

Preconditions To Victory

by V. B. Karnik

COMMUNIST CHINA is now engaged in a war against our country. It may be an undeclared war but, none the less, it is a war and must be recognised as such. What is happening in Ladakh and NEFA are not intrusions and frontier skirmishes, but a deliberate and pre-planned attempt to occupy all strategic passes and strongholds and to destroy our defences on the frontier. This is the first step in the direction of the conquest and occupation of the entire Himalayan belt on the Indian side, including the kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim and NEFA area. Once these areas are conquered, India and the whole of South East Asia can be easily converted into vassal states taking their orders from the communist regime in Peking. This is the objective the communist rulers of China have in view and they will continue to wage a war against India and other free nations until it is realised.

The war may be sometimes hot and sometimes cold; and from time to time there may be spells of lull. India has experienced all these forms of war during the last twelve years. The latest phase is that of a hot war. It has broken out at both the ends of our northern frontier. The offensive was, as usual, taken by the Chinese. They marched into our territory and have overrun it. Our brave soldiers resisted these attacks. In a few places they were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. In other places they had to retreat in the face of the vastly superior might of the enemy. We have already lost some territory and a number of our strategic outposts. The winter may intervene and put a stop to fighting. But it will be resumed, as soon as the weather improves, in one form or another and at one place or the other. The enemy that we have to face is, in the words of the Prime Minister, "powerful and unscrupulous". He is also cunning and crafty and has no scruples about means and methods in the pursuit of his aims. There will be no end to the war until he succeeds in gaining his aim or we succeed in defeating him and throwing him out of our country.

In a war there should be no internal dissension and everybody should rally under the national flag in order to put up a determined resistance. That is the

patriotic duty of every citizen. But while performing that duty, it is also his duty to see that the war in which he is engaged, may be, in a civilian capacity is being fought resolutely and consistently. If he finds any weakening in this respect, it is equally his sacred duty to raise his voice of protest and to warn the country against any slackening of effort. Free discussion, criticism and opposition are the strength of a Democracy at war.

A war can be won, it should be clear, only through well-directed efforts. Efforts will not be well-directed unless the real significance of the war is properly grasped. One can legitimately wonder if, even at this stage, the Government of India have grasped the full significance of the war that has been thrust upon them. Are they aware that the war is not for a few thousand miles of the barren and hilly areas near the boundary? China would not engage in a war with India for a few thousand miles of territory. It is a war for the subjugation of our country as a communist vassal state. It is a war for the domination of Asia. It is also a war for the domination of the world. The fight that is going on in South Vietnam, in Berlin or around Cuba is part and parcel of the fight that has now erupted on our frontier. The utterances and actions of the Prime Minister and other leaders of the Government do not give one an idea that even now they have grasped this significance of the war.

For fifteen long years, the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister and others have talked of the undying friendship between China and India and Panchsheel which were to be a model to the rest of the world. Hypnotised by that picture, they allowed China to grab Tibet and to establish there a base for operations beyond the Himalayas. Unsuspecting as they were, they paid no heed to avowed Chinese claims to Indian territory expressed through their maps or to the warnings sounded in Parliament and the press. When after a couple of years, the cartographic aggression took the form of territorial aggression, they regarded it as the action of local commanders which did not have the sanction of the Government in Peking. Obsessed by that fond belief, they kept the country in the dark about the aggression in Ladakh for over two years. They allowed the Chinese to occupy over 14,000 square miles of our territory without any resistance. In spite of brave declarations made from time to time they failed to build up the defence of the country, as a result of which we are finding ourselves today, in the words of the Defence Minister "outnumbered and out-

weaponed". History will take note of all these failures and weaknesses and may regard as "guilty men" those who are responsible for the situation in which the country finds herself today.

The supreme task of the moment is to mobilise all forces and win the war. The news from both sectors of the frontiers is not encouraging. We have met with many reverses, mainly because we did not have enough men and enough equipment. Both these deficiencies must be immediately removed. We are not short of men. We are woefully short of equipment. We must buy, borrow or accept as aid, the necessary equipment from wherever it is available. Accepting equipment from friendly countries is not even in contravention of the policy of non-alignment. Many non-aligned nations including Tito's Yugoslavia have already adopted that course. The safety and effectiveness of our soldiers and the independence of our country are far more important than the policy of non-alignment. Any reluctance to avail ourselves of the equipment that will be readily available in U.K. and the U.S.A. will amount to putting our fighting forces at a disadvantage. They will have to fight against an enemy equipped with all modern arms with insufficient and outdated weapons of warfare.

We shall not win the war if we fight it with our hands tied behind our back. Our hands are tied because we have not yet broken off diplomatic relations with China. We even gave aid and comfort to the enemy by supporting his claim to be admitted to the United Nations. They are tied because we are not yet prepared to open an offensive against the Chinese by encouraging revolutionary activities in Tibet and Sinkiang and by helping the brave Khampas who are still fighting in Tibet. All these steps are necessary if there is to be a real fight against the Chinese. Simultaneously, there must be a complete embargo on all talk or thoughts of negotiations. Even today, the Government of India have not given up their hope of settling the border problem with China through peaceful negotiations. According to the latest information, it appears that they would be prepared to open negotiations if China would vacate aggression committed after September 8. This position amounts in fact to the acceptance of the Chinese conquests up to that date. This is a dishonourable position to adopt and shows how even now the Government of India are vacillating and wavering. It is to be hoped that public opinion and the force of circumstances will compel them to give up that vacillation and wavering and adopt the forthright position of no talks until the Chinese vacate all aggression.


Now that the battle is joined, everybody will be for winning it as early and as decisively as possible. There will be no lack of popular support, but there should be no slackening of the effort until the last invading soldier is thrown out of the borders of our country. The struggle that we have to wage is a long and grim struggle. The Chinese have left us no alternative.

The Government must, of course, lead the struggle.

A government with the widest possible popular support can alone lead it effectively. The Congress Government has a large majority behind it in Parliament, but it cannot be forgotten that it received in the last general election only 45 per cent vote. Those who did not vote for the Congress, and they constitute majority of the voters, are not less patriotic. It is essential to secure their association and support. A reconstitution of the Government is therefore an urgent necessity. It should be broadened by the inclusion of representatives of other democratic parties. Along with the broadening, there should be also a drastic change in policy which has so far tended more towards appeasement than a resolute defence of the independence and integrity of the country.

It is also necessary to entrust the defence of the country to a more reliable person. The Defence Minister has been under a cloud of suspicion since long. His actions and utterances have proved him to be a person very much under the influence of communist ideology. His sympathies have been all along with communist nations. He cannot be relied upon to lead the country's fight against its communist enemies. Moreover, the misfortunes that have befallen us on the frontier have proved him to be incompetent and negligent. There is a growing demand in the country for his replacement. The demand should be accepted without wasting any more time.

Such changes in policy and personnel will go a long way towards infusing confidence in the minds of the people. The people will then rally round the Government and work actively and enthusiastically for victory.



"Do not play with fire."

—Latest Chinese note to India

—Courtesy Hindustan Times

Winning The Cold War

by Richard Moore

Secretary-General, Liberal International

LIBERALS must realise that the Cold War exists because Liberalism exists. The overriding value Liberalism attaches to liberty makes the conflict with a political movement which asserts the total authority of any organisation — whatever its motivation — inevitable. It is not possible for Liberals to be neutrals in the Cold War without ceasing to be Liberals.

In so far as Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Constitutional Conservatives are true to the fundamental principles of liberal democracy, neutrality in the Cold War is equally impossible for them. They too are committed in the conflict, whether they like it or not, and are faced with the same choice of weapons for its waging. Liberals however, even if at present their numbers are smaller, have a special responsibility, unique although not exclusive, to understand and to be in the van of the struggle, because of the overriding value they attach to liberty.

Some of the methods used or suggested for waging the Cold War are themselves destructive of liberal values. These dangers have rightly agitated Liberals and led to deep disagreements between them. But a Liberal Pacifist, no less than a Liberal advocate of Nato, has taken sides in the Cold War. At the same time an anti-Communism which is purely negative and ready to have recourse to any means is not a sufficient inspiration for winning the competition of co-existence.

Liberals and other democrats are confronted with threats so destructive of their values and hopes that many of them refuse to recognise one of the dangers and try only to resist the other. Appalled by the disastrous implications of nuclear war many Liberals and many democrats retreat into neutralism and make a desperate effort to escape from the Cold War, seeing in appeasement and political quietism the only hope of avoiding the death of civilisation. Others challenged by Communism are tempted to abandon liberal standards in the name of the defence of democracy, to seek allies against Communism among those who are enemies of freedom and sometimes to delude themselves that a nuclear war would be less catastrophic than the evidence suggests.

It is the potentially tragic irony of those two retreats from realism that they lead towards the peril they are designed to avoid.

Those who, in trying to avert total war, weaken the determination of the liberal democracies to resist Communism, make it more likely that Western, and especially the American, Governments, may eventually find themselves in so weak a position that preventive war will seem to offer the last hope of escape. Alternatively, Western weakness may place the Communists in such a position of relative strength that they

will be tempted to win the competition by ending co-existence at a blow.

Those who see in the world crisis only the menace of Communism make its victory more likely. By attributing every evil to its malign influence they exaggerate its power and so encourage desertions to its side while by condoning the use of some totalitarian methods and welcoming Fascist or semi-Fascist allies, they compel their own countrymen to doubt the value of the cause they claim to defend. Thereby political indifferentism is spread through the Liberal democracies and the efforts of the Communists to divide and disrupt made easier.

II

THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM

It is the nature of totalitarianism that it accepts no limits to conflict. The concept of a theatre of war in the Cold War is meaningless. Trade is as much a weapon as terrorism and the arts are instruments of arbitrary power no less than the secret police. Since science has destroyed the refuge of remoteness both from bombs and propaganda everywhere, as well as every sphere of human activity, is actually the scene of struggle. There is no escape from the twin dangers which threaten to destroy civilisation and which immediately endanger the power of liberal reason and of liberal conscience.

But if the dangers cannot be averted they can both be reduced if liberals and other democrats recognise that the dilemma of choosing between neutralism and militarism, between the peace of surrender and war of extermination, is a false one. But to spread the hold this false dilemma has on millions of minds in the liberal democracies will require an effort of reason and an awakening of conscience of which there are at present few signs.

That the dilemma which so dreadfully taunts the liberal mind is a false one can best be demonstrated by trying to see the Cold War as the Communist sees it. To him the struggle is inevitable. Its end is no less pre-determined. All who are not Communists are enemies although they may be duped into supposing that they are not. Neutralism is no protection against Communist hostility although it may pay the Soviet Union to give diplomatic recognition to neutrality like that of Austria and Finland. If a non-Communist criticises the anti-Communism of his own government or of an ally, this is not regarded as proof of goodwill but of the success of Communist divisive tactics. The Communist leans on what he supposes is falling and the more evidence of collapse the greater the pressure he will apply. This is not

simply the use of blackmail, it is a conviction being put to the proof. It is also useless to expect the threat of retaliation by force to end by itself Communist pressure, just as neutrality is no protection. Nato is a necessity but it can never be a sufficiency of strength. Foiled — or as he supposes, merely temporarily checked — in one tactic, the Communist takes up another. The quality of tirelessness which must be conceded to the Communists derives from their confidence that all activity tends to achieve their end if it be directed by the Party.

III

ATTACK BEST FORM OF DEFENCE

This conviction of success and this recognition of the endless scope and complete scale of conflict produces, logically enough, among Communists, an unwillingness to regard any encounter as decisive. If ultimate defeat is out of the question, disasters, however painful, can never be final — the only exception being of course physical extinction. It follows that hard blows struck against Communism are less likely to provoke a nuclear war than a series of Communist victories. These could lead the Communists to suppose that they can risk a nuclear attack, confident that Western defeatism and disunity will reduce retaliation to — by totalitarian standards — tolerable proportions.

The materialism of the Communists make them particularly subject to fear of extinction. Keynes' observation "In the long run we shall *all* be dead" is always unwelcome in Communist circles because it recalls to them not only the morality of men but of systems. However willing to contemplate the death of millions, the Communist cannot endure the idea of the destruction of his state and his fount of power. Both Lenin and Stalin made it the first duty of Communists to protect Russia and now that the consequences of war are so much worse, the tendency to avoid an *all-out* nuclear military struggle is reinforced.

At the same time the success of limited war tactics in places like Laos and Viet Nam encourages the Communists to rely on these methods rather than on total war. Guerilla tactics are peculiarly well-suited to the Communists. Guerilla warfare can be sustained for years while the original objectives of the struggle become obscured in the liberal democracies and are replaced by weariness and disgust with the atrocities which this kind of fighting invariably produces. These crimes and the confused nature of the conflict provide rich sources of propaganda for the Communists — counter-terrorism by governments is usually more fully reported than terrorism by revolutionaries.

Furthermore, the struggle of partisans coincides with the propagandist myth of Communism as a popular rising and so fortifies both the convictions of the Communists themselves and the image they wish to present to the world outside.

The attractions of guerilla warfare to the Communists are further increased by its relative financial cheapness to the aggressor. The waste of resources in

policing a territory are always greater than the cost of organising sabotage. In guerilla war, one of the chief Western advantages in the arms race, the superior wealth of the American over the Soviet economy, is largely nullified.

The development of Soviet economy will also make the idea of nuclear destruction less and less acceptable to the manipulators of Soviet power. While it is unlikely that the ordinary Russian's concern for his goods will concern the Kremlin, the Communist leaders are bound to be reluctant to see massive industrial power demolished. Finally, the fact that in a nuclear war Russia's underpopulation compared with China would probably be accentuated leaving the leadership of the Communist survivors in the hands of the Chinese gives still more weight to those Communists who argue that Russia must avoid total war.

The arguments inside Russia against recourse to nuclear war appear so great that only as a *coup de grace* to a demoralised West is it likely to appear as a possible policy. The Communists will, for propaganda purposes, accuse the liberal democracies of provocations which could lead to war if we take initiatives but it is almost certain that they will in fact not allow themselves to be provoked.

It follows that attack in the Cold War is not only the best means of ideological defence: it is also the best means of preventing the world-wide Cold War from turning into a world-wide hot one.

IV

THE WEAPON OF SELF-CRITICISM

If the panicky reaction of one section of liberal and democratic opinion is invalidated by examining the facts, the crude and no less fearful attitude of another is equally self-defeating.

If by the development of military strength the West has probably induced the Communists to abandon the idea of total war, it follows that the struggle will wage all the more fiercely in other ways. It is therefore all the more important that the opponents of Communism should understand and appreciate the values threatened by totalitarianism and not rely merely upon revulsion against the practices of the Kremlin. At present the crudities of Communist dogma are too often matched by the vulgarity of an anti-communism which neither appreciates what it is defending, nor understands the implications of politics which, in many countries all the time and in all countries some of the time, take precedence over the Cold War.

This is demonstrated by the attitude of many Westerners to the underdeveloped countries. With a lack of sophistication which is astonishing, many Westerners expect the newly-independent countries to understand the Communist menace at once. Hesitation is ascribed not to historical memories but to Communist machinations. Yet a glance at the list of non-European powers which are most willing to join military alliances against the Communists will show how history and geography determine their present

policy. It is the countries bordering the Communist powers with experience of Russian or Chinese pressure in the past, or without experience of Western occupation, which belong to military alliances; such states as Persia and Siam. It is not only the memory of colonialism but the natural wish of the newly independent nations to assert their independent role in international affairs which makes them reluctant allies of the West. The military commitments of alliances are unattractive to countries struggling to escape from extreme poverty and relishing the attention lavished on the "uncommitted" in the United Nations Assembly.

The self-styled Cold War crusaders, irritated by their failure to marshal non-European opinion to their side and attributing to Communism demonic powers of political skill, fall back upon the support of reactionary and sometimes fascist governments. By clouding the ideological issue this policy enormously benefits the Communists, while the cynicism that is produced cannot be confined to the countries suffering under reactionary rule but spreads among the peoples of the liberal democracies themselves.

The logic of the policy of deterrence is to sharpen the conflict in ideas but this logic is too seldom understood by the protagonists of deterrence, and its corollaries, even more seldom acted upon.

In waging the Cold War, self-criticism is a weapon for the West to use in its own defence.

V

THE ELEMENT OF TIME

How can Liberals bring home to the fortunate citizens of the liberal democracies the fact that in winning the Cold War we are reducing the dangers of nuclear destruction while in attacking the abuse of power in non-Communist countries, we are denying Communism victory?

One way is to stress the importance of time in the Cold War. Many observers have noticed how the Communists make an ally of time, relying on tedium and weariness to erode resistance to their designs and to shift the contest into contexts of their own choosing. Their tactics in Berlin and in Laos are striking examples of the success of these methods while the sustained emphasis that Communism is "The wave of the future" is probably the most successful stock-in-trade of general Communist propaganda.

It should be brought home to Liberals tempted by neutralism, that time is in fact on the side of peaceful victory if we make use of our opportunities. Every year that the competition of co-existence is prolonged successfully by the West runs down the Soviet dynamo. Although the power of propaganda in the totalitarian state makes the process a very slow one there are signs that the Communists cannot prevent an increasing scepticism and disillusionment in their own ranks. It would be foolishly optimistic to suppose that this must lead to a liberal society in the Soviet Union, but it must reduce the impetus and eventually

the ambition of the Communist rulers. The price of real relaxation in the future is no relaxation now.

VI

THE MYTH OF NEO-COLONIALISM

It should be stressed to Liberals tempted to seek allies among reactionaries that time is already working against the Communists in the newly-independent nations. Lenin's extension of the class conflict to the struggle for colonial emancipation has provided an immense impetus to Communism for a generation. But its obsolescence is already apparent to many in Asia and Africa, for instance Sekou Touré and Nasser, who are bitter enemies of the West. Non-alignment works temporarily to the disadvantage of the West, depriving it of military bases and of an automatic majority at the United Nations, but the establishment of independent governments inevitably shifts the onus of interference from the liberal democracies to the Communists. Realising this, the Communists are struggling to create the myth of neo-colonialism pretending that colonial emancipation is only a sham, but the very success of nationalism in supplanting Western interests is working against the Communists. For some years to come, the West must expect to be made the scapegoat of failures in newly-independent countries, but Liberals can reduce the period by acting against the remnant of Western colonialism.

Western opinion should constantly be reminded that colonial emancipation is a triumph for liberal ideas. The nationalism of the new nations may well not develop into liberalism but the assertion of national personality and independence is an essential preliminary to the spread of liberalism to Africa, Asia and Latin America. After the experience of the recent European past, liberals should rightly regard the claims of nationalism with scepticism but they are not, as the Communist are, even when exacerbating and exploiting it, condemned to regard it with hostility. The assertion of the African personality will certainly cause difficulties for the West, but it does not necessarily represent the defeat of liberal ideas. It is by definition a defeat for the Communists.

VII

MARX DISPROVED

The Communists' claim that time is on their side is all the more necessary to them because their diagnosis of history has proved so inaccurate. Generalised assertion must replace particular prophecy. The gradual abolition of the proletariat in the capitalist countries has disproved the prophecies of Marx while at the same time the Communist states are obliged to tolerate a considerable amount of private enterprise within their own frontiers. A point too often ignored is that of all the Communist countries the only one whose agriculture shows a general increase of production is Poland, where the attempt at collectivisation has been almost completely — if

only temporarily — abandoned. Of course the Communists do not admit the failure of their economic doctrines. They claim that their own societies are steadily advancing towards socialism and they still have great hopes of undermining the economies of non-Communist countries. The Communist Party sees a great chance of sabotage in weakening the currency, and following the advice of Lenin, one of its favourite tactics is to encourage inflation.

But while the Communists have not abandoned their hopes of economic victory, the mixed economy is in fact established in every country. The proportions of the ingredients vary greatly — and are rightly of great concern to liberals — but it is now possible to say of Marxist economics "They have not been tried and found wanting but found impossible and not tried".

This is a shattering blow to the Communist claim to have found the key to human development. In trying to ward it off they have recourse to two arguments which Liberals should expose and counter.

VIII

AID AND TRADE

The Communists assert that the economic exploitation of the underdeveloped countries is essential to the survival of capitalism. Although this charge is itself false, as is shown by the typical experience of the Netherlands since Indonesian independence, it is the basis of the campaign to create the dogma of neo-colonialism. This claims that colonial political domination has been removed in name only and that the colonial powers retain their position by controlling and looting the economies of the nominally independent states.

It is open to the West to disprove the old myth in its new form by economic deeds. Aid programmes, however generous with money and technical assistance, have to be supplemented with trade. Indeed the more successful Western aid is in developing the infant industries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the greater the need for markets for their products in the Western world.

The traditional pattern of trade between the Western nations and the raw-material-producing countries is becoming more and more complicated and diversified and this process produces problems in the domestic politics of the Western nations. While it is comparatively easy for Liberals to persuade public opinion that surplus wheat should find its way to the underfed, it is much less easy to win acceptance for the free importation of the industrial products of the developing countries.

The Communists will certainly encourage agitation against these imports using the familiar protectionist arguments which have never lost their appeal to the Conservative mind.

IX

INGLORIOUS REALITY OF LIFE UNDER COMMUNISM

The second Communist assertion by which they strive to prop up the scare-crow of the coming collapse of the West is that capitalism, even if capable of providing economic abundance, corrupts culture and debases personality. This argument has been developed with a wealth of subtlety and inaccuracy by many non-Communist socialists and alleged progressives. An aesthetic decline which can be attributed to industrialisation rather than capitalism and an abuse of communications which is the result of their mass appeal and the use of crude psychology rather than commercialism per se, is blamed on the liberal economy and polity.

While no Liberal can be complacent about the level of popular culture, it is at least open to them to point out that compared with the productions of the official artists of the Communist states, the Royal Academy is in the vanguard of experiment and the average product of Hollywood sparkles with wit. In so far as the culture of the liberal democracies is degenerate, it shares the characteristics of totalitarian art: repetition, crudity, reliance upon cliché and dishonesty. Any appearance of genuine Russian art has been in spite of the hostility of the Communist hierarchy, as the treatment of Pasternak proved.

The social corruption and moral degeneracy of the West which Communist critics denounce is certainly reproduced and probably exceeded behind the Iron Curtain. The numerous executions for theft, fraud and other crimes in Russia are proof that Communism has not produced a new type of man free from the abuses of older societies. In seeking explanations for this failure, the Communist leaders fall back on two assertions. Firstly, Soviet man is still only at the Socialist stage, the full Communist flowering has yet to come. Secondly the West can corrupt the immature and insufficiently indoctrinated.

More passage of time makes the former argument unconvincing, but the second will be more readily believed if both those under Communist rule and those free of it, can have their attention directed to the failings of Western culture. Liberals must expect a growing concentration of Communist propaganda on the social as opposed to the purely economic weaknesses of the West. That is the Kremlin's best answer to the existence of the "affluent society" and the best — if still feeble — excuse for the corruption rife under Communism.

While it is a debasement of liberal standards to subordinate the art to a political purpose, the West should certainly seek as much competition as possible and challenge the vaunted purity of non-commercialised socialism to comparison as often as it can. The Iron Curtain is a device which has too long been allowed to suggest to the West that it is a privilege to be allowed to penetrate it. Mystery has been allowed to mask the inglorious reality of the quality of life under Communism. Although the Communists

will certainly exploit cultural exchanges and learned conferences, on balance liberalism is more likely to benefit from them than Communism. Contacts with the outside world are in principle more dangerous to the closed than the open society.

X

A STRATEGY FOR VICTORY

It is this fact that makes the maintenance of the Iron Curtain of capital importance to the masters of the Kremlin. Although the Iron Curtain exacts a continuous tribute on Communist reputation this is more than balanced by the protection it affords from the competition of ideas with the liberal democracies. Deplorably the West has added to the advantages of the Iron Curtain by accepting that what goes on behind it is not their affair. This restraint is not reciprocated.

The initiative can never be taken in the Cold War so long as the West tacitly accepts the status quo in the satellites and writes off the Russian people as doomed to live for ever under Communism.

It is imperative that Liberals should abandon the dream of the status quo as a condition which is either possible or desirable in the age of world revolution. Our task is to ensure that the liberal revolution stays liberal and to see that the "rising expectations" of humanity are extended to those under totalitarian rule. Even by the standard of traditional diplomacy, the acceptance that Eastern Europe is forever within the Soviet sphere of influence while the USSR make no such acceptance of Western interests in any part of the world, is folly. To Liberals it is also betrayal.

Since liberation by force of arms is out of the question, liberation can only be achieved by making the occupation of Eastern Europe too politically expensive for the Russians. It will always be politically too expensive for the Communists to withdraw or disengage from Eastern Europe while they still remain convinced of their power to conquer the world, but if they can be compelled by the successes of the liberal democracies to realise that their dream is a mere illusion, the West must be careful not to allow Russian national interest to supplant Communist aggression as the motive for the occupation of the enslaved countries.

The horrors of the Nazi invasion of Russia enabled Stalin to harness patriotism to the Soviet regime. If the satellites are to be freed, it will be by the West winning the Cold War and at the same time assuring Russia that her legitimate demands for security are satisfied. Patriotism will be the last refuge of the Soviet scoundrel and it is of tremendous importance that the West should do nothing to make it easier for the Kremlin to claim that the perpetuation of the regime is essential in the national interest.

This is looking far ahead but it is only by doing so that Liberals will be able to form a strategy for victory.

XI

THE GREAT DEBATE

If ultimate victory is many years ahead, substantial successes are not, or rather need not be, if Liberals will make the most of their opportunities. Ambitious use of the United Nations to expose the hypocrisy of Communist attacks on colonialism will pay an increased dividend as non-European Governments in former Western colonies become the subjects of Communist pressure. A sustained demand for exchanges of undergraduates from the newly independent countries and from behind the Iron Curtain or for the free circulation of books may seem a small matter to Governments dealing with Polaris missiles but if it is sustained, the liberal democracies will have done something to recapture the initiative which the possession of weapons of nuclear retaliation will never do.

Competition of this kind has its dangers. A student accustomed to the superficial monolithism of the Soviet state or the conformity of a primitive society may at first be confused and even repelled by the variety of liberal civilisation. Some of the books from the West will help rather than hinder the Communist propagandists in developing their myths, but the determination of the Communists to maintain the Iron Curtain shows how fearful of the effect of our ideas on their power they are.

Perhaps the easiest line of attack open to Liberals is through the sciences. The Soviet claim that their's is a scientific dogma is still widely believed. Western Universities should invite Marxist dogmatists to put their faith to the test of examination by a free audience and should not take no for an answer. Instead of being gratified by the publication of a few carefully chosen photographs of sputniks, let the West invite the fullest possible public discussion of the implications of Soviet scientific progress for both Marxist and liberal ideas.

The advantages in such a debate are overwhelmingly on our side, yet Western Governments shirk the task of countering Communist intellectual claims. The implications of the Lysenko controversy which makes Marxist views on heredity appear as inadequate to the modern biologist as pre-Copernican astronomy does to the designer of sputniks and the absurdity of Soviet claims to have solved economic problems by the application of Communist science, have made surprisingly little impact outside specialist circles. Challenged in any particular field and the inadequacies of Communism are quickly revealed, but the West is all too feeble in demonstrating that the individual bankruptcies arise from a general poverty of ideas.

Of course the Communist will seek to avoid the challenge, but the significance of their evasion will have its effect. The trouble at the moment is that by allowing the liberal case to go by default the West conveys a defeatism which neither advancing knowledge nor events justify.

XII

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

This is seen particularly clearly in economics. The space devoted to the "Great Leap Forward" in China in non-Communist newspapers was out of all proportion to the space allotted to recording its failure. Surprisingly little has been reported of the news this year of the famine and economic breakdown in China, in spite of the exodus of refugees which these failures caused. The bitter criticisms of muddle, mismanagement and corruption in the Russian papers of Soviet economics administration, do not win a tenth of the attention given to economic difficulties in the democracies. Yet on the narrowest economic grounds it would pay to have public attention drawn to the painful experiences of the Communist planners.

In much the same way the myth of the Communist monolith has been allowed to perpetuate itself through every purge. Although the published exchanges between Russian and Chinese Communists make the asperities sometimes exchanged between Nato statesmen seem courtesies by comparison, the extent and even the reality of the division in the Communist world is still doubted. Yet if the worship of power is the predominant cult in the Kremlin and in Peking, the conflict between them is inevitable. The opportunities for improving their relative positions are too numerous and tempting to be indefinitely resisted by either the Russians or the Chinese. No doubt they will endeavour to preserve the conformity of the Communist camp by waging the struggle through proxies like Albania and Yugoslavia and by taking opposing sides in disputes outside the Communist world—as in Kashmir—but that each is engaged in a struggle to claim the authority of orthodoxy cannot be seriously doubted.

But both the Liberals who hope to abandon the Cold War and those who wish to prosecute it with any allies that come to hand, are reluctant to admit the fact and the implications of the quarrel between Moscow and Peking.

The repeated failure of the West in general, and Liberals in particular, to make use of the openings offered them by Communist weakness springs from something more profound than mere inertia and more subtle than mere materialism. There is a deep feeling of guilt in the West compounded of colonial wars, reliance on weapons of mass destruction and reliance upon reaction as an ally in the Cold War. Until and unless this feeling can be eradicated, the liberal democracies will continue to be defeatist about their prospects and so deprive themselves of the hope of victory.

While the eradication of the guilt complex must be a long process it can begin at once. Emphasis on the liberal origin of the emancipation of the colonies, stress on the purely preventive nature of the deterrent and declared enmity towards the remnant of reactionary and fascist regimes are Liberal duties. Exploitation of the constructive opportunities offered by Western European unity associations like the Com-

monwealth and institutions like the United Nations are more easily acceptable to Western official opinion but will largely fail in their impact if the West continues to compromise its liberal principles by association with colonialism and fascism and reliance on nuclear weapons, not as the ultimate deterrent to total war, but as a substitute for conventional forces withheld for electoral reasons.

XIII

SAIGON — OUTPOST OF FREEDOM

Liberal politicians need not only to be far more outspoken about Communist tyranny; they should link their attacks upon it with attacks on fascist oppression. Thereby they transfer the Cold War from the chosen Communist ground of "Right" versus "Left" to the real battleground of Liberalism versus illiberalism.

There is a temptation to be resisted here. Liberal campaigns against fascism can too easily degenerate into a demand to have "no enemies on the Left." To clamour for strong measures against Franco, Salazar and Verwoerd while accepting Ulbricht and trying to appease Mao Tse Tung and Khrushchev is cowardly as well as inconsistent. If special measures are advocated against a weaker tyranny they should be justified pragmatically. Pressure on the Spanish Government through withdrawal of financial support and American bases or on the South African Government through social ostracism and economic boycott may be politically wise. It can give liberals no claim to boast of their opposition to tyranny unless it is matched by equally stern measures against the Communists.

The pragmatic test suggests that economic sanctions are unenforceable whether applied to Communist or Fascist regimes. Equally, mere resolutions of disapproval are insufficient. Liberals should concentrate on assisting the liberal-democratic opposition to oppression in spite of the diplomatic embarrassment and temporary economic and political cost to their own Governments of such assistance.

Continued compromise with Spanish fascism, Portuguese dictatorship and with apartheid in South Africa can only damage the long-term interests of the West by discrediting the liberal elements in those countries and offering Communism opportunities it will not be slow to seize. This aspect of the Cold War is one of the most urgent as well as the most difficult and requires the attention of liberals in every country.

It is also the urgent duty of Liberals to attack the defence deficiencies of the Nato Governments. British Liberals should welcome criticism by their Nato allies of the absurd defence policy pursued by the present British Government. French Liberals should be no less willing to accept attacks on the disruptive military policy of President de Gaulle. Liberals throughout the West should clamour for military cohesion and shared sacrifice. It is worth considering demanding an equal period of conscription in every Nato country.

The Western public must be constantly reminded that a vital part of the price of peace is the co-operative, as opposed to the competitive, development of Western armaments.

This will be difficult for Liberals to do. Still more hard is the task of working out a strategy for dealing with the defence of countries like Viet Nam. It need not be doubted that Viet Nam is the victim of aggression, but it is aggression of a very subtle kind designed to make a straightforward Western response impossible. For that very reason it is a favourite method of the Communists.

While no rule of thumb should be applied to Vietnamese situations, if the West is to deal with them with any hope of success, the Communists' tactics must be appreciated by a much wider public than at present. At the same time, if Communist aggression involved the West in the defence of a dictatorship, it would be better to admit the fact and not to pretend that the defence of—for example—the Diem regime is for the sake of Viet-Namense democracy but for the right of small nations to exist independently. It can also be claimed that the defence of Viet Nam provides a greater chance for the eventual development of democracy there, than surrender to Communism allows, since the local dictatorship is likely to prove far less powerful and longlived than a Sino or Soviet puppet government.

Confronted by the Communist offensive, the liberal-democracies are compelled to admit the realities of warfare however disguised. In 1942, Stalingrad was, in spite of Stalin, an essential bulwark of liberty. In 1962 Saigon is, in spite of Diem, an outpost of freedom.

XIV

TAKE THE INITIATIVE

Suspicion of the imperialist ambitions of Western powers in different parts of the world—however ill-founded—make it desirable that the defence of an area against Communism should be apportioned according to local prejudice. The Americans make a far more convincing defender of freedom in Central Africa than do the British, and the Europeans than the Americans in the Carriben. Although there are many and power-

ful short-term reasons for the USA providing the bulk of economic aid and defence assistance for Latin America there are far more convincing long-term ones for Europe to take up the burden. The development of Western European unity with its accompanying strength should make this possible in the next decade.

These urgent tasks will be quite beyond the capacity of the West unless it has a permanent planning staff which examines every aspect of the Cold War. Without this, Western policy will consist of little better than a series of more or less disorganised responses to Communist initiatives.

In examining the Cold War two imperatives constantly recur. The need for Liberals to take the initiative and the need for the West to develop the long view of the struggle and to accept many sacrifices of short term and local interests. The liberal democracies managed this successfully in the Second World War. They will not manage it now unless they have a clear idea of the causes at stake in competitive co-existence.

The Liberal International could play a valuable role in winning the Cold War if it sought to establish agreement among Liberals about the objects involved and the methods of waging it. Liberals have a particular responsibility in this. It is the opposition to totalitarianism which springs from liberal convictions which perpetuates the struggle. It is the main contention of this paper that the twin demands for peace and freedom can never be satisfied while liberal democracy remains on the defensive and that the ultimate reconciliation of men depends on the defeat of the doctrines the totalitarians hurl against liberty.

M. N. ROY and RADICAL HUMANISM

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Without Comment

DECLARATION OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

"We, citizens of the United Kingdom, desiring to set on record certain views and convictions concerning the international situation, have signed the following Declaration, which, we believe, represents the principles which free peoples should regard as governing future policy in the search for a true and lasting peace:

1. While welcoming all efforts towards effecting universal disarmament, we submit that these must be accompanied by equal efforts to remove those fundamental causes of tension which create armaments.

2. We ask that the inherent right of all men and women to choose freely their own form of government through free elections be restored. We neither seek the reinstatement of former regimes nor demand the acceptance of any particular non-communist system. We reject all totalitarian systems, whether they be Fascist, Nazi or Communist.

3. We do not accept that the present regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany represent the will of the people they govern. Accordingly we ask that these millions be granted those identical rights of self-determination which have so often been demanded by the Soviet Bloc in the case of many colonial territories in Asia and Africa.

4. It must be for others to decide whether the free choice of peoples can be effected through elections held under United Nations or some other form of international supervision.

5. The existence of the physical barrier to movement imposed by communist governments over thousands of miles across Europe is the visible symbol of the world. We believe that, more than any other action, its removal would contribute to an understanding between peoples living under different systems. To aim at space travel before men and ideas can move in freedom across the earth's surface is, in our belief, a confusion of values.

6. We believe that, in implementing these measures, which represent the simple principles of humanity and brotherhood, communist leadership would make its greatest contribution to a lasting peace."

Edward Beddington-Behrens; Fred Bellenger; Birdwood; Christopher Chataway; Roger Gresham Cooke; Clement Davies; Richard Gooldadams; John Hynd; Ludovic Kennedy; William Lawther; Longford; Thomas Moore; Rea; Sam Watson; George Willelsen.

"We welcome the declaration signed by distinguished British personalities. We endorse it in the firm belief that the principles set out in this statement are essential to an international policy aimed at a true and lasting peace.

In our countries the basic right of the people to

choose their own form of government through free elections is denied by the communist regimes, and to have this right restored remains the fundamental objective of our peoples."

A. Abakuks (Latvia); L. Dalnoki Verees (Hungary); W. Karastoyanova (Bulgaria); E. Raczynski (Poland); I. Ratiu (Rumania); J. Stransky (Czechoslovakia); J. Taul (Estonia); J. Vilcinskas (Lithuania); T. Zavalani (Albania).

ANTI-CASTRO CAMPAIGNER: GILBERTO ARIAS OF PANAMA

A campaign to create an anti-Castro military alliance among Latin-American nations is under way, chief campaigner: Panama's Finance Minister Gilberto Arias.

Mr. Arias has called for a meeting of 10 nations. He urges establishment of a military alliance modeled on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—"for defensive as well as offensive purposes, if such need arises."

Besides Panama, he named Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and Haiti as the threatened nations. His own Government he said, favours the move.

The Panamanian official made his proposal while in the U.S. for economic conferences in Washington and to confer at the United Nations.

The proposal got a quick second front Costa Rica. President Francisco J. Orlich Bolmarcich said he was interested, issued an informal invitation to other Caribbean nations to meet in Costa Rica to discuss the possible formation of such an alliance.

MORE RED TAKE-OVERS?

Next on the timetable of Communist take-overs in Southeast Asia: Cambodia and South Vietnam? President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines says "yes."

President Macapagal, elected last year on a platform of agrarian reform and clean government, is a staunch anti-communist. He is a good friend of the U.S., but has been sharply critical of the decision to agree to a "neutral" Laos.

Officials in Manila say the reports they get indicate the fighting against communists in South Vietnam is not going as well as U.S. military reports say. Communists now are operating freely in Laos. Philippine leaders fear that conditions in South Vietnam will get worse, not better. And in late September, President Macapagal told "U.S. News & World Report":

"Personally, I'm very pessimistic about Laos. I feel the communists are going to take it over in the way they always do when you give them the chance. It's going to be very hard to keep the communists from taking over South Vietnam and Cambodia. Who's to stop them?"

Khrushchev's Rise To Power*

by S. Natarajan

A POLITICIAN in an authoritarian regime requires staying-power and the capacity to adapt himself. Khrushchev, runs the thesis of this book, began as an uneducated man and became educated through the party-machinery. Thus, unlike the Marxist intellectual of an earlier age, he was never troubled by doubts: or, if he was, he learnt early to keep them to himself. Very soon the future of all the party officials became linked to the future of Stalin. Mr. Palocz-Horvath has shown considerable ingenuity in exploring the past of Khrushchev and working out in great detail the development of the man as he emerges out of the machine. It would seem that Khrushchev's great quality was the ability to efface himself and still function as an important cog in the party wheel. Unlike Stalin whose menace was discovered by Lenin, Khrushchev came on his colleagues as an unsuspected force. On the death of Stalin he ranked Number Five in the leadership. Mr. Palocz-Horvath states that this was due to the struggle for power between all the leaders. But he adds that his rise to Number One was his own doing. And he attributes this to his long experience of working the party machine. What it really amounts to is an acute knowledge of how far he could go without attracting attention from his colleagues, of how to eliminate potential rivals, and of how to strike the decisive blow at the right time. A great deal of sizing up men and working into their defences is involved, but this all the leaders after Stalin's death may be assumed to have had since their very survival during the regime indicated it. What was the extra element in Khrushchev was his control of the party machine and the tolerance of this control by his unsuspecting colleagues who were wary of one another.

Mr. Palocz-Horvath, however, appears to exceed the available premises when he maintains that the people were disgusted with the party bureaucracy. His picture of the vast majority of the Soviet people looking forward to the end of the totalitarian dictatorship of the party, as opposed to the limited interest of the post-Stalin politicians who wanted to establish "collective leadership", is fascinating but it is largely derived from writings during the "thaw". The fact that the leaders were able to achieve their end, but the "people" were not is not to be explained away. What the author does not allow for is the passage of over forty years under Soviet rule, the successes that had attended the excesses of the party and the vast empire which Russia controlled — not only the satellite States but even a large number of "neutral countries" which still regarded communism as an untried experiment deserving sympathy and encouragement. As a matter of fact, the education into communism of whole generations and the potential regions of influence are the two dominant factors precluding any popular dissatisfaction with the Soviet system in Russia. These are important matters which the non-Communist world must begin to realise.

Mr. Palocz-Horvath discusses in detail the Twentieth Party Congress analysing the famous de-Stalinization speech, delivered but not written by Khrushchev. It was a cooperative effort, the party theoreticians dominating but each section of the warring factions inserting paragraphs exonerating their leaders from complicity. Because the others did not realise the implications, Khrushchev who was as—and even more—involved in the misdeeds of the Stalin regime than them, was able to put in a good deal in the speech which was to his advantage. After that the rise of Khrushchev to power was swift and, if not smooth, fairly uneventful so far as Russia itself went. And troubles abroad only served to strengthen his position and permit him to accomplish a re-Stalinization which carried him to the dictatorship. Khrushchev's fight is not yet over, and the fact that he has been denied to power to institute purges, indicates that in some way or the other he has to learn to co-exist with rivals who, demoted though they may be, still remain ready to re-enter the political scene. But Mr. Palocz-Horvath's great point is that whoever emerges on top the party machine will dominate the scene.

In the concluding chapters, the author discusses Russia's relations with the communist countries and with the West. After describing the tensions between Mao's China and Khrushchev's Russia and hinting at the internal party reasons which might induce Mao and the present Chinese Party leadership to support the Stalinists in Russia, Mr. Palocz-Horvath observes that ideologically the two are in the same camp and "it is to their interest to preserve the appearance of monolithic unity." This does not mean that the two leaders will support one another and that cross-currents between the two countries will not develop. The points in China's favour are its gigantic population and the interest of Mao and his associates in evolving a comprehensive communist programme for the next fifty years. Of the West, he writes, "It seems to be disunited, constantly on the defensive, to lack a creed ... to abhor any initiative in the international field." Mr. Palocz-Horvath believes this impression to be misleading and he makes the strange remark that freedom is taken for granted and any really grave threat to it would produce a unity more enthusiastic and monolithic "than anything the Kremlin rulers can ever hope to achieve in their country." All this reads well but what "a really grave threat" is has yet to be understood. If the world, and not only the West, could only succeed in arriving at this conclusion there would be less bloodshed in setting things right. India's own technique with China is a case very much in point. There seems some reliance on Soviet Russia intervening but India's own consistent minimising of the Chinese threat serves to rule this out. The result might well be that India becomes a pawn in the struggle between Russia and China.

* *Khrushchev: The Road to Power*, by S. Natarajan, Editor, Harvath's Magazine, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, 100, 105, 110, 115, 120, 125, 130, 135, 140, 145, 150, 155, 160, 165, 170, 175, 180, 185, 190, 195, 200, 205, 210, 215, 220, 225, 230, 235, 240, 245, 250, 255, 260, 265, 270, 275, 280, 285, 290, 295, 300, 305, 310, 315, 320, 325, 330, 335, 340, 345, 350, 355, 360, 365, 370, 375, 380, 385, 390, 395, 400, 405, 410, 415, 420, 425, 430, 435, 440, 445, 450, 455, 460, 465, 470, 475, 480, 485, 490, 495, 500, 505, 510, 515, 520, 525, 530, 535, 540, 545, 550, 555, 560, 565, 570, 575, 580, 585, 590, 595, 600, 605, 610, 615, 620, 625, 630, 635, 640, 645, 650, 655, 660, 665, 670, 675, 680, 685, 690, 695, 700, 705, 710, 715, 720, 725, 730, 735, 740, 745, 750, 755, 760, 765, 770, 775, 780, 785, 790, 795, 800, 805, 810, 815, 820, 825, 830, 835, 840, 845, 850, 855, 860, 865, 870, 875, 880, 885, 890, 895, 900, 905, 910, 915, 920, 925, 930, 935, 940, 945, 950, 955, 960, 965, 970, 975, 980, 985, 990, 995, 1000.

With Many Voices

Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world."
—Tennyson.

✓ Only in America, perhaps, would the Government send thousands of troops to enforce the right of an otherwise obscure citizen to attend a particular university.

—Time Magazine, October 12.

Socialism is about equality of power as well as equality of status and wealth.

—David Marquand in *Encounter*, October 1962.

They want to have their cake and eat ours too.

—Willy Brandt on Communists' view of co-existence.

If only Krishna Menon were a crypto-Communist, India would have been shaken from end to end.

—Mr. Krishna Menon quoted in *Swarajya*, October 3.

China is following unswervingly the Leninist path of Communist expansion.

—Swiss Press Review and News Report, September 6.

No Menon, no Indian speech.

—Times of India, October 13.

I don't call it Castro's Cuba. I call it Khrushchev's Cuba. —Senator Thomas Dodd quoted in *Time*, October 12.

China followed the same principles and strove to achieve the same ends as the Soviet Union.

—Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko quoted in *Times of India*, October 14.

Indian reactionaries and British imperialists are worth about the same thing.

Quoted in *Hindustan Times*, October 9.

✓ If imperialism is going out of the window, so is Marx. Good riddance too.

—Lord Home to the U.N. General Assembly quoted in *Time*, October 5.

Should non-alignment and the national interest conflict there should be no hesitation in abandoning non-alignment.

—N.J.N. in *Times of India*, October 22.

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—C. Rajagopalachari, *Swarajya*, August 25.

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"if only we had right Krishna Menons, India would have been transformed overnight."

—Mr. Nehru quoted in *Swarajya*, August 25.