of this gang and an ally of the German Gestapo, is absent from the dock, the anger of the people and the verdict of the tribunal will catch up with him, wherever he may be."

Léon Trotsky, as everybody knows, was murdered in Mexico, in 1940, by an agent of the Guepeon (Soviet Secret Police) called Jack Mornard.

In the same speech of October 27th last year Mr. Khrushchev branded with particular violence the murder of the Red Army chiefs led by Marshal Touk-

hatchevski. At that particular time however, six days exactly before the execution of Toukhatchevski and of his companions was officially announced, Khrushchev hastened to denounce, at the Moscow Militants' conference, these same Army commanders, particularly General Gamarnik, deputy-Minister and commander of the Red Army political commissars, who committed suicide before being arrested. This apparently is the reason why Khrushchev attacked him in the following terms:

"A Trotskyist renegade, a traitor to the Fatherland, an enemy of the people, Gamarnik was yet a member of the Moscow Committee. Which shows that the enemy can assume every kind of disguise to achieve its subversive action. But these traitors, the Toukhatchevskis, the Gamarniks and others should know that we will unmask them and destroy them and reduce them to dust which we will then scatter to the winds, so that no trace is left of those renegades, of those traitors to the Socialist Homeland."

It is the same Khrushchev who revelled in that hysteria of hatred, who made that call to murder against Toukhatchevski, Gamarnik and other military leaders of the U.S.S.R. who now pretends to be as innocent as a lamb and protests with indignation against their murder.

In his speeches to the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and during the recent 22nd Congress, Khrushchev repeatedly said that the personality cult had led as from 1934 to the establishment of a reign of Terror and to the extravagant praising of Stalin. But in that same year 1934, during the 17th Congress of the U.S.S.R. Communist Party, two speakers specially distinguished themselves in heaping laudatory superlatives on Stalin's name, for example, by the repeated use of the word 'genial'. Those two speakers are precisely the only two leaders to be still members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party: Khrushchev and Mikoyan.

Khrushchev, speaking for the first time at the tribune of a Soviet Congress, distinguished himself by a subtle dosing of the cheapest kind of flattery directed at the same time at Stalin and at his direct 'boss', who was none other than the future "anti-Party" leader, Kaganovitch.

Here is this choice piece of Khrushchevian prose:

"The Moscow organization is unanimous in its ideological support of the Central Committee and of our genial leader, comrade Stalin. This ideological unanimity of the Moscow organization is due to the shrewd daily guidance from which it benefits in the person of our comrade Lazar Kaganovitch. The Moscow organization will stand still closer by the side of our great leader comrade Stalin, and under his banner we will march to new victories."

Actually, those new victories, according to what

Khrushchev himself revealed, meant the destruction, the murder of more than seventy per cent of the members of the Central Committee, elected during that same 17th Congress, at the order of the "genial Stalin"!

As from 1934, Khrushchev takes advantage of every opportunity to flatter and sing hymns to the glory of Stalin. Here are a few specimens of those speeches which he delivered during the most bloody period of the personality cult era.

1937—Khrushchev, chief of the Moscow Party organization, arranges a huge meeting attended by 200,000 Moscovites. Its purpose was to approve the verdict of another mass-trial against the Radek-Oiatakov group, eminent personalities of Party and State, charged simply with having planned to murder Stalin. Khrushchev is the chief speaker at this meeting. According to "Pravda" dated 31st January 1937, he declares:

"Those murderers have levelled their weapons at the very heart and brains of our Party. They have levelled their murderous weapons against comrade Stalin. In levelling their weapons at comrade Stalin, they have tried to strike the Working Class, the working people in the whole world. In levelling their weapons against comrade Stalin, they have threatened the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin. In their attempt against the life of comrade Stalin, they have taken aim at the best man Humanity has to boast of. Because, Stalin is our Hope, the flame guiding Humanity on its march forward. Stalin is our flag, Stalin is our will, Stalin is our victory."

1939—Stalin convenes the 18th Congress of his Party, after having exterminated the majority of the delegates to the preceding 1934 Congress. Not only has Khrushchev survived, but while still keeping the position of leader of the Ukrainian Party, he is now promoted member of the Politburo of the U.S.S.R. Communist Party.

It is in this double quality that he delivers a speech at the tribune of the 18th Congress, in which he declares:

"The Ukrainian Communists are united as never before around the Stalinian Central Committee of the Party and its leader, great Stalin. The affection of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks for Stalin expresses the trust and the love of the whole Ukrainian people. That is why the Ukrainian people proclaims: "Long live our beloved Stalin!"

Ten years later, on the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday, comrade Khrushchev exclaims:

"The greatest merit of comrade Stalin is that during his resolute struggle against the enemies of the people: Mencheviks, Revolutionary Socialists, Trotskysts, Zinovievists, Boukarinians, etc., he has kept pure the flame of the Leninist doctrine. Today the people hails with all its heart, our beloved Stalin. Glory to the beloved father, to the enlightened educator, to the genial leader of the Soviet People's Party and of workers in the entire world. Glory to comrade Stalin!"

In his secret report delivered in February 1956, Khrushchev said of Beria:

"It is now proven that this criminal has climbed the rungs of Party and State office in treading upon immense numbers of corpses."

At the recent Moscow Congress, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Chelepine, Souslov and others brought the same kind of accusation against the "anti-Party" group.

But that same metaphor of treading upon corpses can serve for Khrushchev. Contrary to "anti-Party" leaders like Molotov, Kaganovitch, Voroshilov, and others who were already occupying key-positions in the Party before the corpses started to pile up, the ascent of Khrushchev in the Soviet hierarchy is absolutely parallel to the Stalinian massacres.

Before the elimination of the Bolshevik Old Guard by Stalin, Khrushchev was only the pupil of a small technical college (Rab-Fak). But after the expulsion and the physical removal of the old Bolsheviks, he was able to introduce himself into the central machinery of the Party. Later, when Stalin, during a second wave of frenzy, exterminated the top-members of the Party and even killed his old companions, Khrushchev became an auxiliary member of the Politburo and the chief leader of Ukraine. He himself then began to do away, according to the Stalinian method, with the old leaders of the Ukrainian Party, the companions of Lenin: Kossior, Postychiev, Lioubtchenko, and thousands of others.

Today, Khrushchev sheds tears over the murder of the Ukrainian leaders and specially over the memory of General Yakir, about whom he was to say in his speech of 27th October last:

"I knew comrade Yakir well. During a conference I gave this year in Alma-Ata, his son who works in Kazakhstan came to see me and asked me about his father. But what could I tell him?"

What could he tell the son of General Yakir? Well, perhaps remind him of the speech which he, Khrushchev, delivered at Kiev, on June 5th 1938, after the extermination of the leaders of the Ukrainian Party:

"The Yakirs, the Balistskis, the Lioubtchenkos, the Zatonskis and other such riff-raff were getting ready to open the door to the German Fascists and to feudal and bourgeois elements."

That "riff-raff" thus slandered by Khrushchev after he had had them murdered occupied the following posts in Ukraine: Yakir was the general Commander-in-Chief of the Kiev military region; Kalitski was the chief of the Ukrainian Soviet Police and the Commander-in-Chief of the border-zone military units; Lioubtchenko was Chairman of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party and Zatonski was Minister of Education of Ukraine and a member of the Ukrainian Politburo.

But one can well understand that it was impossible for Khrushchev to say to Yakir's son that he, the denouncer of Stalin's crimes, had murdered and slandered his father and many other "eminent personalities" of Party and State whom, because of the requisites of present Soviet policy, he is now endeavouring to rehabilitate. —Condensed from LE FIGARO.

The Mystery Of Nehru's Action On Goa

by M. A. Venkata Rao

NEHRU'S decision to order military action in Goa contravenes his entire previous record and the image he had built up in the world abroad and at home as the man of peace *par excellence*, as the worthy successor of Gandhi. Many anxious and earnest people in all nations had come to look upon Nehru as the hope of peace.

The emotional reaction to Indian action in Goa in Britain and America and elsewhere is to some extent due to a sense of bitter disappointment at the failure of "One More God" this time of the free world.

While accepting the end-result with satisfaction as the completion of Indian national independence (that was bound to come some day and that was already long overdue), the thoughtful observer alive to the sensitiveness and demands of the international scene for shoring up the forces of peace and peaceful change is disturbed over the long term consequences of our police action in Goa.

Already, Indonesia and Iraq have followed India in initiating warlike proceedings against the Dutch and Kuwait in regard to West Irian and the oil-rich British protectorate in the Persian Gulf respectively.

And Pakistan has decided to re-open the Kashmir question in the UNO to cash in on Western annoyance with India.

And even apart from these repercussions in the international scene, there is room for uneasiness in regard to internal affairs from the manner in which Nehru was ultimately prevailed upon to sanction force contrary to his entire past record and dominant motives and ideals.

It is clear that very great pressure must have been brought on the Prime Minister to induce him however reluctantly to agree to order the armed forces to take action in Goa.

It is of the utmost importance for the immediate future of the country to fathom this mystery and find out the group that influenced the Prime Minister against his better self and habitual attitude and philosophy.

One factor that played a part in this drama was the summoning of the African conference on Indian soil. It is clear that the sponsors were communists. The pressure of African peoples particularly from that of Portugal in Angola and Mozambique recently subjected to terrible suppression by Dr. Salazar to break their spirit of rebellion had its own effect on Nehru. Nehru has the temperament of a great Moghul. He responds spontaneously to the role of a magnate enjoying acts of benevolence relieving the suffering of the unfortunate.

In this light, it is quite intelligible that the request of the African delegates from oppressed colonies should have touched the imagination of Nehru. And so we find him for the first time in fourteen years

saying that warlike action was *not ruled out* in regard to Goa! The change of tone in regard to violence thus indicated disturbed Sri Morarji Desai who next day took occasion to assert without ambiguity that India preferred non-violence as the land of Mahatma Gandhi. Was Morarjibhai asserting himself consciously in this statement (contradicting even the Prime Minister's utterance) against the pressure of Sri V. K. Krishna Menon?

It is to be remembered that the Communist Party (unofficially it may be) was prominent in forming a pressure group that was sent to the Goa border under the lead of Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali who emerged from inactive obscurity for this purpose. She called loudly for military action by Indian armed forces.

The need to rehabilitate Mr. Krishna Menon's prestige (damaged so obviously in the Chinese aggressive intransigence on our borders in the North) especially in the North Bombay constituency no doubt played a part in mobilising the *ginger group* of the communists in parliament and outside.

How far was this group with Mr. Krishna Menon as its unofficial leader and star of hope was heartened by Russian officials is a question not to be lightly set aside.

Did Pandit Nehru finally yield to the pressure on the receipt of *unofficial but reliable support from Russian representatives*,—the local envoy at New Delhi, if not from Khrushchev himself contacted by wireless? It must be recalled that Pandit Nehru had confidential talks with President Breznev at Delhi before the news of Indian military movement into Goa startled the world.

And Breznev came out with a whole hearted statement of approval and support for Indian action as soon as he heard of it while in Bombay.

And we should contrast this with Nehru's refusal to resist Chinese aggression militarily and see it in the light of the Russian advice to him to deal with the matter by peaceful negotiation without resort to military action.

This reminds us of the danger of having a supreme ruler who is liable to take action even contrary to his declared principles when subjected to pressure by communist or pro-communist influences.

He also acts on impulse without weighing consequences with due deliberation. His acquiescence in Lord Wavell's invitation to Muslim League representatives to enter the Interim Government is an example of impulse overmastering conviction and declared principle.

Nehru's action in this context is therefore an indication of the decisive preponderance that the pro-communist elements surrounding him have come to

(Continued on page 12)

An Encounter With Narcissus

by John Rosselli

WHEN a British intellectual monthly sells close on thirty thousand copies something is happening which we thought had gone out with the decline of the great Victorian reviews. "Encounter," which publishes next week its one hundredth number, has trebled its circulation in the eight years since it was launched and doubled it in the past four. Although it sells at 3s 6d it is not far behind a nine-penny weekly like the "Spectator." Some of its articles on class, sex, or royalty have had a lot of free publicity, but they are for the most part several thousand words long, unrelieved by illustrations, and addressed to highly educated readers. What kind of a magazine is it that enjoys such unlooked for success?

Before discussing what "Encounter" is like one had better say what it is not. Since the first issue came out in October, 1953, with a ruthless, penetrating article by Leslie Fiedler on the Rosenbergs, the reputation of the magazine among many British intellectuals has been that of an ice-making factory in the cold war, run with American money in the anti-communist cause. Its real failings are, I think, other; they have to do with British not with American-inspired attitudes. But there is just enough truth in the image to make it worth a look.

"Encounter" is an offshoot of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, itself founded during the most rigid period of the cold war, between the Berlin blockade and the death of Stalin. The Congress is "an independent world-wide organisation of scholars, writers, scientists, and artists" ranging—the words are those of Melvin J. Lasky, "Encounter's" co-editor—"from the non-Fascist Right to the non-Communist Left." Its honorary presidents include Reinhold Niebuhr, Salvador de Madariaga, and Jayaprakash Narayan. Its office in Paris, under its Secretary-General Nicolas Nabokov, organises congresses, seminars, and other international palavers; it helps to rouse support for imprisoned Hungarian intellectuals and the like; and it administers a few "para-academic" fellowships for writers. Finally, the congress sponsors or has ties with 16 periodicals in 12 countries.

All this is paid for by American foundations, chiefly the Ford Foundation. Recent attempts to enlist European support now that Europe is prosperous have come to nothing outside Switzerland; the trouble is said to be chiefly that in much of Europe "culture" is hopelessly entangled with the Church and State conflict. "Encounter," too, depends on the foundations to make up its loss. Unlike some other quality periodicals, it cannot translate rising circulation into profitable advertising revenue, no doubt because a lot of its readers have more intellect than money.

For the rest, "Encounter's" editors, Mr. Lasky and Mr. Stephen Spender, have personal ties with other

congress luminaries abroad. The editors of the "loose federation" of congress magazines sometimes take articles from each other; they may club together, for instance, to send Arthur Koestler to the Far East, but, because national tastes differ, they do it only desultorily.

When "Encounter" first came out, announcing that Stalin's death and the East German revolt between them signified "the death of the Marxist-Leninist creed," it did show a marked anti-communist temper. But this never swamped the magazine; it is still less noticeable now that communism, both internally and internationally, is in a less desperate stage. "Encounter's" feature "From the Other Shore"—giving news of Eastern Europe—does suggest a certain obsession with the communist world; yet the last instalment, on Ilya Ehrenburg, showed exemplary balance.

In that first number Mr. Spender and his then co-editor, Mr. Irving Kristol, said that the paper would be international in content and Anglo-American in editorship; it would discuss such problems of our time as nationalism, hunger, and the reconciliation of equality with liberty; finally, it would regard "literature and the arts as being values in themselves, in need of no ulterior justification." A rough judgment might be that "Encounter" has been only stutteringly international but fully and usefully Anglo-American; that it has discussed ideas and current affairs with great vigour; but that literature and the arts have come off second best.

"Encounter" has one seventh of its circulation in America; it also circulates in India and Japan and takes a good deal of notice of both countries (Mr. Nehru is said to have sanctioned publication of "Lolita" on the strength of Lionel Trilling's "Encounter" article). Yet it is the work of people like Dwight Macdonald, David Riesman, Edward Shils, Mary McCarthy, Marcus Cunliffe—Americans or concerned with America—that has given the magazine a sense of international exchange, rather than the odd piece on "the literary situation in Japan," the isolated story or poem by a Mexican or Italian, or the report on some international congress by a peripatetic French "*cher Maitre*". In all this, "Encounter" probably does no more than reflect the spirit of the time.

Mr. Spender and Mr. Lasky might say the same thing of the balance the paper has held between ideas and the arts, between comment and creation, between dissection and representation. It has leaned heavily towards ideas, comment, and dissection, so much so that fiction has of late years almost vanished. Mr. Spender says that good creative work is hard to come by and people in England are anyhow most interested in "their own condition." True, but it seems characteristic of "Encounter" that although it has taken up

(Continued on page 11)

Without Comment

INCREASE OF PRIVATE FARMS IN POLAND

Collective farming, though increasingly developed in Europe's Communist countries, is apparently unattractive to the Poles. The latest issue of the Polish Statistical Bulletin shows that about a month ago only 1,26 collective farms were registered and that for the past 18 months their number has been decreasing.

At the same time there has been a small increase in new private farms and there are now about 3,600,000 private holdings in the country. Two-thirds of the land sold by the State since August 1958 has been bought by people starting new holdings. At the present time collective farms account for only 1% of Poland's arable land, State farms employing direct labour another 12%; the remaining 87% are with individual farms.

Although Hungarian farming is far more collectivized — in fact, collectivization is almost complete — production has shrunk and last year was about 9% below the planned total. In the last three years collectivization has made rapid progress in Hungary and official newspapers take pains to exonerate this form of farming from blame for the shortfall in production and exports. The weather, in the form of summer drought, is held responsible, but the three years that

(Continued from page 10)

new writers who have arrived with a bang it has printed, not a scene from a John Osborne play but Osborne's muddled attack on the Establishment, not part of Kingsley Aims's work in progress but a story with a dog-eared look about it, not Colin MacInnes's poetic evocations of teenagers but his documentary raw material. "We've had to hold out Herbert Read's poem again to make room for Jo Grimond on the monarchy," Mr. Spender said recently. Poetry is not urgent.

Against this the paper has had the merit of keeping to a "central" path without falling into the hands of a coterie. But as a review of ideas it has been central in a livelier sense. Articles like those of Anthony Crosland on the future of the Labour movement, Nancy Mitford on U and non-U, Michael Young on meritocracy, Wayland Young on prostitution, are what has set people talking and thinking and incidentally raised circulation (though Isaiah Berlin on Russian thought and Trevor-Roper blasting Toynbee may keep better). Whether the things that really stirred the intellectual British public in the 1950s will look well in future is another question. There seems about them a strong tinge of narcissism — of a society's minute self-absorption. "Encounter" can say that it has shrewdly held up the mirror to Narcissus. To try to tear the mirror away would no doubt require another sort of publication.

have seen increasing collectivization have also recorded increasingly disappointing harvests. As reported earlier, Czechoslovakia is also seriously below planned output from its collectivized farms and dairies. Even Rumania, which did so well industrially last year, showed disappointing agricultural figures.

—*Statesman*, January 8.

RED MONEY IS POURING INTO AFRICA

The talking point in Kenya today is the extent of communist infiltration in the political life of the colony.

Dormant for some months, this issue has been brought into public focus again by an allegation in London's Conservative Daily Express on Monday that Mr. Oginga Odinga, vice-president of the Kenya African National Union, was being paid monthly instalments of £10,000 and that he had already collected the first instalment through the West End office of a London Bank.

Mr. Odinga, who received two substantial sums from foreign sources last year to aid his political activities, the report continued, was to receive another £150,000 from China.

Speaking from his home town Kisumu, Mr. Odinga scoffed at this report and said: "I don't care what these people say about me. This is not the first time they have planted false allegations."

But it is public knowledge that Communist money has been pouring into the country for over a year and this has also been stated by Defence Minister Swann in the Legislative Council.

Reaction to the London daily's disclosure has, however, been fast here and one of the first to comment on it was KANU Legislative Council member Ayodo, who said last night: "KANU is in a confused state because of the money from outside used by individuals to buy support and power."

The chairman of the Governmental party, the Democratic Union, said the source of trouble in Kenya for the last two years had been the money from the Communists. He warned there were elements in Kenya trying to sell the country to foreign powers.

Another KADU leader, Mr Peter Okondo, who is also Parliamentary Secretary in the Finance Ministry, said the Communists were trying to disturb the political stability of Kenya and he wanted the Government to take a serious view of the matter.

He urged KANU President Jomo Kenyatta to take steps to rid the country of Communist infiltration. He referred to the practice of sending Kenya students to China and other Communist countries and warned that the red menace would be very great in the next four to five years when these students returned.

Mr. Odinga, I understand, struck the money deal with the Communists when he visited China recently and ever since the flow of red funds into his London account has continued.

Mr. Kenyatta, who is aware of his colleague's diversions, has not so far reproached him publicly. In fact, Mr. Odinga has had little scruples about his red connections and has openly stated he would gladly accept money from any source and send African students for study to whichever country he liked.

China's efforts to spread her influence in Africa are on a smaller scale than those of Russia, which operated in big way in Guinea until expulsion of the Soviet envoy from Conakry last month. But China has achieved results particularly among young radicals in East Africa and the Cameroon Republic.

In order to co-ordinate these activities, the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has set up a separate Africa section.

These attempts take the form of diplomatic overtures, identification of Chinese Communism with African nationalism, exchange of visits and technical, cultural and educational aid.

The Chinese had been trying to compete against Russia in Guinea but following the Soviet failure there, they are likely to turn more to East Africa.

Besides Kenya, Chinese universities already have students from Somaliland and Zanzibar and they have offered another 250 scholarships to students from these countries.

Tanganyika is also within China's purview inasmuch as she was one of the first countries to offer to establish diplomatic relations with the new nation. Mr. Julius Nyerere welcomed their desire, though he expressed his country's inability to afford a diplomatic mission in Peking.

BENGAL REDS DROP STALIN DAY PLANS

Celebration of Stalin's birthday, planned for Jan. 5 by West Bengal communists, has been cancelled following strong disapproval by the central secretariat of the Communist Party of India. A mass rally at Calcutta Maidan and cultural shows had been scheduled for that day.

It is understood that Prime Minister Nehru's recent speech at Bolpur condemning West Bengal communists for their anti-national role has also had a sobering effect on the State leaders who felt the celebration might prejudicially affect the party's election prospects.

The West Bengal communist daily came out with Stalin's photograph and laudatory editorial on Dec. 21 in commemoration of Stalin's 82nd birthday. But the paper significantly omitted to publish any photograph of President Brezhnev, though he reached Calcutta on that very day.

—*Hindustan Times*, January 5.

CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO PAK RESIGNS

The Cuban Ambassador to Pakistan resigned his post last night and left by air for Zurich en route to an unknown destination.

The envoy, Mr. Antonio Andres Rodriguez Echazabal, said before leaving that he had resigned because he was opposed to the new ideology accepted by the Cuban regime.

The envoy was accompanied by his wife and children.

He said: "I do not regard myself committed to the communist line proclaimed by the Government of Cuba."

—*Hindustan Times*, January 7.

(GUINEA — Continued from page 2)

Guinea because he was involved in the anti-Guinean conspiracy.

Does this turn of events mean that Guinea's leftward course is at an end and that all the Communists' pipe-dreams have dwindled away to nothing overnight? May Guinea even, as a few Western diplomats in Conakry seem to hope, rather than believe, turn to the West? There is no easy answer to these questions. It is a fact that at the moment Sekou Touré and several prominent members of the politburo of the Guinean government party are angry, depressed and bitter about Communist policy in Guinea. It is also a fact that in the politburo as well as in the government and, above all, in the small intellectual elite of the country there still exists a sizeable and not insignificant number of people who support an orthodox Communist course and whose influence may have suffered only a temporary setback. Finally, it is a fact that Soviet foreign policy has very speedily set about analysing and counteracting its blunder in Guinea. The relative haste with which Moscow and Conakry arranged Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit, is an impressive token of this.

Will Guinea allow herself to be appeased by the renewed Soviet offers of economic aid which Mikoyan no doubt carried tucked away in his luggage? Will the orthodox Communist organisation in Guinea succeed in holding its ground under the aegis of fresh doses of Soviet assistance until the bargaining position becomes more favourable? On the answer to these two questions depends the course to be steered by the Guinean ship of State in the near future. Past experience shows, however, that even tropical Africa with its diverse potentialities for crisis, and even where they have encountered a strong psychological preparedness for Communism, the Russians are quite far from having won the day.

(GOA — Continued from page 9)

acquire. The Gandhian groups like Morarji Bhai and Rajendra Prasad have been relegated to the back benches.

The presence of the Russian leader Suslov at the Vijayawada Conference of the CPI is another pointer to the growing influence of the Kremlin men on the Indian scene.

The same groups may suggest after elections the formation of a "national coalition government" including Communist Party members. The Prime Minister may yield for a consideration such as an offer from aggressive China that she would call off her programme of further penetration into Indian soil!

This is the psychology we have to counter-act if we wish to remain independent and not pass behind the Iron Curtain.