

Defence In The Air

Raman Desai

THE landings in Normandy during the last War were successful primarily because of the Air Cover provided. Weeks of preparatory bombings of oil refineries destroyed the supply lines of oil. Even in the early stages of the Korean War, General MacArthur argued that there was no point in meeting the huge waves of soldiers at the fighting base but the supply lines beyond the Chinese border, from where the Chinese Government lent supplies, must be destroyed. This would have involved open recognition of China as the aggressor and President Truman was unwilling to do so. The dismissal of MacArthur has now been recognised as an error. The Chinese have pursued this pattern of aggression, through the use of local rebels, in Vietnam and Laos. It is only in Cuba that Mr. Kennedy recognised and named the hidden enemy and dealt with him.

The manner in which India defended itself in the present war follows the blunder in Korea. It was assumed that the bombings of supply lines in Tibet would involve an air attack on northern cities in India. It is well to recognise that army unpreparedness, by a defenceless Defence Minister, would not have resulted in such signal defeats if at least the air force had been properly deployed. If we are serious about removing the Chinese from our soil, we shall have to gather a vast air force for attack; for the existing Chinese tactics appear to be to wait patiently on their illgotten gains and dare us to advance. To hope to manufacture planes in a reasonable time or to pay for a vast force, seems illusory. Our only hope is to seek the timely assurance of proved friends that in times of need their air resources will be on our side. It appears that such assurances are available to us. To regard them as leading to foreign bases manned by foreign personnel is to deny our past experience where the Western powers have not, directly or indirectly, attached any such conditions to any of their aids.

It is unfortunate that the whole idea of air cover in our minds is related to the defence of our cities from civilian bombings. But the battle of Britain

was not won by air defence of civilians; one can save cities and lose a war. We must think in terms of winning the war by an aggressive air force. Sooner or later the logic of events will compel us to seek the aid and alliance of tried friends, of a way of life similar to ours.

In a statement to the Lok Sabha Mr. Nehru suggested that on a sudden emergency the government would deal with it as it arises and seek support of friendly countries; he considered that the immediate need was for us to extend air strips, improve communications and generally make the Indian Air Force more effective. He went on to say that "the air defence of the country is too vital a matter to be left to improvisation and delays inherent in any project like that of the air umbrella suggested in press reports." As if the long term plan for an effective air force coupled with sudden demand on friendly countries promises more immediate action than the air shield arranged with the co-operation of friendly powers! This is yet another example of woolly statements on the lines for which Ramsay MacDonald was beloved of *Punch and Low*.

The Communist Party is agitated over the air cover supposed to be assured by the Western powers. Their anxiety is understandable. They would prefer no doubt that we wait till 1966-67 when the Russians will manufacture MIGs here, so to speak. I suppose in the meantime, their only alternative suggestion is to negotiate with the victor on the terms of our surrender of a thousand miles, here or there, where not a blade of grass grows and everywhere our sacred soil is open to horse trading. Let us be clear about a few things in our minds: if we mean to wrest our land from the Chinese we must be ready with a boundary air force, protected by fighters and must be ready as well to face attacks on our cities; and in this most desperate hour we must rely on tried friends and not on pretentious heads of states who hitherto, in our hour of need, offered us not a bamboo stick to defend ourselves with.

THE PEACOCK

INDIA has selected the Peacock as an emblem to focus our attention, in an international endeavour, on the preservation of wild life. I have a vivid recollection, after many years, of an early morning near Ellora Caves where the dusty dark green panorama was suddenly lifted by the magnificence of a peacock in all its glory. But this memory is surpassed by so many others where even in hot summer, the morning began with the glorious singing of the Koel or the Cuckoo in the Mango grove. In all our poetry the Koel has been the recipient of many a lyric, as it is the inspirer of many a lover. I should have thought a mellow and gentle culture would have preferred the Koel as an emblem. But I suppose our minds and times have changed. The peacock represents pride. It was the emblem of one of our historic rulers. We have still retained among our present rulers the livery and pageantry of Moghul and British Imperial Courts; forgetting that for the British this was all for export only and that their own Ministers live simply and move in buses. It is observed that the male of the species is more glamorous than the female and

the most splendid exhibition of the famed train is of the male, at the breeding season, for the delectation of its mate. It is prolific in breed, particularly in captivity, and in this it is our emblem too. In Rome and in Europe its flesh was delicate meat. In the days of chivalry in Europe, a most solemn oath was taken "on the peacock"; herein perhaps lies the utility of the peacock as our emblem; we may swear never to swallow our pride and swear to meet our foe only on the battlefield, not the dinner table, "on the peacock."

R. K. D.

INNOCENT BY DEFINITION

James McAuley

This is the solid-looking quagmire
The bright-green ground that tempts the tread
And lets you down into despond.

Enough consistence to conform,
Enough form to yield to pressure,
Enough force to wink at a fraud.

Unbiased between good and evil:
The slander's only what they're told,
The harm something they didn't mean —

They only breathe what's in the air,
They have certified pure motives,
So pure as to be quite transparent

They are immune. Are innocent.
They can never be convicted,
They have no record of convictions.

This poem really needs a chorus
Spoken in dialect by the drowned
Who live like frogs and have learned quagtalk:

'On the one hand this, on the other hand that,
Having regard to, I heard for a fact,
What one would want to say about this is.
That's not my point, and where are we at.

Courtesy: QUADRANT, SYDNEY.
(Summer issue 1963.)

What a Life!



"...And just what was your view of Chamberlain's
under the concrete
Gandhi's Hinduism Virus Delhi

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Double-cross At Moshi

S. Sharangpani

WHO won at Moshi? And who was double-crossed? The answer to both these questions would be "India", if one were to go by the inspired reports that appeared in the Indian press during the week when the Third Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference was in session. Until the last day, the Indian reader was fed with glowing accounts of the efforts of the four-man Indian delegation to convince the delegates attending the Conference of the justice of India's case. The reader was led to believe that the Chinese were being "increasingly isolated" and "losing face" as the Indian delegation was gathering "substantial support" for its case. Several anonymous communist sources, Russian as well as other, were quoted as expressing their sympathy for the Indian side, and other equally anonymous sources were reported to have expressed their disgust at the behaviour of the Chinese dogmatists. On the last day, the Indians were even reported to have scored "absolute victory" over the Chinese. But, unexpectedly, on the day following the conclusion of the Conference, it turned out that the Indian delegation was, after all, not the victor but the victim of the diplomatic manoeuvres at the Conference, and the loud noise with which it was frequently greeted during the session by the delegates was not indicative of cheers, but jeers. The post-Conference confession of Mr. Chaman Lal, leader of the Indian delegation, that "we were double-crossed", was as baffling as it was pathetic, if not plain laughable. For, it should have been obvious from the beginning even to the meanest of intelligence that it was futile to expect an international communist gathering, like the Moshi Conference, to support a non-communist country, howsoever friendly, like India against the Chinese Communists. But, still, the Indian delegates, thinking that they could reap the advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift, attended the Conference with high hopes and much fanfare only to find themselves victims of the communist intrigues and double-talk.

The Indian delegation consisted of Mr. Diwan Chaman Lal, and Dr. Gopal Singh, both fellow-travellers, and Mr. A. S. R. Chari and Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer, who are known crypto-communists. Thus, because of its very ideological character, the delegation was unsuited to represent India's case in a forthright or convincing manner. This became evident from the first day of their arrival at Moshi when the Indians began to retreat from their position on the Sino-Indian conflict. On the day prior to the inauguration of the Conference, the delegation had indicated that it planned to bring up a resolution in the Conference condemning the Chinese for their aggression. They had obviously counted on the Soviet support for such a move. However, the leader of the Soviet delegation immediately dissociated his delegation from any move to raise the Sino-Indian dispute at the Conference on the plea that the aim of

the Conference was "to liquidate imperialism and colonialism in Asia and Africa" and not to air the differences between two members of the Conference. Consequently, an "unspoken agreement" was announced to have been reached among delegations that the Sino-Indian conflict would not become a subject of debate at the Conference session. Not only that, Mr. Chaman Lal, who was scheduled to speak on the first day of the Conference, asked for a postponement and, it was reported, the text of his speech was "changed several times" during the first night. The next day it became obvious that Mr. Chaman Lal had to tone down his prepared speech at the instructions of the organisers of the Conference. Nowhere in his speech was the Chinese aggression mentioned by its proper name. He only referred to "this grave conflict that has been thrust upon us and has endangered the very basis of Afro-Asian solidarity, the principles of non-alignment and world peace." Mr. Chaman Lal, however, plucked up enough courage to sermonise in his speech: "Words must not be twisted to mean something entirely different from their accepted connotation. Peace is peace. War is war. Aggression is aggression . . . truth must not be a casualty in the context of the new world that is emerging around us". The only flaw was that he had chosen a wrong pulpit to deliver his sermon, as the audience was composed mostly of those who had elevated the art of double-talk into a state-craft. And Mr. Chaman Lal himself was not free from this guilt. While indulging in abject flattery of the Soviet rulers in his speech, he paid a tribute to Mr. Khrushchev's initiative on the Cuba issue which "saved Cuba's independence and the world from disaster."

The Soviet delegate speaking later in the Conference praised the efforts of the Colombo powers to bring about a negotiated settlement of the Sino-Indian dispute and, true to his country's neutral stand, only mentioned the fact that India had "accepted the Colombo proposals as a basis for negotiation." On the fourth day, at the Political Committee meeting, a resolution moved by the U.A.R. delegate came up for discussion recommending to both China and India to accept unreservedly and *in toto* the Colombo Proposals on the Sino-Indian border conflict in the interest of Afro-Asian solidarity. The Chairman of the Committee, after much heated discussion, withdrew the resolution as the Chinese were dead set against it. This left the Indian delegation no alternative but to walk out of the meeting in protest. "The organisation is killed, destroyed and ended", Mr. Chaman Lal told the reporters. "India is leaving the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation altogether." But the next day, the Indians returned to the Conference to shake hands with the Chinese to "welcome" thunderous applause." They reversed their earlier decision to boycott the Conference as, it was stated, the Indians were "saved" by the Soviet re-Communist

of the Conference that the original U.A.R. resolution on the Sino-Indian conflict had been passed by the Conference unanimously. However, the words "without reservation" were deleted from the resolution with the consent of the Indian delegation. Thus the resolution, as adopted finally, was a victory for the Chinese, as they had already announced their acceptance of the Colombo proposals "in principle", while India had all along insisted on their acceptance "without reservation."

But, still, the Indian delegates claimed the victory as their own and left Moshi without waiting for the Conference to conclude. On arrival at Nairobi, the delegates realised that their claim was not only premature but totally unfounded. The Conference, instead of their resolution, had adopted a "recommendation" merely expressing appreciation of the efforts of the Colombo countries "to create conditions for the promotion of peaceful talks between India and China leading to a peaceful settlement of the border dispute." The Conference thus upheld unreservedly the Chinese stand and contemptuously double-crossed the Indian delegation. But Mr. Chaman Lal was undeterred by the humiliating outcome. Though the Conference had accepted an entirely different resolution, he told newsmen, "the Chinese delegation was completely routed." And, in spite of the slap in the face given by the organisers, he announced that India would not withdraw from the organisation. It was, he reasoned, the only forum open to the Chinese and since India could not deal with China at the U.N., she should deal with them through the Conference. The brave Indian delegation which went to Moshi with the declared aim of persuading the Conference to condemn the Chinese thus returned with the realisation that it could "deal with the Chinese" only through the Conference and carrying with it the precious souvenir of the Conference—the double-cross.

It is difficult to sympathise with the Indian delegation which was treated so shabbily by the organisers of the Conference. The Indian delegates were unbalanced in their performance, hysterical in their utterances, and always shifting their position in order to accommodate the recalcitrant Chinese in the name of Afro-Asian solidarity. Even then, the whole Moshi episode could have been ignored as a farce, had it not been for the fact that the efforts of the Indian delegation were unofficially blessed by the Indian Government. Mr. Nehru himself sent a message to the Conference preaching, as usual, the Panchsheel, and there is reason to believe that the Indian High Commissioner's office in Tanganyika was also involved in the lobbying at the Conference. The Indian delegation, besides, included two members of the Congress Party. Though it is true that both of them have been known fellow-travellers, it is obvious that they could not have joined the delegation without the tacit approval of the Government. The Moshi Conference thus once again showed that the Government, in spite of its professed support for the Panchsheel, still refuses to learn anything. It is still desperately clinging to its dream-world and trying to make the Panchsheel mean something.

As Others See Us

INDIAN DILEMMA

THE map clarifies China's strategic intentions. Having consolidated Tibet as a base, she begins to squeeze the border nations—Bhutan, Sikkim and the more important Nepal—in a strategic vise, with the presumptive political aim of turning the three into puppets. Through the same operation, the Chinese take a position on the Indian side of the mountain passes, from which they threaten the entire eastern segment of the sub-continent; and, for good measure, partially outflank southeast Asia, down which the Communist forces are already driving.

For the West and for us, this is a complicated war. On the one hand we must extend military aid to those who use it to resist the aggressions of the only world force that threatens our own security. On the other hand we must not neglect the subtle traps involved in giving direct and unrestricted aid to the Government of India.

Although the Chinese guns have finally compelled Nehru to oust Krishna Menon as Defence Minister, this cannot erase the fact that for a decade Menon was Nehru's closest political associate. Even in firing him, Nehru stated that Menon should not be too much blamed, since he was only carrying out the policies that were Nehru's own. Menon, among the most disliked of the world's statesmen, has been incorrigibly neutralist by reputation and devastatingly pro-Communist in impact. He is a principal symbol of a narrow, anti-Western, misanthropic neutralist defeatism. To give aid to India—which, we repeat, we should do—is in some measure to rescue both Menon and Nehru from the consequences of facing up to their mischievous miscalculations—i.e., save them from personally well-deserved military humiliations at the hands of their beloved friends, the Red Chinese.

India's Government, moreover, is so thoroughly incompetent that the doubt seriously arises whether it can usefully deploy the arms we give it. Its troops in the border region were miserably armed, badly trained, providently deployed, ill-informed. Still, we must help India.

India fights in part (in Ladakh) over severally disputed territory. Kashmir is not only the object of naked aggression by the Chinese Communists. It is claimed with impressive argument by Pakistan; but preponderant Indian power in the region has not only sustained Indian rule but has denied the people

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the help of the Russians. Moshi, where the Russians joined hands with the Chinese to double-cross India, has once again demonstrated the utter folly of such a policy. If anything it has shown that the Kremlin is not a power. The Afro-Asian solidarity, despite its differences with Peking and is ready to let down New Delhi if the choice is between the Indian Government and the Chinese Government.

Dr. Sukarno And Malayasia

Adam Adil

ANY association or grouping of small nations into one administrative system for their political, economic and cultural advancement is always welcome. It is, therefore, heartening to see that Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo have decided to merge together to form a larger Malayasian Federation. The possibility of the emergence of Malayasia has been generally hailed throughout the free world.

Naturally, if any country, out of sheer ulterior motives, seeks to hamper the occurrence of such a great historical event, it deserves strongest condemnation. Indonesia's threat that the emergence of Malayasia would provoke a war between herself and the new Federation is abjectly illogical as it goes against the trend of thinking amongst small or weak nations, who are anxious for broader unity or alignment for the preservation of their political and economic independence. Secondly, Malaya, Singapore or any other unit of the proposed Malayasia is least interested in war as, even together, they are not strong enough and they are primarily concerned with their political and economic stability. If war comes, it will be obviously imposed by Indonesia herself since Indonesia is militarily better prepared than Malayasia. By her attitude towards Malayasia, Indonesia is giving evidence of neo Afro-Asian imperialism, which is striving to take the place of the old, declining, receding, nineteenth century imperialism of the Western brand. What is surprising is that this neo Afro-Asian imperialism is sustaining and strengthening itself on the moral and material support of communist totalitarianism represented by Soviet Russia and Communist China.

It would be interesting to find why Indonesia is

(INDIAN DILEMMA—Continued from page 4)

of Kashmir a chance to show by a free ballot their true loyalties. Still, we must send aid to India; and it is encouraging to read that our government stipulates that the aid now arriving is to be used solely to fight the Chinese.

It is less so to note that India's best troops are still deployed against Pakistani, not the Chinese, positions, and in Katanga, of all places, where a year ago they contributed to the atrocities perpetrated against the Katangese who, unlike the Goans, resisted the predatory Indians. One would think that before calling on the nation over whose stand against Communism Mr. Nehru and Mr. Menon have writhed for fifteen years, the Indian Government would have called its own crack detachments back home from Katanga as soon as the Himalayan fighting started.

But still we must send them aid, because their enemy is our enemy, and in a strategically schematic world, that is what counts—above all.

(Editorial in *National Review*, New York, Nov. 1962)

adopting a war-like attitude towards the proposed Malayasian Federation.

Indonesia, though potentially amongst the richest nations of the world, is virtually on the brink of bankruptcy and politically, economically and militarily it is in a veritable mess. President Sukarno, though a demagogue and can hold large mobs under the spell of his oratory and power, finds himself unsafe. He has so far survived five attempts on his life. He moves about surrounded by a big retinue of bodyguards and security police. In order to be alive and then continue in power, Mr. Sukarno must divert the attention of his people away from their political instability and economic distress. West Irian had so far served a good diversion for the people. But with the settlement of the West Irian question, that diversion no longer exists — on the contrary, West Irian has become an economic burden on Indonesia. Therefore, Mr. Sukarno must either solve at least some of his domestic problems or find another diversion for the people. Fortunately the proposed Malayasian Federation has come handy for him. He must exploit it to the fullest extent and keep the people of Indonesia excited by describing the Malayasian Federation as a "new imperialist design against Indonesia". Originally, Mr. Sukarno had ignored the proposal about the formation of the Malayasian Federation. Mr. Tunku Abdul Rahman had mooted the idea as far back as May 1961, but Mr. Sukarno discovered the "danger" only about three months ago!

It seems the Russians have been largely responsible for Mr. Sukarno's present worries. Indonesia has failed to pay interest on the Russian loans, which amount to more than \$ 1,000 million, taken for establishing heavy industries in the archipelago. Russians have taken political advantage of the Indonesian failure to pay the interest. They have been putting pressure on Mr. Sukarno to include members of the Indonesian Communist Party in the cabinet. President Sukarno, however, cannot just act according to the Russian bidding. He has to contend with General Nasution and his friends, who are not favourably inclined towards communists. Frustrated by Mr. Sukarno's indecision, and encouraged by the Russians, Mr. Aidit, the Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, openly threatened a civil war. Mr. Sukarno compromised. He, however, did not take the communists into the cabinet but formed a new semi-government body called Consultative Assistants of Revolutionary Leadership, and included communists into it. Communists, afraid of general hostility against them, felt satisfied with this arrangement.

But the major worry of Mr. Sukarno are the economic problems of Indonesia. With a population of 90 million and 30 per cent of the population dependent on the armed forces, economic problems are defying solution.

Malayasia may serve Mr. Sukarno's purpose for some time, but it is obvious that he will not be able to halt the formation of Malayasia. It is clear that the vast majority of the people in the proposed units are in favour of the new Federation. The result of the Referendum in Singapore was an indication that even where there is a large Chinese population, the formation of Malayasia has been favoured. Even the revolt in Brunei has died down, indicating that it did not enjoy the support of the local people. Mr. Tunku Abdul Rehman, who is the most popular figure, moves freely without any bodyguards or security police in the whole region will have his way.

One thing is also certain that it would be madness on the part of Mr. Sukarno to start a war with Malayasia although Indonesia is far superior from the point of view of population and military build up. After all he will have to contend with the determined and powerful British with whom he cannot afford to be funny. Further, war with Malayasia will not be backed by the people of Indonesia, who will not be ready to fight their fellow Muslims in Malayasia—the orthodox Muslim influence in Indonesia is still strong. Further, the people of Malayasia will not hesitate to present a formidable opposition to Mr. Sukarno's military adventure. Again, Russians will not actively support Mr. Sukarno for fear of American intervention.

Considered from all these angles, it would be suicidal on the part of Mr. Sukarno to carry his oppo-

sition to Malayasia to the point of war. It would be wise for him to mind his own business and try to solve the economic problems of Indonesia. For that also, he will have to give up his alignment with the communists, both internally and externally, and, rely upon the people of Indonesia themselves to develop their country in peace and amity with the people of neighbouring countries, especially of Malayasia.

So far as India's attitude towards Malayasia is concerned, it cannot be any other than of fullest support to the proposed Federation. Mr. Tunku Abdul Rehman is one Asian figure who has been a consistent friend of India. Unlike other Asian leaders, he has not hesitated to condemn treacherous Chinese aggression against India. He has even started a Fund in Malaya with the object of helping India against Chinese onslaught. It is natural, therefore, that India must unequivocally declare its support to the formation of the Malayasia. Further, Malayasia will be a formidable check on the advance of Chinese, Communist influence in South-East Asia, and thus, will go a long way in ensuring the defence of freedom in that part of the world. India will not be in a position to resist aggressive China, if South-East Asia falls to Chinese Communists. India, therefore, must back every move in South-East Asia which is likely to restrain Chinese Communism. Therefore, both from the points of principle and self-interest, India must help in the formation of Malayasia.

De-Militarisation Of Tibet

M. A. Venkata Rao

PARLIAMENT had declared solemnly and unanimously that there should be no negotiations with China until its forces leave Indian soil completely so as to restore the borders of 1947.

But the Prime Minister used his influence and party majority to get the Colombo proposals accepted in flat contravention of its own resolution!

Those who had noted the Prime Minister's reported statement to Mr. Kingsley Martin, the editor of the *New Statesman* of London that he would work for a negotiated settlement were not surprised at the despiriting reversal implied in accepting the Colombo proposals *in toto*.

Like President De Gaulle, the Prime Minister decides fateful issues by himself and uses his influence to get democratic machinery and the press and public opinion in general to endorse it on the whole.

It is not clear now just what his policy is as regards the Chinese aggression and his plans to prevent its recurrence, (not to speak of getting our borders of 1947 free of the invader.)

His representation of the principle of nonalignment like a sacred *scripta* (scroll) and the reiteration of his followers that it has not failed and that it would continue to be successful is a policy and pos-

gramme intelligible to any one. The means adopted should seem reasonably calculated to achieve its end. Nonalignment did not prevent massive invasion by China—one of the leading members of the communist power bloc, a beneficiary of our nonalignment! Our actual treatment of China as a friend ignoring the oceans of blood that its leaders shed in achieving power and the total absence of freedom in their regime to the ordinary citizen and our championship of China's right to a place in the UNO and our deference to her in international conferences like Bandung etc. did not help us.

The nation is anxiously looking for signs of a positive policy capable of containing the Chinese aggressors.

1. The first point that claims our attention insistently is the grim fact that the present unilateral cease-fire by the invader is not enough assurance that he will not attack us again, in NEFA or in other sectors of the long border—in Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh or Sikkim and Bhutan.

There is no guarantee either that he will keep any agreement that he may come to as a result of the talks he is forcing on us through the mediation of the

Colombo States who are obviously intimidated by the military power of Red China.

2. The second point therefore is the search for a sanction to back any agreement we may come to with Red China.

To assure ourselves of future security on the northern border in the future on a reliable basis, there is only one condition to be achieved. It is the restoration of Tibet to its former position as an autonomous state.

It was the constant aim of the frequent negotiations that the British Governments in Britain and in India held all through the nineteenth century, particularly since the Crimean war of 1856 with Russia and China to prevent the absorption of Tibet into either of these empires. Several treaties (of which the latest of 1914 defined the much-talked of MacMahon Line) stipulated that neither of the empires should establish administrative control within the hermit kingdom. All three neighbours—Russia, India and China were to be free to conduct trade with the Tibetans but no one should seek to annex the country nor should they post military contingents there or establish military installations or construct military roads or fortresses.

The Chinese had an old imperial claim over Tibet but it was shadowy. The Tibetans have always resisted them. Weak rulers had at times allowed a Chinese envoy to stay at Lhasa and that is about all. The Dalai Lama used to send formal presents to the Chinese emperor annually but did not allow any administrative control. Once a Tibetan ruler invaded China proper and conquered parts of eastern Tibet, about the ownership of which there was much dispute all through.

The Chinese representative did not sign the MacMahon Treaty of 1914 to which China had agreed because of a disagreement over certain districts of eastern Tibet. But there was no dispute about the areas included in the MacMahon Line. Tibet, India and China were the signatories to this treaty, the Chinese representative having appended his initials to the draft tentatively in view of the doubt about eastern Tibetan districts.

The fact that Tibet was allowed by China to join in the negotiations with India and herself on equal terms up to 1914 shows that the Chinese had recognised the independent personality of the Tibetan kingdom. Tibet had become independent by that time.

It was a crime against nationalism, democracy and humanity when India allowed China to assert her shadowy ancient claims by military might over the helpless people of Tibet.

Today Tibet has been converted into a vast military base and rapidly being equipped with all the appurtenances of modern power-aerodromes, railways, airplanes, arsenals, depots, military camps etc. It is becoming a jumping off ground on the Roof of the World—over ten thousand feet high on an average, with the bulk of the area even higher.

Airplanes based here could command Northwest

India and Pakistan upto the Persian Gulf. The oil wells of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman would be within bombing range. Of course the entire chain of northern cities of India from Amritsar to Calcutta is menaced by this development.

The scale of the militarisation of Tibet suggests vast ambitions in West Asia, South and Southeast Asia—not excluding Australia.

The return of the Chinese behind even our 1947 borders is therefore no security against a perpetual Damocles's sword of overwhelming aggression.

The minimum demand of security for India therefore lies in what may be called the de-militarisation of Tibet as before the Chinese occupation and genocide beginning in 1950-51.

How should this be secured?

By adequate military preparation in the first instance. Any aggression should be met with firm resistance and the aggressor should be made to feel that the adventure is not worth the cost.

Even nonalignment and neutrality demands defence. The examples of Switzerland and Sweden are illuminating in this respect. Hitler left them free not because of any tenderness but out of an unwillingness to pay the cost of invasion and occupation which would have swallowed too many of Panzer Divisions!

Since India cannot hope to match China's military potential in any reasonable period out of her own resources, she should enter into a Pact with the Western Powers for the defence of her borders. If Russia is so friendly as the Prime Minister proclaims, she should also be invited to participate in the joint scheme of assistance to India like America and the members of the Commonwealth.

This would not be alignment or abandonment of neutrality. The agreement would be confined to the defence of the borders of India—sea and land. Since Russia too has her own border disputes with China and may be interested in containing China's vaulting world ambition, she may be asked to join.

It would be like the Eisenhower doctrine for the defence of the Middle East, in pursuance of which American Marines were landed in Lebanon a couple of years ago. It need not be called a pact against communism. It may be called a pact for the defence of India against any aggressor, from either bloc: China from the communist bloc or Pakistan from the western bloc. It would be a regional security arrangement that could be deposited with the UNO, quite consistent with its Charter.

These two aspects of policy—(1) military, securing the de-militarisation of Tibet and (2) diplomatic, securing assistance of the Powers in case of aggression are the indispensable and integral parts of any viable policy with any hope of success.

The mental revolution and fresh thought demanded by such a change in policy are inescapable and are urgent moral obligations of the Government of India today.

Emergency And Government

Dr. L. M. Singhvi, M. P.

THE constitutional proclamation of emergency was a precursor and a progenitor of the Defence of India dispensation which was implicit in the state of emergency. We must remember, however, that the emergency and the Defence of India dispensation are not to abrogate the Constitution; they are not to supplant the Constitution, but only to function within the framework and jurisdiction defined by the Constitution itself.

I should like to go back to the seedtime of our Republic, to the preparatory materials and influences which shaped our Constitution. Unfortunately, there is no properly edited and annotated work available on the preparation of our Constitution. I think, however, it would be a faithful portrayal of the influences which were active at the time of making the Constitution if three of the sample expressions of opinion which were articulated at that time are cited.

Mr. H. V. Kamath moved several amendments to the parent article in the draft Constitution and in doing so expressed his apprehension that like Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution of the Third Reich it may pave the way for authoritarianism. He said: "We are all talking of subversive elements. Let us remember that a Constitution can be subverted not merely by agitators, rebels and revolutionaries, but also by people in office, by people in power."

Mr. Mahavir Tyagi made an observation which is highly pertinent. He said: "Our country, our people, our economics, our military and strategic position and other similar considerations are all to be taken into account and democracy has to adjust itself accordingly. The only cardinal point in a democracy is that the administration must be carried on according to the wishes of the people as a whole. The will of the people must prevail and so long as that is guaranteed, democracy is not disturbed at all."

Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari, speaking of curtailment of liberties during an emergency, said: "We tolerate such curtailment and we should probably have to do something more than that in order to help the State through an emergency and to safeguard the Constitution; and if the civil liberties of the people are unduly restricted, I say the responsibility will be that of the ultimate rulers, of the people, not that of the executive. And if the executive does not obey the call of the representatives of the people who are watchful, that executive will have to go provided the people's representatives assert themselves."

It is apparent from these quotations that in a spirit of practical wisdom and statesmanship the founding fathers of our Constitution enacted a provision the utility and the desirability of which is more than convincing at the present juncture.

Conditioned as they were by a successive concatenation of convulsions all around, it was quite natural for them to anticipate either internal disturbance or external aggression which the nation may

be confronted with. Therefore, while providing for an emergency such as this, they have also provided that the basic structure of our Constitution must be safeguarded and that the locus of popular will, the Parliament, should remain watchful and vigilant and should continue to guide the executive in its actions even in a state of emergency. That basic framework of our democratic Constitution has been preserved even in the stresses and strains of the present emergency. We all fervently hope that this will continue to be so even though our country may be embattled.

Mr. Hiren Mukerjee, Communist leader, in his speech on the Defence of India Bill, quoted Lord Atkins to say that even in war, even in the clash of arms, laws are not silent. He quoted Lord Atkins, who had said in the famous case of *Liversidge Vs. Anderson* that the laws of England speak the same language in peace and in war. But Mr. Mukerjee had perhaps forgotten the original adage of Cicero who had said *inter arma silent leges* and that Lord Atkins was writing what was merely a dissenting minority opinion in the United Kingdom. What is more, Lord Atkins was saying this only while making an observation on how the statute should be construed and was not expressing an opinion on whether such regulations are valid for the safety of the State.

If at any time, there are any undue or excessive or unconscionable inroads into the liberties of the citizens of India, the Government would owe an explanation to the Parliament. A heavy responsibility, therefore, rests on M.P.s to see that the Defence of India Bill, when it is enacted, is implemented in its proper spirit. It is a Bill of faith and a sacred trust with the Government. This faith should not be abused and the sacred trust remains inviolate. Either a committee or some other suitable mechanism of Parliament should be devised to see that excesses of administration may be reported to it and may be relieved by it.

The Soviet Constitution, to which a reference could appropriately be made in this context, also provides for the promulgation of martial law in article 49. In all countries, the safety of the State and the preservation of its freedom has been regarded as supreme rationale of all legislation and, therefore, the Defence of India Act deserves and merits the support of citizens in this emergency.

However, while the desirability of the Defence of India Act at the present juncture is beyond doubt or dispute, our rulers should heed the advice of the Wise Duke in Shakespeare's "Measure for Measure" who says:

"He who the Sword of Heaven will Bear
should be as Holy as Severe."

The people armed the executive through this enactment with vast, almost Draconian powers. In administering this law, the executive should strive to be "as holy as severe."

Reluctant Nationalists?

M. Devadas Kini

WHAT exactly is the stand of the Indian Communists on India-China border "dispute"? Even communists may not be able to say anything definitely and confidently.

Way back in 1959, the CPI declared in a resolution that "a socialist China can never have any warlike designs on India just as free India can never think in terms of war against China." According to the CPI a communist country cannot be aggressive by definition. Aggression is possible only by a capitalist state. Later, they admitted that there was incursion by China but not aggression. The difference between the two words, incursion and aggression, is the same as between tweedledum and tweedledee. But according to communists, incursion is unintentional occupation of foreign territory.

Even after the fall of Thagla Ridge, they were not sure that it was a clear case of aggression. Mr. Nambudiripad, the then General Secretary of the Party, said that the "party had no access to any independent source of information and had merely underlined the facts that the Government of India had alleged violation of the MacMahon Line and Chinese had denied it." Mr. Dange, the Chairman of the Party, said that the Chinese have "violated the MacMahon Line." They scrupulously avoided the term aggression, may be, because the term has not yet been defined by the United Nations!

Then came the massive attack of 20th October. It took ten full days for the CPI to recognise it as aggression. The National Council of the CPI passed a resolution on November 1, 1962: "The crossing of the line, under any excuse or pretence whatsoever, indisputably constitutes aggression and violation of our territory." It is to be noted that they passed the resolution after the proclamation of emergency. This helped them to weather the storm of criticism inside the country. They even supported Prime Minister Nehru's condition that Chinese should withdraw beyond the September 8 line and earned the displeasure of Moscow. Pravda accused CPI of "chauvinistic position." They were on the horns of a dilemma. The acceptance of the Colombo proposals by the Indian Parliament and the support by Moscow for these proposals saved the situation for them.

The question naturally arises why should the communists find themselves in such unenviable, difficult positions? That is because the communists try to ride two horses at the same time. They want to be nationalists and "proletarian internationalists" at the same time. The contradiction between the two will be clear if we know the communist definition of internationalism. "Defence of the Soviet Union was the acid test of internationalism" declared Mr. B. T. Ranadive, the then General Secretary of the Party in an article published in February 1949 issue of *The Communist*. That is to say, if there is a conflict between the interests of our country and that of the

Soviet Union, the communists will support the Soviet Union in the name of proletarian internationalism. Stalin has said, "Our Communist organisations.... can become genuine internationalists, Marxists cadres, only if they get rid of their nationalism. Nationalism is the chief obstacle to the training of Marxist cadres." Fact of the matter is, a genuine communist cannot be a genuine nationalist.

In the Draft Platform of Action published in 1930, CPI declared: "The C.P. of India declares with pride that it considers itself a part of the organised world Communist movement, a section of the Communist international." Again it declared in 1934 in the Statutes of the Communist Party of India: "The decisions of the Comintern and the higher party organs are unquestionably obligatory for lower organs and for all members of the Party." In a letter written in 1927 by M. N. Roy as a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in Moscow and despatched through Mr. Clemens Palme Dutt to Mr. Muzzafar Ahmad, he said: "A Communist Party must be an organic part of the world communist organisation. It cannot be otherwise and call itself communist. Those who smell foreign dictation in this organisational principle of a body that carries on a relentless struggle throughout the world are not Communists." Conclusion is irresistible and that is, one cannot be a nationalist and a communist at the same time.

It was the proletarian internationalism that made the Indian Communists sport suits made of foreign cloth as a gesture of solidarity with the British workers in Lancashire when the swadeshi movement was sweeping the land. Again this proletarian internationalism made the CPI declare the second world war a people's war after Hitler's attack on Soviet Union. Before Hitler's attack it was an imperialist's war for them. They supposed the war efforts of the British Government and became police informers to spy on the activities of the Congressmen.

It was during this period that they called Gandhiji "reactionary" and Subhas Bose, "traitor". In a pamphlet entitled *The Congress Socialist Party and the War* (March 1940) Communists wrote: "With the outbreak of war... Gandhism has entered into its last and most reactionary phase." In a resolution adopted by the first Congress of the CPI held in Bombay on 23rd May 1943 they said: "The groups which make up the fifth column are the Forward Bloc, the Party of the traitor Bose...."

The CPI even supported the formation of Pakistan. The editorial of the *People's War* of 9th August 1942 said: "To look upon the right of secession as the sacred fad of Jinnah, as the conspiracy of a few communists to divide India in the interest of British imperialism is to ignore the Muslim awakening.... They supported Pakistan on the principle of self-determination. But, of course, they are not prepared

to extend the same right and apply the same principle to Tibet.

The CPI repeated the same mistakes again after 1947. Independence won on 15th August 1947, according to the CPI, was just sham and spurious. A political thesis issued by the second Congress of the CPI held at Calcutta on 28th February 1948 declared that "though the bourgeois leaderships parade the story that independence has been won, the fact is that the freedom struggle has been betrayed and the national leadership has struck a treacherous deal behind the back of the starving people, betraying every slogan of the democratic revolution. . . . The establishment of the Central Government headed by Pandit Nehru has not solved a single problem of democratic revolution. Its establishment does not mean that the Indian people have won either freedom or independence, nor does it ensure that they will be moving in the direction of democracy and freedom for the people. . . ." Even in 1951 they did not change their opinion on our freedom. The review report of the Politbureau of the Party Conference held at Calcutta in October 1951 concluded that the "position that our country occupied today in world policies as the biggest semi-colonial country yet to win freedom." The CPI recognised our independence only after Pak-American military pact, after the Panchasheel agreement of India with China. That is, the CPI recognised it after our foreign policy became neutral towards the Soviet Bloc.

This Calcutta Thesis was responsible for their armed adventures in Telangana, Manipur and some other parts of our country. "From August 1946 to 13th September 1948, they brutally murdered nearly 2,000 persons . . . robbed cash and jewellery worth more than a million rupees. . . ." says *Communist Crimes in Hyderabad*, a pamphlet issued by the Hyderabad Government. This money must have come in handy during the election!

The root cause of these betrayals, mistakes and crimes by the CPI is to be found in the constitution of the CPI as adopted at the Extraordinary Party Congress held at Amritsar in April, 1958. It says CPI's inspiration is "the great October Revolution" and guiding philosophy "Marxism-Leninism". "In the struggle for its immediate as well as ultimate objectives, the Communist Party of India is guided by the philosophy and the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism which alone show the toiling masses the correct way. . . ." There is nothing Indian about their inspiration or their guiding philosophy. It is not far from true to say that the CPI is more a Communist Party in India rather than Communist Party of India. I do not know exactly whether the Indian Communists open their umbrella when it rains in Moscow or whether they put on woollens when it snows in Moscow, but one thing is certain that all Communist Parties all over the world are like "sun flowers to the sun," to use a picturesque phrase from Milan Kundera. They are the supporters and imitators of International Communism. Indians should beware of this Trojan horse and the fifth column. At best they

are reluctant nationalists and at worst they are traitors.

How to contain and eliminate this Party with extra-territorial loyalties? There are two ways. One is to ban the Party and the other is to expose its pretensions. The first course has the merit of being straightforward and clear. This has been done by UAR, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. But it is quite possible that this may give them a look of political martyrs and it may also drive them underground. The second course is more in accord with democratic traditions. But this demands more vigilance on the part of those who believe in freedom and democracy. Whatever course we adopt we have to see that history of China or East European countries is not repeated in India. The CPI has failed in its civil war tactics since they could not create a Yenai near the borders of China or Russia. Now it is trying to follow the Eastern European way, that is, the united front tactics. Communists are infiltrating the Congress. It is also reported that they are trying to create Yenai in NEFA. Perhaps they want to use both the tactics here in India. It is our duty and responsibility to see that their efforts are frustrated.

You Said It

By LAXMAN



I don't know if you've ever said, but the best medium to communicate with the people I've always found to be the microphone! Courtesy: Times of India, Bombay

Review

On the Tiger's Back

Six Years Under Communism: by Aderogba Ajao, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Sh. 21.

TO get hold of young men from the so-called colonial and semi-colonial countries and to train them as communist agents has been the time-honoured practice of the international communist movement. Many such agents were recruited in the twenties and the thirties in London, in Paris, in Berlin and other places and were later sent to China, India, Japan and Indonesia to develop communist activities in those countries. That work is still continuing. It is at present being conducted on a much wider scale. The training need not be now confined to Russia. A number of East European countries and China are available for the purpose. Simultaneously the area open for communist penetration has also widened. Africa is now regarded as a very promising field. Consequently, emphasis has shifted from Asia to Africa.

Every year hundreds of young Africans are being picked up and taken to Moscow, Peking and other centres of training. Dozens of educational institutions have been set up. Some give technical training. Others are overt or covert political propaganda centres. But whether one is sent to a technical institution or to a political school, no efforts are spared to indoctrinate the trainees and to convert them into useful instruments of the communist movement. The efforts may not always succeed. In some cases the young men see through the game and refuse to be the cats-paw of the Russian or the Chinese Governments. In some other cases, the trainees are appalled by the conditions of life as they are in communist countries and cured of their illusions about communism. However, in some cases at least the organisers must be succeeding and getting good dividends for their money and the labour. Otherwise the practice would not have continued.

On the Tiger's Back by Aderogba Ajao is the story of an effort that did not succeed. It is the story of a Nigerian youth who was lured into East Germany in his quest for technical training and forcibly detained there for about six years in order to train him up as a communist agent. Aderogba Ajao was recruited a member of the Communist Party when he was in Edinburgh and Leicester for his studies. His anti-imperialism, the colour prejudice that he experienced and association with a couple of communist students drove him into the Communist Party. The Party was not satisfied to have him as a mere member. It wanted him to be an active instrument of the international communist movement. His visit to East Germany was therefore contrived and as soon as he reached there he was deprived of his passport and money which kept him chained to his communist captors for six years. It was in 1958 that he got an

opportunity to go to Potsdam. That enabled him to go to Berlin and thus regain his freedom.

The six years that he spent in East Germany under the vigilant eyes of his communist tutors and captors were for him, "a long hard school of disillusionment." He worked for some years in a German factory and for some time in a German technical institute. That enabled him to see at close quarters the life of German workers, students and other groups and to learn at first hand their feelings about communism and the Russians. That experience shattered all his illusions about the utopia of communism and the liberating mission of the Russians. Having had his "fill of the party-line and instruction in Marxism and Leninism" he is now able "to read between the lines of Communist statements."

Aderogba Ajao is now back in Nigeria and is naturally worried about communist machinations in his country and other countries of Africa. Russians, he knows "are obviously ready to move". "Communist propaganda", he says, "is attractive to Africans." He writes: "They are the 'anti-colonialists', they are the 'anti-imperialists'—always provided the colonialism and the imperialism is not their own brand as practised in the Baltic States, or in Hungary, or in Tibet. The Communists back Afro-Asian solidarity, they back pan-Africanism from time to time, they encourage Egyptian and pan-Arabic hatred of Israel. They jump on every band wagon which will take them a yard further into Africa." He knows that communist propaganda succeeds because the Nigerians and other Africans have no knowledge and information about communism as it exists in Russia and other countries. He warns them: "if Stalin is dead, Lenin, in a sense, is not. Communism's inner compulsion is to obtain power everywhere it can, and lies and tricks, and the wearing of masks are still parts of the technique." The warning is uttered by a person who had the opportunity of studying communism at close quarters for six long years. It is to be hoped that it will have some effect on the thinking of naive people in Asia and Africa.

V.B.K.

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With Many Voices

"The deep
Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world."
—Tennyson.

✓ I have not gone so far as to declare the State is our Enemy. It is our ally—but a dubious, unreliable and occasionally even treacherous ally.
—Quoted by C. Rajagopalachari in *Swarajya*, February 9.

To argue about the merits of India aligning with the West at the present juncture is akin to discussing vegetarianism in a Chinese restaurant.
—C. Rajagopalachari quoted in the *Hindu*, February 12.

✓ We Russians have a proverb which says that when dear friends quarrel they are just amusing themselves.
—Khrushchev quoted in the *Hindu*, February 11.

✓ When the last spadeful of earth is thrown on the grave of capitalism, we will do it together with China.
—Khrushchev quoted in *Time*, February 22.

The Chinese aggression also had the result that we lost one of our most faithful friends among the Indian leaders because he relied on our word.

—A Soviet Communist Party letter addressed to all Communist Parties, quoted in *Indian Express*, February 4.

Many are the great and good qualities of Mr. Nehru but among them cannot be listed the ability to divine the mind of the Chinese Communist rulers or to predict their actions."

—Thought, February 2.

Something may happen some day—I don't know what—which will change China's attitude.

—Prime Minister Nehru quoted in the *Hindu*, February 6.

To the Editor,

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I believe socialist countries, considered as individuals in the society of nations, are now committing the same crime as was committed by capitalists before.
—President Julius Nyrere, quoted in *Indian Express*, February 5.

For every oil well you drill, 1,000 Indians will have to go without an education.

—Walter James Levy quoted in *Time*, February 22.

For the time being, affection for India is still fresh enough for the British public to want its Government to help India, even if this means losing Hongkong.

—Taya Zinkin quoted in *Opinion*, February 19.

Very few people in high office have any real confidence in Mr. Nehru not turning round, making up with China and leaving them in the lurch.

—Taya Zinkin quoted in *Opinion*, February 19.

Be warned of the folly of disregarding the pride of those who are smaller, less numerous, poorer or weaker than yourselves.

—Lord Hailsham in *Swiss Press Review & News Report*, February 7.

I often make mistakes in what I do, but never in what I predict.

—President De Gaulle quoted in *Time*, February 8.

Our relations with the Soviet Union today are better than our relations with Canada.

—A U.S. Government official quoted in *Time*, February 8.

Surrender had become a part of the methodology of the Congress.

Dr. Raghuvira quoted in *Hindustan Times*, February 11.

Malaya was something like "an island of progress in the sea of chaos in Asia".

—Prof. Hugh Russel Tinker quoted in *Hindustan Times* February 6.

"The Sino-Soviet debate centres upon which is the most effective way to gulp us down. I find the Russian policy much more dangerous than the Chinese Communist brutality."

—President Diem of Vietnam quoted in *U.S. News & World Report*, February 18.