

China & Aggression

by K. Sheshadri

ONE must compliment the Government of India on firmly telling the Chinese Government that its proposal for a renewal of the trade agreement entered into in 1954 will not be entertained until the aggression is vacated and the status quo as it existed in 1954 is restored. The note embodying this reply was sent to China on April 11. It was placed on the table of the Rajya Sabha on April 23.

The note contains a clear and concise statement of the Indian case. It points out how when the agreement was negotiated in 1954 the Chinese had accepted the Indian frontiers as they then existed and how that acceptance was the very basis of the agreement. It then gives a detailed account of the various violations of the borders committed by the Chinese since 1954 and refutes point by point the various allegations of breaches of agreement and unfriendly behaviour levelled by the Chinese. While asserting that India would be always willing to consider proposals for developing trade and commerce, the note points out: "These negotiations, however, can hardly be undertaken till confidence in the 'bona fides' of the Chinese authorities that they will implement the agreement both in letter and spirit is restored". It is further pointed out; "Nor can an agreement on trade and intercourse across the border be negotiated while the Chinese authorities continue to violate the territorial integrity of India along that border."

This is a very welcome declaration of policy. It is to be hoped that the Government of India will stick to it. The country as a whole will support the Government in its refusal to discuss the matter with China unless she vacates her aggression.

The trade agreement of 1954 was at one time paraded as a document of great historical significance as it embodied the Five Principles, the *Panchsheel*, which were supposed to have inaugurated a new era in international relations. As a matter of fact, there was nothing new in those Five Principles and it was not necessary to attach any particular importance to their enunciation in the treaty. Moreover, the principles were violated by China immediately after they were proclaimed as is clear now from the note.

It may be remembered also that the agreement was, as Acharya Kripalani had the wisdom and the courage to point out, "born in sin". It was concluded immediately after the rape of Tibet. It sanctified that most cowardly and brutal act of China and the

Government of India, by blessing and acquiescing in it, laid open the borders of the country to the armies of China. The border troubles with China which began in 1954 would not have arisen, it is clear, if Tibet had continued to stand as an independent buffer State between the two countries.

The trade agreement did not also lead to any improvement in trade and commerce. The agreement was systematically broken by China from the day it was signed. Any number of oppressive restrictions were imposed upon Indian traders. Even the governmental agencies established according to the agreement were not allowed to function. A treaty which has been so barren of good results and so fertile in the evil consequences which flowed from it should best be forgotten as early as possible. It will be improper and unwise to think of extending or renewing it. Whatever the reasons stated, one is glad to find that the Government of India have also now reached the same conclusion.

The people will not be satisfied, however, with non-renewal of the agreement. They are happy that the Government has decided not to negotiate with China unless she vacates her aggression. But they know that by itself it will have no effect upon the aggressors. The aggression will not be vacated unless the Government takes some positive steps to throw out the aggressors. And in that respect nothing has happened so far which will enable the people to have greater confidence in the Government's desire and ability to repel Chinese aggression. There is always the talk about preparations. But preparations will never be unilateral. They will be going on in the other camp as well. Nobody has yet been able to tell the people when ours will outpace theirs.

The equivocal and unsatisfactory attitude of the Defence Minister is an additional factor which makes the people uncertain about the Government's will to resist and repel aggression. Mr. Menon has to his credit or rather discredit a number of statements since the aggression began whereby he sought to make light of it refusing on some occasions to give that name to the Chinese action. He has capped them all by his statement after the most recent Chinese incursion which took place in the second week of this month. According to the protest note sent by the Government of India, the Chinese have on this occasion established a new military post six miles west of Sundo in Ladakh. The Government assert that it constitutes "a flagrant breach of the repeated assurances extended by the Chinese Government regarding the maintenance of *status quo* in the area".

(Continued on page 4)

The New Djilas Affair

by Ernest Halperin

WHEN the former member of the Yugoslav Politburo, Milovan Djilas, was sentenced to several years imprisonment in 1957 for the publication of his book "The New Class", one could not approve the sentence but it was quite possible to understand it from the Communist point of view. Communist regimes simply do not recognise the principle of freedom of thought and cannot tolerate any fundamental criticism of their institutions. "The New Class" was a fundamental criticism and therefore bound inevitably to anger the Belgrade government as much as it would have done any other Communist regime.

Djilas has now been arrested again and remanded in custody, this time because of the imminent publication of a book which does not contain any attack on the Yugoslav regime or any criticism of Communism. This new book of reminiscences, "Conversations with Stalin", deals with a man who died nine years ago and only describes events which took place at least fourteen years ago. What Djilas has written is not in any sense a hymn in praise of Stalin calculated to annoy the intensely anti-Stalinist Yugoslav leaders. His description of the great tyrant is entirely negative, though he is fair-minded enough not to deny his historical importance.

A man has been arrested not in China or Albania but in anti-Stalinist Yugoslavia because he intends to publish a book critical of Stalin. This makes it seem not only a brutal but also an unconsidered and plainly ridiculous action. It obviously arises from the fact that for the Communists world politics is a great conspiracy. They regard the publication of reports of meetings of Communist Party leaders as the betrayal of conspirator's secrets, even though the meetings took place fifteen years ago and the world political situation and the position of their own country have meanwhile changed completely. The arrest of Milovan Djilas proves that even today the Yugoslav Communist leaders still adhere to this attitude in spite of the fact that they have long since been excluded from the great conspiracy.

The Yugoslavs' desperate attempts to stop the publication of "Conversations with Stalin" inevitably suggest that they have a bad conscience. Their attitude is bound to give the world the impression that the book contains secrets damaging to the prestige of the Tito regime. In fact, however, the manuscript contains no such secrets whatsoever. For a long time now the Western chancelleries have been in no doubt as to the kind of radically anti-Western policy the Yugoslavs were pursuing right up to the time of their exclusion from the Cominform.

That Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in 1948 wanted to intervene together on the side of the partisans in the Greek civil war and that Stalin stopped them because

he did not want to risk a world war was already known from the official biography of Tito by Vladimir Dedijer, which appeared in 1953 with the consent of the Yugoslav Central Committee and of which hundreds of thousands of copies have been sold in the non-Communist world. This knowledge did not prevent the Greek king and queen accepting President Tito's hospitality in Belgrade and on Brioni, nor did it stop the Americans from giving Yugoslavia generous economic aid and, in the years of trouble, military help as well.

There are no rational grounds for the arrest of Milovan Djilas. But the Yugoslav leaders' attitude towards him is not dictated by reason but by emotion, and emotion is notoriously the worst adviser in politics. For them Djilas is an old comrade in arms who suddenly abandoned them and declared war on their cause. For them that was treason. Hence their harshness towards him.

Yugoslav courts have already sentenced Djilas to more than nine years' imprisonment. He served four and a half years partly in solitary confinement, partly in the company of criminals, until the government was induced to release him in response to the pleas of Eleanor Roosevelt, the British Labour Party leaders and other personalities.

But the amnesty which had been promised him did not follow. The pension due to him as a former member of the government has not been paid. Djilas has failed to find a publisher for his non-political books in his own country, in spite of the fact that the reminiscences of his youth in his native Montenegro are probably the most valuable work to be produced in the literature of that country, which does not abound in masterpieces, since the days of the national poet, Prince-Bishop Peter Petrovitch Njegosh.

Djilas's biography of Njegosh, to which he devoted many years, cannot be published in Yugoslavia. Even the issue of Ignazio Silone's magazine in which his moving short story "The War" has appeared, has been banned in Yugoslavia. (It has recently been published in English in "Encounter").

The wrath aroused in them by the "renegade" seems to have completely blinded the Yugoslav leaders to the fact that the rest of the world considers it not treason but courage of a high order when a man openly expresses deviating opinions at the risk of imprisonment and death. They simply do not realise how greatly the international standing of their regime is being damaged by the persecution of this courageous man — and this in spite of the fact that the political influence of their country depends in large measure on how their regime is evaluated by the outside world.

Notes

New Chinese Line

THE Chinese National People's Congress which was convened, after long delays and two postponements, on March 27, has once again proved that in spite of the Sino-Soviet differences, both the sides are not willing to precipitate a crisis or an open rupture. The meeting was held in strict secrecy; no foreigners, including Soviet or Albanian representatives, were allowed to witness or participate in the deliberations of the Congress. The reason for this secrecy was obvious. The Chinese Communists had to grapple with problems which have been weighing down on them since they met two years ago. The problems, of course, have been well-known to the outside world. Internally, the Chinese economy is on the verge of a breakdown and the Chinese leaders have to devise ways and means to save China from ruin as a result of past mistakes in planning, natural calamities and the severe economic consequences of their quarrel with the Soviet Union. Another problem they have to face is whether they should patch up their quarrel with the Soviet Union or push it to an open breach. Though Moscow has taken a very firm stand on the question of the Sino-Soviet differences on ideological issues, it has shrewdly left it to the Chinese to bring the quarrel into the open and thus shoulder the responsibility for an open breach in the communist camp. Besides, Moscow has also used the Chinese economic difficulties to force the Chinese Communists into falling in line with their Soviet comrades. By stopping the Soviet economic aid precisely at the time when China was in the greatest need of it, Khrushchev practically gave a warning of dire consequences of China's continued intransigence. He thus showed his determination not to tolerate any challenge to his leading position in the international communist movement. This firm attitude of the Kremlin has been based on the obvious calculation that the economic crisis in China is so great that Peking is in no position to withstand Russian pressure.

From the reports of the decisions taken at the Chinese Party Congress, it appears that the Kremlin's calculations have proved correct and that the Chinese Communists have decided to retreat from their rigid, militant position, at least temporarily. In the party's theoretical journal *Red Flag*, the Chinese Communists published an article on March 29 outlining their modified stand which is no less than an admission that a "hasten slowly" policy is better than a great leap forward. Though the article stressed the Chinese position that there was no one road to communism, it made the public admission of the need for gradual step by step progress, thus conceding the failure of their adventurous and extravagant economic policies.

Similarly, the Chinese Communists have renewed their campaign of letting "a hundred flowers bloom." Thus, in the domestic sphere at least the Chinese have decided to take one step back, and have yielded to the Soviet pressure. This was evident from the fact that immediately after the publication of the Chinese article, a Soviet trade and economic delegation arrived in Peking for negotiations.

It is yet too early to assess the changes in the Chinese Communist line. It is obvious that the changes have been made essentially because of the great economic hardships which China has been undergoing for the last two years. The Chinese Communists, under the circumstances, cannot afford to continue their militant policies as that would precipitate a breach in the communist camp and would possibly bring about a breakdown of the Chinese Communist system. On the other hand, even Moscow could not use its tactics of economic blackmail for long without the risk of disintegration of the communist bloc. How far the change in the Chinese and Soviet stand is genuine is therefore yet too early to say.

Similarly, it is difficult to assess its effects on the Chinese foreign policy. Any change in the Chinese foreign policy is bound to have a vital bearing on Sino-India relations. Already there have been indications that the Sino-Soviet rapprochement might affect India adversely. For example, Sino-Indian relations, which are rarely mentioned in the Soviet press, were referred to in *Pravda* on 15th April in a *Tass* message from Peking reporting a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement that Peking's proposals for negotiations on a new trade agreement had been turned down by the Indian Government. On previous occasions, when Sino-Indian differences were reported the Soviet press had usually stressed its impartiality by publishing both India's and China's versions. This time, the Soviet press publicised only the Peking's version, which may portend a significant shift in Russian "neutrality" on the question of the Sino-Indian dispute.

Radcliffe Report — Its Lesson

PRACTICALLY nothing has been reported in the Indian press about the Radcliffe Report and its recommendations. The omission is very much to be regretted as both the Report and the recommendations have a good deal of relevance to the conditions as they obtain in our country.

The British Government appointed the committee about a year back to inquire into the present position and effectiveness of security procedures in public services. The committee was appointed after the discovery of a case of espionage in one of the vital services.

The committee did not find any "radical defect" in existing security procedures. It found, however, that the communists had infiltrated into a number of Civil Service unions and had made special efforts to get

into positions of power in those unions. The committee is "disturbed at the number of communists and communist sympathisers who are holding positions either as permanent full-time paid officials or as unpaid officers or members of executive committees". The committee is forced to conclude on the basis of the materials collected by it that the communists "appear in fact to have achieved a higher degree of penetration here (in Civil Service unions) than in almost any other sector of the trade union movement." "This presumably deliberate massing of Communist effort in the Civil Service unions", the committee regards, "as most dangerous to security, however one may define it."

The committee has therefore recommended that "purge procedure should be applicable to named trade union officials". Any department would have the right to deny access to or to refuse to negotiate with an official who it had reason to believe is a communist under the purge definition. Trade union officials thus regarded as objectionable would have the right of appeal to a panel which regularly deals with purge cases. This and other recommendations of the committee have been accepted by the Government.

The committee found that security arrangements in some departments were rather lax. The laxness was probably due, the committee thought, to the "ambivalent attitude on the part of the general public and of the Government towards the Communist Powers and the Communist Party generally". It observed that many public servants found it hard to believe in an enemy who is invisible and of whose existence he may feel somewhat sceptical. Complacency about the designs and activities of Communist Powers and the Communist Party was mainly responsible, it seems, for the gaps in security arrangements.

The Report and the recommendations have a lesson for India. In India also the communists have captured strategic positions in a number of unions of government employees. It will be interesting to find out if this has happened just by chance or as a result of a deliberate plan of the international communist movement. Many of these unions are recognised unions, a number of communists are thus enabled to pry into secrets and to exercise influence over many of those who are in charge of them. The Government of India will have to consider if this state of affairs can be allowed to continue or will need some change in the interest of national security. It may be remembered that Great Britain is not at present faced with a direct threat; while India is, with the Chinese aggression on her northern frontiers. It is moreover known that most communist leaders have their sympathies with China rather than with their own country. It is these additional factors which should make the Report of great interest to the Government and the people of India.

(CHINA & AGGRESSION - Cont'd from page 1)

And yet the Defence Minister had the effrontery of telling his questioners in Madras that "the reported new Chinese incursion into Ladakh did not create any new situation." He asserted moreover that "India would not take the initiative in any action that meant war or turmoil". He added, may be as an afterthought: "We will not sit back if force is used against us. We shall resist it in whatever way we like and we can". One wonders if the Defence Minister thought that the Chinese did not use force when they committed their latest aggression. If force was used, what happened to his brave assurance: "We will not sit back if force is used against us"? As a matter of fact, not only did the Defence Minister "sit back", but went to the extent of asserting that the new aggression "did not create any new situation". If the press reports of Mr. Menon's statements are correct, it must be said that there is a wide divergence between his views and those of the Government of India.

With such a divergence of views regarding the estimate of the situation if not regarding the action to be taken to meet it, one wonders how the Government of India will be able to take effective steps for repelling the aggression. The aggression is in fact a continuing phenomenon. It has been taking place from time to time during the last seven years. It appears that more is in store during the next few months. The type of propaganda that is now being carried on by the Chinese Government, accusing India of aggressive activities, appears to be directed towards preparing the mind of the Chinese people and of the peoples of South East Asia for fresh military operations for repelling the alleged Indian aggression. It may be therefore that the Chinese will be more active on our northern borders during the next few months.

This fact must be brought home to the Indian people. They will then realise the seriousness of the situation and compel the Government to be more alert and energetic in the defence of the northern border. In their latest note the Government of India have already declared their firm intention. The firm intention should now be followed by firm action.

ENCOUNTER

Literature • Arts • Politics

Editors: STEPHEN SPENDER & MELVIN J. LASKY

INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOPATH

by Giles Playfair & Derrick Sington

BETWEEN COMMERCE & THE STATE

by Colin Welch

TOCQUEVILLE ON INDIA

by J. P. Mayer

May 1962

104

Annual Rs. 12/-

Asian Reds Between Moscow & Peking

(Contributed)

THOUGH the two protagonists still avoid naming each other directly, the Sino-Soviet dispute is no nearer a solution. In recent election speeches Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have in particular continued to attack "dogmatists", those who put the "liberation struggle" before peace and disarmament, and those who hope to build communism on a basis of austerity and shortages. The Chinese, meanwhile, began regular broadcasts in Russian to the USSR on February 26. The first programmes were moderate in tone, but expounded and justified Chinese attitudes at length.

As before, the underlying issue has been the "correct" strategy for extending communist power throughout the world in present circumstances. Now the Chinese are increasingly setting up the slogan of "principled coexistence", or coexistence based on the Five Principles, against what they describe as "unconditional" co-existence—i.e., the Soviet version. But in practice the essential feature of principled coexistence is that it applies to China's relations with such neutral neighbours as Burma, Nepal and (generally speaking) India, but cannot apply to relations with "Enemy No. 1"—the United States—or those associated with it, who must be "struggled against" to the end.

On disarmament and the "struggle for peace", the dispute continues to centre on the relative priority to be given to these aims or to the liberation struggle in colonial and developing countries. A major editorial article in *Kommunist* in January and subsequent Soviet commentaries stressed that disarmament by the Great Powers would not interfere with "liberation struggles" or involve the "peoples" in colonial and developing countries giving up their armed forces. Chinese spokesmen, on the other hand, have insisted that first priority must be given to revolutionary and anti-American movements everywhere. But with the opening of the Geneva disarmament conference, the Chinese line shifted slightly. Much more attention was given to the subject and full support expressed for the Soviet proposals, but it soon became clear that in Chinese eyes the negotiations are another occasion for "exposing the imperialists". They claimed that President Kennedy's decision to resume tests and increase defences "exposed" the aggressiveness underlying his "peace tricks", while the Western Powers' resistance to immediate acceptance of Soviet disarmament proposals "exposed" their insincerity in negotiating at all.

An indication of any Party's attitude to the organisational (rather than doctrinal) unity of the world communist movement is mainly given in its view of the Albanian leadership and of the Soviet

attacks on it. Since the Party Congress, the Soviet leaders have enlisted the support of many more Parties in attacking the Albanians, though apparently not enough (or not the right ones) to allow Albania's public expulsion from the bloc. Meanwhile, some who had remained aloof have now revealed a pro-Chinese alignment by listing Albania as a member of the bloc or paying tributes to Albanian achievements and leadership. While appeals to maintain world communist unity and solidarity usually indicate a pro-Chinese alignment, the Soviet and pro-Soviet Parties proclaim their belief in world communist unity based on the "creative" Soviet policies adopted at the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses. The Chinese, on the other hand, repeat the compromise formulas on unity and co-operation embodied in the 1960 Moscow Declaration, even sometimes including its view that in the present period the Soviet Party remains the "vanguard" of world communism.

In spite of Soviet pressures, the only Asian bloc Communist Party so far to endorse the Soviet position fully is that of Outer Mongolia. The Mongolian First Party Secretary, Tsedenbal, sharply attacked the Albanian leaders at a Party meeting in January and the personality cult in Mongolia.

The two other bloc Asian Parties, those of North Vietnam and North Korea, have continued to avoid any commitment to either side and have demonstrated their hopes that formal unity at least will be maintained in the communist movement. Both sent warm greetings to the Albanian leaders for the New Year and continued to list Albania as a member of the bloc. But they have not echoed Chinese formulations on the issues in dispute. The North Vietnamese Party originated out of the Soviet model, though it has copied many Chinese policies in the past few years. Ho Chi Minh's opposition to a split that might involve North Vietnam falling entirely into the Chinese camp has been demonstrated by his continuing tributes to the Soviet as well as the Chinese leaders. At the end of February, a high-level Soviet Party delegation, led by B. N. Ponomarev, visited Hanoi. The Korean leaders, on the other hand, have recently leant slightly further towards China by supporting the Chinese position on the Sino-Indian frontier dispute.

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is the largest non-bloc Party in Asia (claiming about 2 million members) and probably the most united. After a period of considerable wavering, its leaders have adopted a generally pro-Chinese line, stressing in particular the need for world communist unity based on the 1960 Moscow Statement. In a speech in Djakarta on November 27, the Party's leader D.

N. Aidit echoed Chinese dissatisfaction at the open airing of a dispute between two Communist Parties and called on Party members to study Albanian as well as Soviet statements. At a Party Central Committee meeting at the end of December, Aidit went further. The PKI could not be indifferent to the problems faced by the international communist movement, he declared, and "where a split occurs, we must actively do something to restore unity". Unity should grow, he said, if every Marxist-Leninist Party stood by the world Communist Declarations of 1957 and 1960. While echoing the 1960 Statement's formulation about each Party being "equal and independent", he stressed that this did not mean they should become autonomous or that there could be any question of "polycentrism". Polycentrism "reveals a hesitancy as regards the Soviet Communist Party", he said; but "let there be no doubt about it" the Soviet Party was the one and only "vanguard" of the world communist movement and the creation of more than one would "greatly weaken the movement". For this reason, the PKI could not possibly agree to such an idea.

More specifically, the communist plan is to prevent "progressive" programme.

A resolution adopted at the same PKI meeting endorsed Aidit's position at the Soviet Party Congress in "not joining in the attacks on Albania", which, it said, were not in conformity with the 1960 Moscow Statement and would not facilitate the solution of outstanding problems. It also emphasised that Stalin had been a "leader of the international working class" and that his reputation was a subject for discussion by "every communist and democrat", though it acknowledged that his mistakes must be criticised in order to "ensure advance".

Finally, in an interview reported in the Party daily *Harian Rakjat* on March 6, Aidit echoed Chinese views on international issues by describing President Kennedy's Government as "more aggressive and more undemocratic than Eisenhower's", by urging people to reject "illusions about Kennedy's peaceful intentions", and by defending the PKI's "fight against modern revisionism... upheld by the Yugoslav leaders" as a "fight to maintain the purity of Marxism-Leninism".

The PKI's attitude is affected by its own strategic position between Soviet and Chinese pressures and its fear of internal divisions. The irony of the 22nd Congress for the Indonesian leaders was its disastrous effect on bloc unity just as they had apparently won the support of the Soviet, Chinese and many other Parties for a plan to exploit the West New Guinea crisis so as to extend their own power. According to Aidit, the PKI delegation to the Congress had talks with Party leaders from five continents, all of whom supported the PKI's "struggle for West Irian and struggle against imperialism in general".

More specially, the communist plan is to prevent any peaceful settlement with the Netherlands over New Guinea and to urge President Sukarno not only

to train youth groups for the "struggle to liberate West Irian", but also to train "workers and peasants and the two million members of the Communist Party" in the use of arms (Aidit to the PKI Central Committee). The Party's main line internally is to continue building up and educating its cadres in outlying districts, so as to "complete the demands of the 1945 revolution" (e.g., more extensive land reform and nationalisation) before going on to any specially communist programme. On tactics, Aidit continues to support a united front with President Sukarno's Nationalist followers and with all "progressives", but increasingly stresses that the PKI is "not a club but a militant organisation". This reflects the growing hints over the past two years of PKI dissatisfaction at the small dividends brought by its gradualist and peaceful tactics. When the PKI leaders set out to make the Party a mass one in 1954-5, the aim was to try to capture power through the ordinary parliamentary elections. But in spite of winning 6 million votes at the 1955 elections (about 16½ per cent of the total vote) and co-operating closely with Sukarno, the PKI failed to secure an influential political role. In July, 1960, the PKI accused Sukarno's Administration, though not Sukarno personally, of failing to carry out its programme and of pandering to the Western Powers. It went on to suggest that only a Government that included "progressive and Left persons" could carry out a really "progressive" programme.

But the question of Soviet and Chinese support for any Indonesian Communist bid for power is obviously a key factor. Though the PKI's present leaning towards militant tactics makes China its natural ally, the Chinese are generally unpopular in Indonesia. On the other hand, the close co-operation that the Soviet leaders have developed with President Sukarno would seem to preclude any rash Soviet encouragement for Indonesian communist adventures. The position should become clearer at the PKI Congress, due to take place in April.

For the Japanese and Indian Parties, the main pre-occupation aroused by the developing Sino-Soviet dispute is to avoid being split into opposing factions. The death of Ajoy Ghosh, the Indian Communist Party's General Secretary, last January, had already removed a conciliatory figure from the Party leadership and opened the way to a struggle for power between the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese leaders left in the Secretariat. In addition the Party is divided geographically, with the Party organisations in Andhra, Kerala, Madras and West Bengal urging more militant tactics in line with Chinese examples. Except in Madras, these branches made some advances in the February general election. But a majority of the Party branches are still dominated by pro-Soviet factions.

Traditionally pro-Soviet, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has recently shown signs of moving closer to the Chinese viewpoint. It is a small and deeply divided Party, claiming a membership of only

(Continued on page 8)

Ghana - A One-Party State

by Adam Adil

WHEN after the conclusion of the Second World War, most Asian States, which were dominated by one or the other Western imperialisms, became free, it was the turn of the African countries to attain full and unfettered freedom and nationhood. The process of African freedom was as warmly welcomed by the rest of the world as that of the Asian nations. Asia and Africa stood on the threshold of an era of freedom and development, of social and economic equality and of intellectual and spiritual progress.

But the initial enthusiasm for freedom and progress of Asia and Africa was often marred by unhappy developments in certain recently freed states. These developments were generally of undemocratic character. Corrupt and unscrupulous politicians had paved the way for ambitious military officers to stage coup d'etat and destroy the very fabric of democracy in some of the countries.

The latest country where democracy is becoming a casualty of personal ambition is Ghana. Unlike in some other countries, here, it is not the militarists who are destroying democracy, but the politicians led by the head of the State himself. Ghana is speedily becoming a one-party state where all opposition to the ruling party or the President is scuttled by methods, which characterise the totalitarian states.

President Kwame Nkrumah, it is well-known, has been implicitly, often explicitly, advocating one-party state. In a recent speech, he described the Opposition United Party as "defunct." It is "defunct" not because of its failure to attract followers in the country—in fact, it commands a large following—but because all of its leaders, at national as well as at local levels, have been arrested and put into prison. Under the Preventive Detention Act, so far, a person could be arrested and detained without trial for a period of five years. But it seems Dr. Nkrumah is not satisfied with this period. He has recently announced that in the future the release of detainees at the end of the five years would not be automatic and that the Act would be amended to enable the Government to extend the period of detention upto twenty years. Further, in order to equate the ruling Conventional People's Party with the State, Dr. Nkrumah has proposed that village-councils, with appropriate administrative powers would be soon established throughout Ghana, and that the offices of the Chairmen of such councils would be occupied by the local Chairmen of the Conventional People's Party and that other "comrades of the village party" would be appointed on the councils and invested with powers under the law. This is being done in addition to the fact that even under the divisional and district commissioners in Ghana are Party nominees and the principle of non-partisan

administration is considered unsuitable to the conditions in Ghana.

It is obvious that even those who had expressed sympathetic appreciation of the difficult problems faced by Dr. Nkrumah in the wake of Ghana's freedom and who had most charitably explained away some of his disconcerting actions, have now begun to realise that Dr. Nkrumah is not so innocent after all and that he is consciously and willfully turning Ghana into a totalitarian state with himself occupying the place of an unchallenged dictator. The evidence of his ruthless methods of suppressing opposition has piled up and it leaves no room for reasonable doubt.

It is true that in the beginning Dr. Nkrumah faced a difficult situation. Though the Leno-Boyd Constitution formally provided for a unitary form of state, it conferred such large powers on the regions and traditional tribal authorities as to encourage them into separatist, parochial or fissiparous tendencies. Dr. Nkrumah, therefore, adopted policies or tactics calculated to discourage all forms of separatisms. He was often harsh at putting down parochial mischief. This was understandable in view of the fact that the Convention People's Party which was solely responsible for the attainment of Ghana's freedom from Britain was anxious to forge the sense of national unity and solidarity throughout the country before fissiparous tendencies raised their heads. The Gold Coast had become Ghana with the aim of strengthening the roots of common nationality of the Ghanaian people. Dr. Nkrumah introduced constitutional reforms and thereby consolidated the central authority, despite the protest of the opposition parties which, by and large, represented narrow regional and tribal interests. The introduction of Preventive Detention Act, with its provision for detention without trial for five years was, of course, disturbing, but it assumed some semblance of justification in the prevailing context. It could serve as a deterrent to those who might have been tempted to subvert the state through secessionist moves.

But all these are no justification for the latest attitude of Dr. Nkrumah. The Preventive Detention Act, after initially serving its objective was made use of for destroying all opposition to the personal power of the President. Every opposition leader of some repute has been imprisoned without trial and there is no knowing when he will be released. And now there is the threat of detention without trial to be extended to nearly twenty years!

The White Paper published by Dr. Nkrumah's government which attempts to show that the opposition leaders were engaged in a sinister conspiracy against the state, is undoubtedly least convincing. It

is a matter of common sense that Ghana does not lack enough number of patriotic people and that every opposition leader cannot be unpatriotic or anti-national or anti-state. Further, the role of these opposition leaders in the attainment of Ghana's freedom was, in no way, insignificant.

The only explanation for the behaviour of Dr. Nkrumah is that he is trying to build himself into an unquestioned dictator of Ghana. He has not only imprisoned opposition leaders but has weeded out all those from within the ranks of Convention People's Party who challenged his leadership. He has suppressed all trade unions which have dared to organise strikes or otherwise protest against some of the harsher aspects of the economic policies of the Ghana Government. He has gathered round himself and in the government only such people as flatter him and submit to him without questioning the propriety of his actions.

The developments in Ghana have shocked the civilised world and caused disappointment in Asian and

African countries which had hoped that Ghana's example would inspire newly independent African states towards constructive democratic ideals. The increasing criticism in the Western and other democratic countries against Dr. Nkrumah's brazen contempt for elementary human rights, has led him to seek support from the Soviet Union, which is too willing to oblige morally if not materially. Dr. Nkrumah may not be a communist or a cryptocommunist, but his pro-Soviet line in external affairs will suit his internal policies. This fact should be borne in mind by Western countries when they try to woo Dr. Nkrumah by giving him generous economic aid. Let the Western aid be not misused for strengthening anti-democratic forces in Ghana. This is, however, not to suggest that all Western aid to Ghana must be stopped, but to point out that some moral obligations must be imposed on Dr. Nkrumah as a condition of Western aid. This attitude on the part of Western countries will be, indeed, appreciated by the democratic minded people of Ghana.

(ASIAN REDS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING - Continued from page 6)

about 80,000 members; but this figure amounts to double the membership of three years ago and in the light of Japan's important position in Asia and proximity to China, the Soviet leaders are probably dismayed at the way the Party is developing. So far, none of its leaders has given any clear indication of its stand on the Sino-Soviet issues in dispute, but it has significantly refrained from criticising the Albanian leaders.

The first signs that the JCP was moving Leftwards again (it has been through several such phases in the past, but usually to its disadvantage) came in 1960 when a majority of its members insisted that its primary task must be to free Japan from "United States imperialism" and only its second to move towards a transition to "Socialism" or Communism. The minority held that Japanese "monopoly capitalism" was the first and main enemy. At the 8th Party Congress held last July after several postponements, the first group won the day and secured the adoption of their views as official Party policy. At the same time the Party left itself free to use "peaceful" or "violent" methods in seeking to carry out its aims, depending on the attitude of "the enemy".

One sequel to this Leftward turn was the expulsion of Kasuga, a veteran Party member, and several other Party leaders. Kasuga had resigned on the eve of the Japanese Party Congress, complaining that the dominant group were packing the Congress and preventing the opposition from making its views heard. The Party's reaction was prompt and violent. Kasuga and 11 other Party members, including several members of the Central Committee, were officially expelled and attacked as "treacherous, Right-wing, revisionist and corrupt". Kasuga subsequently formed a new

dissident communist group, but his expulsion has had far-reaching repercussions leading to further divisions in such communist-front organisations as the two youth associations (*Zenjiren* and *Zengakuren*) and the New Japan Literary Party. An indication of China's approval of the trends in the JCP was given in its enthusiastic welcome for the expulsion of Kasuga, who was said to be "an exponent of revisionism". In addition, the Chinese Party's message to the Congress described the JCP as "all along loyal to Marxism-Leninism" and "defending its purity". China has been host to a number of the present JCP leaders in recent months.

But the Soviet leaders, too, are reported to have demonstrated their interest in Japanese Party tactics and to have had sharp exchanges with Nosaka and Myamoto, the JCP Chairman and Secretary-General respectively, during their visit to Moscow in October for the Soviet Party Congress.

How Communists Destroy Democracy

A LESSON FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA



Price Rupee One

Available from

DEMOCRATIC RESEARCH SERVICE
127, Mahatma Gandhi Road
Bombay 1

Albania's Moves Under Scrutiny

by John B. Wood

WILL the truculent yet badly harassed Albania eventually turn to the West for help?

To see one Communist State quarrel with another is not what it was when Tito first broke with Stalin back in 1948. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to underestimate the potentialities of the Albanian situation from the point of view of the free world. Whatever the precise value of a foothold on the other side of the Adriatic might be, the very fact that a forward-looking and purposeful policy has been applied on a communist State by the West would bring fresh encouragement to all those who strive for freedom in Eastern Europe. But even if Albania is not promptly turned into a democratic State, it should be borne in mind that even the most inveterate Communists have gradually turned into something more reasonable once they finally broke with Moscow.

Only one thing could, however, induce General Hoxha to turn to the West: economic plight. This was the only reason why Tito eventually accepted Western support. But in the case of Albania the situation is more complicated. On the basis of a long-term credit agreement signed in February, 1961, and worth about 125 million dollars, China is now unloading large quantities of industrial machinery, tractors and a wide range of other goods in Albanian ports. In 1958 China supplied only 2.3 per cent of Albania's imports; this year the percentage is 59.1.

Chinese help for Hoxha fits in nicely with the present quarrels in the Communist camp. Less clear are, however, the economic relations between Albania and Russia's European satellites. An over-keen analyst might interpret the very great increase in Czech-Albanian trade this year as an indication of underlying sympathies and affinities between the two regimes. There may be something in this. The Albanians, who normally shower abuse on Mr. Khrushchev and his puppets in Eastern Europe, have come out with an enthusiastic support for the Czechoslovak Government when this decided to prosecute a former vice-premier, Mr. Rudolf Barak, who had an anti-Stalinist reputation. It may on the other hand be argued that Czechoslovakia is a special case because Albanian exports of chromium and nickel ores are particularly desirable there, due to some new factories which have been built to process these materials. At all events, the share of Czechoslovakia in Albania's import trade went up from 15 per cent in 1961 to 17.4 per cent in 1962.

But Poland — by no means a Stalinist State — has also increased its trade exchanges with Albania and so have Bulgaria, Hungary and Eastern Germany. Even Yugoslavia has concluded a new trade protocol. Only Russia stays aloof. But it is quite obvious that these satellites would not dare to sabotage an econo-

mic blockade of Albania if such a measure were decided by the Soviet Union.

But why should Russia wish to support the offensive Gen. Hoxha in this indirect way? It is tempting to conclude that Mr. Khrushchev does it in order to prevent Albania from slipping entirely into the Chinese fold. But Albania is already desperately dependent on China, and there is every reason to believe that if these two allies wanted to strengthen further their mutual ties they would do it. If General Hoxha had any reason to suspect that the satellite economic assistance is meant to loosen his ties with China he would no doubt refuse to fall into such a trap. A much more likely interpretation is that Moscow and all the other Communists, including the Yugoslavs, are anxious that Gen. Hoxha's adventurism should not expose Albania to some Western influences which might possibly enable a really democratic movement, such as that of the Albanian Agrarian Democratic Party, the Balli Kombetar, to assert itself.

This, of course, is about the only thing Gen. Hoxha would like less than shaking hands with Mr. Khrushchev. That is why his feelers to the West have so far been extremely cautious. The only non-Communist country with which Albania has dealings with any significance is Italy (the only other two "Western" countries which are represented in Tirana are France and Turkey).

There has indeed been some increase in Italo-Albanian trade lately, after a new three-year trade agreement was signed last December. But this remains marginal as Albania's exchanges with the non-Communist world, and this including a large number of non-committed countries, accounts for less than 10 per cent of Albania's total trade. The recent row over the expulsion of an Albanian diplomat from Rome (he was accused of spying) and the subsequent expulsion of an Italian diplomat from Tirana served to illustrate the point that Albania is by no means ripe for a pro-Western course.

There have been some promising reports of a possible reconciliation between Albania and Greece. But initial timid steps, which included the return of some hundred or so Greek hostages from Albania, have apparently ended in a blind alley. War is technically still on between the two countries, and Greece continues to claim a large part of Albanian territory. It is worth noting that all Albanians — Communists and non-Communists alike — vigorously dispute this claim.

But now, when the Albanian Government has freed itself from Soviet tutelage and direct control, it may well gain confidence and begin to look around for

(Continued on page 11)

Without Comment

AGRICULTURE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

As part of its effort to do something about Czechoslovakia's flagging agriculture, the Czech Communist party has decided to extend social security benefits to the collective farms farmers. The programme will take the form of a comprehensive social security system with a sliding scale of benefits depending on plan fulfilment. Farmers fulfilling the state plan and meeting all their deliveries will be eligible for maximum benefits.

The programme was announced in the report of Jiri Hendrych at a session of the Central Committee which was held on February 6 and 7. In his report Hendrych painted a grim picture of the situation in the countryside. "The increase in agricultural production was very low last year," he said. "Over-all production increased by about one percent while crop production declined compared with the preceding year. The failure to fulfil the planned tasks is mainly due to lower production of grains, potatoes, sugar beet, corn and livestock, particularly pork. The main cause, however, was poor treatment of land, inadequate attention to seeds, careless and belated treatment of crops, low utilization of machines, inadequate organizational work and the shortcomings of the working people." Hendrych also cited the lack of good arable land, brought about by unwise building practices, and the drain of manpower from the countryside into the industrial cities. In January as many as 36 districts failed to reach their production goals. "From what I am saying," added Hendrych, "the conclusion could be drawn that even this year's reduced targets are beyond our capabilities."

— AND IN POLAND

The big harvest of last fall has brought pragmatic justification for Warsaw's support of private farming. Poland is the only country in the Soviet bloc which has not collectivized its agriculture, and almost the only one in which the authorities could take satisfaction in the crop statistics. The Warsaw weekly *Polityka* said on December 30 that the good harvest had resulted from "a wise social policy combining social profit with the interests of the individual; this individual is the farmer, connected — sometimes not always quite consciously — with the worker and with the building of socialism."

In January the Poles received encouragement from an unexpected quarter. P. Demichev, leader of a visiting delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, declared himself impressed by the achievements of the Poles in "building socialism," and added that "we also found out that the agricultural policy of your party is bring-

ing good results. This year Poland has obtained high yields of grain and of sugar beets. It is obvious that your party attaches great importance to the development of agriculture.... We share your joy in the achievements of your agriculture. We wish your agriculture a further development and a maintenance of its present speed." (*Trybuna Ludu*, January 27.)

However, planners in Warsaw were concerned that the peasant might be enriching himself at the expense of other sectors of the economy. The report of the Politburo at the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee (November 21, 1961) asserted the need to "curb the increases in cash income from agriculture." In 1961, peasant income rose 12.6 percent as compared with a rise in real wages in industry of 3.1 percent. Another disturbing aspect from the planners' point of view is that the increase in farmers' cash income was more than four percent higher than the increase in total farm output for the year. To offset the rises in wage income in agriculture as well as in other economic sectors, "it is planned to decelerate the increase in real wages and in real incomes of the agricultural population during the first two years in order to curb the increase of individual consumption."

RUSSIAN AID TO CHINA

The news that Russian aid to China has been stopped does not come as a surprise since even in 1960 Russian technicians in China, of whom there were ten thousand at one time, were being withdrawn. Both Russian and Chinese sources agreed that this happened because of ideological differences and the official Russian journal in Peking and the Chinese journal in Moscow ceased publication at that time. Though a compromise formula was found at the conference of all Communist parties at the end of 1960, Sino-Soviet differences continued and the Russians resented Chinese interference in their "sphere of influence" in Albania. However, in February 1961, a Soviet Trade Delegation went to Peking and it was believed that Russian aid would continue, though on a reduced scale. But it seems that all that emerged from the visit was a Russian agreement to extend the period for the payment of the Chinese debts already owing to them.

Reliable information on Soviet aid to China is not easy to obtain, partly for the reason that much of the aid takes the form of deferred credit and is difficult to distinguish from normal trade relations. Two long-term loans were given in 1950 and 1954 but the sums involved were not large. Before and after the Korean War, the Chinese obtained large quantities of military equipment from Russia and there were Chinese complaints in 1956 that the Russians were exacting full payment for these weapons. But there is no doubt about the fact that during the past decade Russia has supplied complete plants and industrial factories to China to the tune of about \$2,000 million (Rs. 1,000

crores). Russia's exports to China were three times her exports to all the undeveloped countries in the world. China paid for this with raw materials, food, mineral ores and consumer goods, especially cotton and silk textiles. She became in fact Russia's greatest supplier. While this was a useful complementary trade, it did not allow for a sudden rift of the kind that has now occurred. The Chinese had bumper crops in 1958 but in later years the harvests were poor.

Last year Sino-Soviet trade fell by fifty per cent as China had little raw material to offer and could not obtain maintenance imports from Russia. The Chinese have had to arrange for shipments of wheat from Australia and Canada on a ten per cent deposit basis and there was a recent report that they had tried to obtain wheat from a private source in the United States. Licence to export was, however, refused by the U.S. Government which took the line that since it was the Chinese Government that was asking for wheat, it would be given only on a government-to-government basis. Meanwhile, the textile industry and the coal mines of China have had to cut production as a result of their dependence on Russian orders. Another consequence of the break-down in Sino-Soviet relations is that China has been forced to open trade relations with Britain and Japan. She has purchased Viscount planes from Britain and is asking for petrol also. But there is a definite limit to what she can buy unless large foreign credits can be arranged. There is little doubt that Chinese industrialisation will have to be halted until there is better agricultural production. —*Hindu*, March 31.

PASTERNAK TO BE REHABILITATED?

Preparations are observed which aim at the rehabilitation of Pasternak and his works in the USSR. "Dr. Zhivago" is in fact already in print with negligible changes which do not affect the author's meaning. In this connection, well-informed people have envisaged the release of Pasternak's friend Olga Ivinskaja and her daughter, both arrested after the poet's death and sent to labour camps. Pasternak's literary legacy is in the hands of Ilja Ehrenburg, who is working on its publication. A selection of Pasternak's lyrics, 370 pages long, was recently published in 30,000 copies, which were practically out of print overnight. There may even be a monument erected over his grave in Peredelkino. It is all a highly political move intended to impress and confuse the West. —*Feature & News From Behind The Iron Curtain*, April 18.

CASH PRIZES FOR WORKERS

Communist China has begun giving out cash prizes as incentives to its industrial workers, a device normally associated with capitalistic practices, reports AP. This has been disclosed for the first time in the People's Daily of Peking.

RUSSIA: A MASTER COLONIAL POWER

Soviet Russia squeezes about a billion dollars a year out of her seven European satellites through economic exploitation—according to a new study based on official Soviet statistics.

The trick is done by overcharging the satellites for Soviet exports, and underpaying them for Soviet imports.

A study of Soviet yearbooks, made for the Assembly of Captive European Nations by Aleksander Kutt, an economist from Estonia, showed this:

In 1956, Russia was buying wheat from the West at \$62.30 a ton—and selling wheat to East Europe at \$82.60 a ton. In 1957, Russia imported wheat at \$58.40; exported it to satellites at \$81.10.

In 1960, Mr. Kutt found overcharging up to 300 per cent in 41 commodities traded with East Europe. In 1959, Outer Mongolia was forced to pay twice as much as Japan did for Soviet crude oil.

The study's conclusion: Russia is a "master colonial power" engaged in economic "looting."

—*U.S. News & World Report*, April 23, 1962

A return to capitalist-style practices in the Chinese countryside has already been noted. In an effort to overcome serious grain shortages, the communist regime has for some time been encouraging farmers to cultivate private plots of land and sell their products in old-fashioned country fairs.

Explaining the reasons for the employment of a "capitalist" device, the paper said: "At the socialist stage, despite the considerable rise in the ideological consciousness of the broad masses of labourers as a result of party education and of the practice in a series of social reforms, the old concepts, habits and psychology formed under the influence of the private ownership system and of the exploiting class in the past cannot be completely eradicated in a short time."

—*Statesman*, April 8.

(ALBANIA — Continued from page 9)

possibilities which are more in line with Albania's position and interests than the present liaison with China.

It is perhaps significant that the Albanian Government has now decided to open the country's frontiers a little wider this year to Western tourists. In the past only select guests could come in, but now groups of tourists will be allowed to visit the country. In September the first group of British tourists for many years will go to Albania (minimum cost £125 by rail and air) to visit Tirana, Durazzo, the ancient town of Berat, the archaeological centre of Gjinabaster and other places for a total of 10 days. It is an interesting experiment.

With Many Voices

"The deep
Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world."

—Tennyson.

"..... a certain totalitarian empire, which muzzles fourteen nations, and yet lavishes insults on 'so-called colonialist' France."

— General de Gaulle, quoted in *The Economist*,
(London) March 31

Recently Mr. Krishna Menon expressed great concern about traitors in the Congress. Go they must, he declared indignantly and emphatically. Nothing easier. Let him forthwith resign from the Congress. Let him make the pro-Communist fellow-travellers who under his aegis have successfully infiltrated the Congress also resign. There will then be no traitors left in the Congress.

— *Opinion*, April 10.

Only an idiot never reacts. The question, rather, is whether we react healthily or morbidly, prudently or frantically.

—Russell Kirk, *National Review*,
February 27.

If we do not adopt a policy of recognising our friends before we recognise our enemies.....we will find ourselves standing alone at some future day when we are confronted with dire peril..... by the Soviet Union.

— Senator Russel, quoted in the *U. S. News & world Report*, April 16.

To the Editor,
FREEDOM FIRST,
C/o Democratic Research Service,
127, Mahatma Gandhi Road,
Bombay 1.

Please enrol me as a subscriber to FREEDOM FIRST.
I remit the annual subscription of Rs. 3!

Name:

Address:

Signature

Politicians are more afraid of their voters than journalists are of their readers.

—*The Economist*, London, April 14.

"Communism also belongs to the twentieth century," Mr. Lippmann writes. Aye, just so; few recognise that fact better than Senator Goldwater and Senator Thurmond. But they, being conservatives with backbone, have made up their minds that the twentieth century must not belong to Communism."

— Russel Kirk, *National Review*,
February 27.

Manners do not make the man, but unmanners unmake him.

— Katherine Whitehorn, *Spectator*
(London) March 9

The predominant party at any one period is that which successfully merges positive class issues with persuasive classlessness.

— *The Economist*, London, April 6.

Mr. Nehru is emerging as the world's greatest self-contradictor.

—*Indian Libertarian*, April 15.

Dinner jackets, like party manners, cannot be discarded until you have them.

— Katharine Whitehorn, in the *Spectator*,
London, March 9.

FREEDOM FIRST

Published on the first of each month



Annual Subscription: Rs. 3

Single Copy: 25 nP



Maneckji Wadia Building, 4th Floor,
127 Mahatma Gandhi Road,
Bombay 1.