

The Hindu Personality

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I

I WANT to consider the subject from the Freudian point of view. Such treatment puts familiar facts in a somewhat new light and draws new inferences from them. The dogmatic tone is adopted for clarity and brevity.

As contrasted with the typical personality structure of the occidental, which can be called "punitive", the typical *Hindu personality is narcissistic*. Narcissism means that an uncommonly large proportion of the libido is cathected on the ego. This simple formula has many implications, which I believe account for most of the peculiarities of Hindu culture.

Thus the Advaita Vedanta express narcissism in the clearest way. So much of the libido is cathected on the ego that everything else loses some of its reality: the world is felt to be illusory, and the ego is identified with the universe. The Uttara Mimamsa takes the same view, and the other four orthodox philosophies do not much modify it. The ways to salvation are techniques for achieving total internal cathexis of the libido. This is true even of the bhakti marga, for in the end God is identified with the ego. Traditional moral teaching greatly stresses vairagya, i.e. the withdrawal of libido from all external objects, and that means increased cathexis on the ego. Even when, as in the Gita, the teaching is that a man should indulge in worldly activity, he is told to do it without attachment, i.e. without allowing libidinal cathexis on external objects.

Ordinary, uncultivated narcissists, the majority, are vain, selfish, etc., but the more cultivated ones shed external attachments and concentrate on the development of the ego. It is natural then that a narcissistic culture should greatly stress *inner freedom, spiritual freedom*. Hindu tradition does this very emphatically, and traditionally-minded Hindus feel, quite consistently, that that is the only freedom that matters. A yogi feels as free in a jail as anywhere else. Moderns, however, cannot take that view. We are concerned with freedom of thought, but also of expression and action. For us the situation is different.

Most Hindus are worldly, i.e. narcissists of a less extreme or less cultivated type. Even so, in such men much libido cathects on the ego and comparatively little is left for outer things. Little is left therefore for other people. A narcissist tends to be indifferent to other people. He will interest himself primarily in people with whom he can easily identify himself, i.e. blood relations or others whom he regards as such. Hence the segregation of Hindu society into groups which consider themselves kinship groups, i.e. castes or sub-castes. Hence also the unconcern of one group for what happens to others. *This condition is favourable to liberty*. In the old Hindu society, lower castes might have complained of neglect, but not so much of oppression. So long as they observed certain ritualistic restrictions, they were allowed to do as they pleased. In practice these ritualistic restrictions could be fairly comprehensive, but we are not concerned with the detailed working of caste society. Our concern is with the attitudes it embodies, and in relation to liberty these cut both ways.

Caste is presumably doomed, but the tendency to segregate is not. At present it is showing itself in regionalism and linguism, and in the segregation of occupational and status groups such as the armed and administrative services. Generally such segregating groups tend, like castes, to leave each other alone, and so far as they do so, they favour liberty. However, just as a caste could be oppressive within, towards its members, so can these other groups. Moreover, some of these groups show an opposite tendency, to spread their influence over others.

The narcissistic psyche has a strong feeling of superiority. Caste society was therefore a hierarchy, and the business of ruling was restricted to a few castes which had attained ritualistic and military superiority. Those who had attained ritualistic superiority set the intellectual and moral tone for all, and they normally included many men who had had the traditional education and were therefore highly narcissistic, or at least had absorbed the basic narcissistic philosophy of identification of the ego with the universe. In a ruling group this psychic trend, together with the feeling of superiority expresses itself in *paternalism*, the effort to set up a state organisation which would manage or regulate all the affairs of all the citizens. This tendency is shown in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, and it is no less obvious in the bureaucratic welfare or socialist state of today. (It was the late Professor Beni Prasad who

first pointed out the psychic affinity between the Advaita philosophy and the administrative octopus of the *Arthashastra*). This trend is inimical to liberty of all kinds.

If the relation between castes tends to be one of aloofness, the relations within a caste tend towards those within the bureaucratic society depicted in the *Arthashastra*. There is little of the spirit of aloofness: those who manage the caste adopt the attitude of omniscient benevolence. This occurs even among people ignorant of philosophy, for it derives from the narcissistic personality structure and family situation. The caste is psychically an extended family.

The narcissistic family differs considerably from the occidental punitive family. The strong libidinal cathexis on the ego leads to a strong cathexis on the semen. There is much evidence in modern life and in the classical literature for this preoccupation with the semen and its identification with the ego. The *Aitareya Upanishad* says: "That which is semen is the vigour come together from all the limbs." (This belief is still common). "In the self, indeed, one bears a self... while he (the father) nourishes the child before birth and after the birth, he thus nourishes his own self." This belief results in an identification of the father with the son, to which this passage also witnesses. That is in fact a common theme. In the *Mahabharata* we read: "The learned men of old say that the husband himself, entering the womb of his wife, comes out as the son."

This identification submerges the father's latent hostility to the son which is so noticeable in the West. In his early years the father "spoils" the child, as the occidental would view it. From different causes, which are also traceable to her husband's narcissism, the wife "spoils" the child too. (See an article by Winifred Bose in *Opinion*, Bombay, of July 28). The attitude of the father, as modern experience testifies, and as the myths show, is not one

of active interference but of leaving the child to the women. But this is the crucial point. In his early years the boy experiences little frustration, and thus develops the narcissistic type of personality, for it is frustration and the resultant aggressive feeling which first disturb the tranquility of primary narcissism, the infant's original state. The boy in a Hindu family is not forced out of his primary narcissism by early weaning, harsh lessons in cleanness, and so forth, as the Western child is, and so the Hindu boy remains fixated in the stage of primary narcissism, that is, he develops secondary narcissism. Further, the boy develops little of the hostility to his father which in the West results from such treatment. In old-fashioned families, where he spends almost all his time with the women, he is systematically taught the women's attitude of unquestioning submission to his father, grandfather, and all authority.

The father's identification with the son begins to result in disciplinary action only later, in the second decade, when the basic personality structure is fixed. Then the father's ambition and fear for his son may express themselves in increasingly strict control. But the time is past when this would have provoked resistance. Normally the son submits. The course of the Hindu boy's upbringing thus differs from that of the occidental boy in both the earlier and the later phases. In the West, discipline is strict in the early years (though it is becoming less so in our time), and is relaxed in the second decade.

The result of the weakness of discipline in the first years of life is that the positive Oedipus phase is passed over lightly and leaves little effect behind, and the psyche remains fixated in the later, negative Oedipus phase. That is, there is little trace of the infantile fantasy of attacking, castrating and killing the father, but there are strong traces of the passive homosexual attitude to the father, and of propitiating him, submitting to him and castrating oneself in order to ward off his anger and gain his love. In many cases, self-castration has the purpose, which is quite compatible with this, of achieving identification with the mother and returning to the womb.

II

In the Hindu myths there are many traces of the positive Oedipus theme, but all these come down from a very early period when the prevailing personality type seems to have been punitive. Thus there is good evidence that originally Rama was the twin brother of Sita and the son of Ravana, so that like the hero of punitive myth he committed parricide and incest. But in the current versions these circumstances are omitted. Originally Rama's son in turn killed him, but this happens in very few of the extant versions. The only one I know of in which Lava and

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Kusha kill Rama is the Bengali *Ramayana* of Krittibas.

In the story of Rama, and in that of Krishna, and in that of Arjuna killing Bhishma and then Babhrughava killing Arjuna, the original incident is preserved, but the circumstances and atmosphere are so changed that all the sting is taken out of it. But in the majority of Hindu myths the substance of the story is changed. There is a clash between father and son, but the father is victorious. Thus the *Rigveda* says that Indra killed his father and hints that he castrated him, though it omits to give the father's name. But when it comes to Indra's turn to be killed by his son, the reverse happens. Kutsa lies with Sachi, his mother, but Indra overthrows him. Similarly Indra seduces Ahalya, but Gautama castrates Indra. This victory of the father-figure over the son is a mark of the narcissistic culture.

A myth which can be considered paradigmatic for the narcissistic culture is that of Prajapati and Rudra. Prajapati, the father, commits incest with his daughter, and his son Rudra castrates him with an arrow. This is the ancient punitive type story, preserved in a fairly pure form in the *Rigveda* and the *Shatapatha Brahmana*. By the time this myth has reached the *Matsya Purana*, Prajapati has become Brahma. Brahma desires his daughter Gayatri, and his sons express indignation; but no more. The sons do not attack him, and he does not seduce her; he merely puts on four extra faces so that he can always see her. Later still, in the *Narada Pancharatra*, Brahma has a quarrel with his son Narada. Brahma tells Narada to marry and people the earth, but he prefers asceticism. Brahma then curses him to a life of sensuality and subjection to women, and Narada curses Brahma to be plagued by incestuous passion. Thus the Oedipus conflict has been reversed: father and son are not competing for the same woman, but both desire the opposite, the magical power conferred by chastity, and they punish each other with the imposition of sexuality.

Another paradigmatic myth is that of Shukra, Kacha and Yayati. The young disciple Kacha wants to learn the mantra which revives the dead, which Shukra alone knows. Kacha is burnt to ashes and Shukra swallows them. Then Shukra's daughter Devayani persuades her father to teach the mantra to the ashes. He does so, and Kacha bursts forth alive, killing Shukra but in possession of the mantra. He restores Shukra to life, but refuses Devayani's offer of marriage. Here the son-figure defeats the father-figure by bursting his stomach open, an act rather like castration, though he then restores the old man to life. But the conflict is not about a woman: he refuses the woman when she offers herself. The conflict here is again about the magic power of chastity, the power of the chaste phallus, the archetypal magic wand, and in that conflict it seems

to be compatible with the narcissistic standpoint that the son should be victorious. In later times the sanyasi or the yogi can do almost anything he pleases. But when the conflict is about the sexual power of the phallus, the father-figure is always victorious. This is so in the story of the further adventures of Shukra and Devayani. Devayani married Yayati, but after having two sons by her he had three sons by her servant Sarmishtha. Shukra punished Yayati by depriving him of his sexual power. Yayati persuaded Shukra to let him get it back by taking it from one of his own sons. Four of the sons refused, and were denied their inheritance. The fifth son, Puru, agreed and gave his sexual power to his father for a thousand years. As Mr. Hamdi Bey once pointed out, Puru is the model Hindu son.

There is historical evidence that retainers of kings behaved towards their masters according to this model. Under some of the early dynasties of Karnataka, the king formed a guard of picked men called Garudas — who were subservient to him, like Garuda to Vishnu, but aggressive to everybody else. They took a vow that when the king fell sick, they would fall sick, when he was wounded they would be wounded, and when he died they would die. There are many records of their suicide upon the death of the king, and in some instances they did it by jumping from a height on to a spear-point — a clear image of passive homosexuality. Sometimes, however, they did it by cutting their own throats — an image of self-castration. In literally scores of the romantic stories in the Vikramaditya cycle and in the *Kathasaritsagara*, heroes offer themselves to a god or a goddess by cutting their own throat. I need not stress the similarity to sati, to sitting dharna, to satyagraha, and to the attitude shown in the revolutionary song I used to hear thirty years ago — *Sar faroshi ki tamanna aj hamare dil me hai*: today there is in my heart a desire to sacrifice my head.

Kautilya, in his meticulous way, instructs the king how to prevent a successful rebellion by his son. Despite that, it is a historical fact that the sons and nephews of Hindu and Buddhist kings indulged in rebellion far less frequently than the sons and nephews of Muslim kings. I once counted through the standard history of Raychoudhury, Mazumdar and Dutta; I have lost the figures, together with the book, but the frequency of rebellions in Hindu and Buddhist dynasties was only about a third, if I remember, of that in Muslim dynasties. The difference is striking, and surely significant.

III

It needs no more emphasis that the Hindu child inherits, through his infant training and his cultural tradition, a very small dose of rebelliousness and a

strong tendency to submit to his father and to revere that ideas and institutions associated with him. This tendency to conform is noticed as much in intellectual matters as in politics. There is no lack of ability, but little original work is done, apparently because there is little desire for originality. But it is not only a matter of lack of rebelliousness. There is not very much done that is unoriginal, either, for the creative impulse is weak. The creative impulse is a development of the outward-turned libido, together with a tinge of aggressiveness; but in the narcissistic psyche most of the libido is turned inward.

Let us look at the other side. Rebelliousness of the punitive type is not always conducive to liberty. Sometimes it provokes authority to suppress freedom even more drastically than a Hindu bureaucracy would normally do. A Hindu Stalin seems hardly possible — though the acquisition of power by a psychologically abnormal minority is not impossible. There are probably a sprinkling of punitives among Hindus, and a minority of narcissists are abnormally aggressive, probably because of a fixation on the aggressive mother. The revolutionaries of fifty years ago seemed to have a Kali-fixation. A comparatively small number of people of an abnormally aggressive type, if they could get together, would have little difficulty in imposing a tyranny on their submissive fellows. Centuries ago the Lingayats seem to have done so. (Other people in Mysore say they are doing it now). Such a psychically abnormal minority nowadays would rally round a secular ideology.

Aside from such possibilities, we have to reckon with the tendency, which seems to be the most natural in a narcissistic society, to set up a Kautilyan, paternalistic regime, to which all sides of life, including culture, are subjected, and to which everyone after a ritualistic grumble submits. Its effect is not to suppress but to smother freedom.

But the narcissistic ruler has what is from this angle a weak point. This is his high ego-ideal. In almost all narcissists the high ego-ideal is conspicuous. Even if his conduct is but human, he cannot resist

a lofty sentiment. But in the better type of narcissist, the aspiration to live up to the ego-ideal takes charge. This is the specific form of the narcissistic conscience, in sharp contrast to the punitive's aggressive super-ego.

The narcissistic ruler or bureaucrat, in obedience to his high ego-ideal, strives to bring into being the ideal state. But the ideal state is a variable thing. At the present moment it is excessively paternalistic, egalitarian and stifling. But it need not always be so. Nobody can question the ideal claims of liberty.

The task of those who desire more liberty, then, is to attach authority to an image of the ideal state which is more libertarian than the present one; *they must change the intellectual fashion from socialism to liberalism*. Or perhaps it would be more realistic to speak of hope than of the task. It must be the hope of those who desire more liberty that the embodiments of the ego-ideal of the next generation, the future Gandhi, Nehru, Vinoba, Radhakrishnan, Einstein, Russell, Laski, will place more emphasis on liberty than on equality.

Can anything of the kind be done at the intellectual level? A cult of Voltaire? The fate of Russell shows the futility of that. Idolising a Western iconoclast only reinforces Hindu conservatism. Some people have tried to revive Charvaka, but even if it could succeed, it would mean a Stalin in place of a Tsar, Ramaswami Naicker in place of Nehru. However, the fact that in the search for a Hindu Voltaire nobody more satisfactory than Charvaka could be found shows the difficulty of the task.

M. N. Roy called for an Indian Renaissance. He failed to take account of narcissism. The Renaissance released a repression, but Hindus are not repressed, so there is nothing to release. But Roy was right if he is interpreted to mean that the Renaissance ideal of intellectual liberty, or perhaps rather intellectual vitality, must be made an effective part of the prevalent ego-ideal. Intellectual liberty is accepted in theory, which is something to be thankful for. Can it be made a more operative part of the ego-ideal of the elite? That seems to be the best we can hope for.

South East Asia And Ourselves

Rohit Dave

THE region of South East Asia seems to be heading towards a crisis. Recent developments in Laos, South Vietnam and Malaysia cannot be explained except in terms of a definite pattern. The underlying factors may be historical or may be the result of changing power relations in the area. The settlement on the eve of the French withdrawal from Indochina was obviously provisional; and the terms

of the settlement themselves contained a provision for a more permanent set up in the area — the provision which has not been implemented so far. Similarly the withdrawal of the British and the Dutch Powers from Malaya and Indonesia has created a vacuum where visions of past glory or present greatness motivate actions that have dangerous potentialities in the unsettled situation in this part of the

world. This may be one explanation of the recent developments.

It is also possible, however, to interpret the events in terms of new power configurations attempted by the protagonists to fulfil their expansionist ambition or as strategic moves in the East-West confrontation. Professor Juergen Domes in his Paper on 'Communist China in South East Asia' defines the strategic goals of Communist China as 'the establishment of a powerful greater China ruled by the totalitarian dictators in absolute control of the country, the dependence of S. E. Asia on the Communist system and to make India and Indonesia as obedient neutralist countries which are not able to put up any resistance.' President Sukarno is known to relish taking of calculated risks if high stakes were involved.

Whatever be the motivating forces operating in South East Asia today, however, it is quite clear that the consequences of recent developments could be far reaching. The precarious equilibrium of the power system is threatened and persistent attempts are made to fill the vacuum in a manner that would assign a dominant position to the Chinese in this region. This is not likely to be accepted by other powers who are anxious to maintain the present alignment of forces. The Tonkin Gulf incident was rather a loud ultimatum to that effect by the United States.

We cannot remain idle spectators in this conflict. The situation has now reached a stage where a more positive policy is called for. We are no doubt moving in that direction. Mr. Krishnamachari's support to the Malayasian efforts to maintain her independence and territorial integrity was more than a mere polite expression of a diplomat visiting that country. It was a part of the attempt to define our policy in this region — or at least one would wish that it was a move in that direction. Our role in the developments of Indochina, however, is not commensurate with the position we hold on the International Control Commission. Even without taking sides in the civil strife going on there, we could and should define our position in clearer terms so as to leave no one in doubt that we view the developments there with apprehensions. Our interests are indissolubly linked up with peace, freedom and prosperity of this region. Any threat to these should therefore cause uneasiness in our mind. We have to apply our mind to the best method of safeguarding our own interests, in these fast changing kaleidoscopic alignments of power.

What is needed is a positive assertion of this fact of our being a part and parcel of the South East Asian region, at least vis-a-vis the Chinese designs embracing the whole area. If China dominates Laos and Vietnam and if Malaysia disappears from the scene our own defence would become much more

difficult than what it is today. This is a simple statement of an obvious fact; and there should be no hesitation in making it. This could certainly entail reformulation of our defence strategy which will have to be more outward looking than hitherto.

It is unfortunate that rather extreme positions are advocated in our country to deal with the situation we are facing on our Northern borders. One school advocates concentration on building up our own military strength irrespective of the sacrifice we might have to make. They want to redefine our economic priorities so as to make the economy defence oriented to the maximum extent possible. Behind this school of thought is the conviction that any other course would involve us in the Cold War and would jeopardise our policy of non-alignment. While the other school goes to the other extreme and wants the country to enter into military alliances with the West. They are convinced that it is our policy of non-alignment which is at the root of the situation we are facing. In view of the dangerous developments in the South East Asia they want the country to abandon the policy of non-alignment forthwith. Both these positions seem to be wide off mark in the context of the realities of the situation.

The situation in South East Asia is not that of Cold War confrontation as that concept is usually understood. It is difficult to believe that Russia and China see eye to eye on this issue or that the United States is oblivious of this fact. Any interpretation of the Strategy followed by the protagonists — the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., China, the U.K. and France — that starts on the assumptions of East-West conflict is bound to be unreal. After Mr. Khrushchev's direct attack on the expansionist designs of China, and after his reported revelation to the Communist meet about the Chinese views on President Sukarno, it would not be correct to visualise the South East Asian situation as a conflict between democracy and communism. It is interesting to note that the U.S.A. has so far not taken any positive stand on the Indonesian-Malayasian Confrontation in spite of the fact that the United Kingdom is deeply involved in this conflict. France continues to harp on its theme of neutralising this region in spite of the State Department's cold-shouldering of the scheme. In the United States pains were taken to explain away the Tonkin Gulf incidents as due to misunderstanding. No systematic attempts are known to have been made to substantiate the charge of a deliberate and calculated attack on the U.S. warships in international waters. In view of all these facts the South East Asian situation should be viewed more in terms of attempts to ensure the stabilisation of forces in this region and to preserve its status as a subordinate state system where power vacuum continued.

From the point of view of the world strategy of

major powers this may be a desirable goal, but for India it is fraught with a few dangers. The present uneasy equilibrium in the South East Asia is due mainly to the handicaps from which China suffers. These are short term difficulties and the Chinese leadership is determined to overcome them in as short a time as possible. They are frantically trying to develop atomic weapons and it is quite conceivable that they would take care to design them in terms of the carrying power they can muster. The United States President has borne testimony to the terrible destructive power even of tactical atomic weapons and it could be highly optimistic to assume that China cannot master the technique of producing these relatively light atomic weapons. At any rate we cannot afford to take any risks in this matter. Once China is able to acquire the atomic know how the situation in the South East Asia would resemble more that which prevailed in the Balkan States before the First World War. And it is not pathological to fear the results might be similar.

Our strategy to meet the long term Chinese challenge to the integrity of the States in South and South East Asia must be based on the acceptance of these potentialities. Of course, the first step has to be to develop our defence potential to the maximum

extent possible without diluting too much the long term goals of democracy and socialism we have set before us. But that by itself would not be enough. India will have to take a lead in attempting an Asian solution to the threats posed by the Chinese expansionism. Attempts by the Philippines to do this in case of the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia have not proved successful; and this no doubt, could act as a damper. But we cannot afford to lose heart. Taking full note of the difficulties in the way we should initiate a move in this direction embracing the whole of the South and the South East region and continue to press forward till we achieve our goal. Any friendly nation willing to help the countries of this region to develop their defence potential should be encouraged to do so. The peace and the stability of this region is a concern for countries in both the power blocs. That is one favourable factor which should be taken full advantage of, so that in the long run we may be able to build a power system that could guarantee the freedom and security of the sovereign states in this area. The path is long and arduous, there are pitfalls on the way. But it is not of our choosing, it is forced on us and on our neighbours. We can ignore the signs of times only at our peril.

Russian Aid

INDIA is receiving a certain amount of aid from Russia in the form of loans and credit and help to build up some basic industries. There are some in the country who always talk tall about it, and would like India to spurn aid from all other quarters and rely exclusively on Russia and other so-called socialist countries. Communist China was also one of the beneficiaries of Russia until all aid was stopped abruptly sometime in 1960. Her experience of Russian aid and trade is recounted in one of the letters exchanged between the Communist Parties of the two countries. The following are excerpts from the Chinese Communist Party's letter of February 29, 1964:—

"In recent years the leaders of the CPSU have habitually played the benefactor and frequently boasted of their "disinterested assistance". When commemorating the fourteenth anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February this year, Pravda, Izvestia and other Soviet propaganda media again beat the drum to the same tune. We have not yet made a systematic reply in the press, but we must point out that, so far from being gratis, Soviet aid to China was rendered mainly in the form of

trade and that it was certainly not a one-way affair. China has paid and is paying the Soviet Union in goods, gold or convertible foreign exchange for all Soviet-supplied complete sets of equipment and other goods, including those made available on credit plus interest. It is necessary to add that the prices of many of the goods we imported from the Soviet Union were much higher than those on the world market."

* * *

"While China has received aid from the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union on its part has also received corresponding aid from China. No one can say that China's aid to the Soviet Union has been insignificant and not worthy of mention. Here are some examples:

Up to the end of 1962 China had furnished the Soviet Union with 2,100 million new roubles' worth of grain, edible oils and other foodstuffs. Among the most important items were, 5,760,000 tons soya beans; 2,940,000 tons of rice, 1,090,000 tons of edible oils and 550,000 tons of meat.

Over the same period, China furnished the Soviet Union with more than 1,400 million new roubles' worth of mineral products and metals. Among the most important items were: 100,000 tons of lithium concentrates, 34,000 tons of beryllium concentrates, 51,000 tons of borax, 270,000 tons of wolfram concentrates, 32.9 tons of piezoelectric quartz, 7,730 tons of mercury, 39 tons of tantalum-niobium concentrates, 37,000 tons of molybdenum concentrates and 180,000 tons of tin. Many of these mineral products are raw materials which are indispensable for the development of the most advanced branches of science and for the manufacture of rockets and nuclear weapons.

As for the Soviet loans to China, it must be pointed out that China used them mostly for the purchase of war material from the Soviet Union, the greater part of which was used up in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. In the war against U.S. aggression the Korean people carried by far the greater losses. The Chinese people, too, made great sacrifices and incurred vast military expenses. The Chinese Communist Party has always considered that this was the Chinese people's bounden internationalist duty and that it is nothing to boast of. For many years we have been paying the principal and interest on these Soviet loans, which account for a considerable part of our yearly exports to the Soviet Union. Thus even the war material supplied to China in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea has not been given-gratis".

"But in spite of our objections you turned your backs on the principles guiding international relations and unscrupulously withdrew the 1,390 Soviet ex-

perts working in China, tore up 343 contracts and supplementary contracts concerning experts, and scrapped 257 projects of scientific and technical co-operation, all within the short span of a month.

You were well aware that the Soviet experts were posted in over 250 enterprises and establishments in the economic field and the fields of national defence, culture, education and scientific research, and that they were undertaking important tasks involving technical design, the construction of projects, the installation of equipment, trial production and scientific research. As a result of your peremptory orders to the Soviet experts to discontinue their work and return to the Soviet Union, many of our country's important designing and scientific research projects had to stop halfway, some of the construction projects in progress had to be suspended, and some of the factories and mines which were conducting trial production could not go into production according to schedule. Your perfidious action disrupted China's original national economic plan and inflicted enormous losses upon China's socialistic construction".

"Your action fully demonstrates that you violate the principle of mutual assistance between socialist countries and use the sending of experts as an instrument for exerting political pressure on fraternal countries, butting into their internal affairs and impending and sabotaging their socialist construction.

Now you have again suggested sending experts to China. To be frank, the Chinese people cannot trust you. They have just healed the wounds caused by your withdrawal of experts. These events are still fresh in their memory. With the leaders of the CPSU pursuing an anti-Chinese policy, the Chinese people are unwilling to be duped".



Mao: "Hang on, we'll only have the winner to deal with!"
Courtesy: B.P.A.

"Moreover, in pursuance of your policy of further imposing restrictions on and discriminating against China in the economic and commercial fields, since 1960 you have deliberately placed obstacles in the way of economic and trade negotiations between our two countries and held up or refused supplies of important goods which China needs. You have insisted on providing large amounts of goods which we do not really need or which we do not need at all, while holding back or supplying very few of the goods which we need badly. For several years you have used the trade between our two countries as an instrument for bringing political pressure to bear on China. How could this avoid cutting down the volume of Sino-Soviet trade?"

"You constantly accuse us of "going it alone" and claim that you stand for extensive economic ties and division of labour among the socialist countries. But what is your actual record in this respect?

You infringe the independence and sovereignty of fraternal countries and oppose their efforts to develop their economy on an independent basis in accordance with their own needs and potentialities.

You bully those fraternal countries whose economies are less advanced and oppose their policy of industrialization and try to force them to remain agricultural countries forever and serve as your

sources of raw materials and as outlets for your goods.

You bully fraternal countries which are industrially more developed and insist that they stop manufacturing their traditional products and become accessory factories serving your industries.

Moreover, you have introduced the jungle law of the capitalist world into relations between socialist countries. You openly follow the example of the Common Market which was organized by monopoly capitalist groups.

All these actions of yours are wrong".

Without Comment

Communism and democracy do not go together; but even a Communist Party is recognised by its own rules to hold from time to time congresses and conferences in order to consult its members. It appears the Communist Party of China is not following these ordinary norms of communist behaviour. The Communist rulers of Russia have drawn pointed attention to these failures of the Chinese Party. In the course of an article entitled "Certain aspects of Party Life in the Communist Party of China", *Pravda* writes inter alia as follows:

"The Communist Party of China held its Sixth Congress in 1928, its Seventh Congress in 1945 and its Eighth Congress only eleven years later, in 1956. Thus the Communist Party of China convened only two Congresses over the past 35 years. The C.P.C. held its congress six years after complete victory was won in the whole of China, adopted important decisions, which in principle corresponded to Marxist-Leninist theory, and applied Marxism-Leninism to the conditions existing in China. This was pointed time and again by our Party, which still continues to appraise the significance of the Eighth CPC Congress of 1959, as it has always done.

"The Congress adopted the Party Rules. According to these rules Congresses are to be convened once every five years, with annual Congress sessions held over this period. According to the Rules, the delegates, elected to the Congress in 1956, retain their powers for five years. The Second Session was to be held in 1957. It was held in 1958. That was the last one. Six years have already passed. And although the Third Session of the CPC's Eighth Congress was to be held in 1960, it has still to be convened.

This method of keeping a delegate in office for five years is unusual and is not practised in any Marxist-Leninist Party. This cannot be considered a contribution to inner-Party democracy in the world communist movement and, no wonder, no other party has borrowed this "experience" from the Communist Party of China.

"Let us examine, for instance, the following aspect of the matter. At the election of Congress delegates in 1956, the Communist Party of China had 10.7 million members. Today it has 18 million, almost twice as many; however the delegates elected in 1956 still represent the entire Party and retain their powers though the five year term envisaged by the Rules expired long ago. This means that almost half the Party, more than 7 million members, never elected delegates to the Congress. Where is inner-Party democracy then? Where are the rights of Party members.

"Then, there is one more strange thing. Since the Party Rules have not been changed, it would seem one should abide by them. The Rules however, are being grossly violated.

"The five-year term envisaged by the Rules expired in 1961 and a new Party Congress should have been convened and new delegates elected. However, seven odd years have passed since 1956 and it is not even known when a Party Congress will be held or why it is not being convened.

"According to the Rules the term of office of the Central Committee also expired long ago. However, it seems that nobody is noticing this, that the Party itself is not noticing this. Can it really be that nobody on the Party is interested in this? Not even old Party members and nor even those seven million who joined the Party after the last Congress and thus never

participated in the election of its leading bodies, and the elaboration of Party policy? Finally, can it really mean that the sense of responsibility of the members of the Central Committee has been blunted to such a degree?

"The leadership of the Communist Party of China does not even consider it necessary to explain to its

Party the reasons for not complying with the Rules and for not convening Congresses. Everything shows that these questions are now decided in the Communist Party of China not by the Rules, but by the directives of Mao Tse-tung as was also the case with us for a certain period after the war, when Stalin was alive."

Review

Neutralism

by Peter Lyons, Oxford University Press—Rs. 15.

THE primary objective of the foreign policy of a country is to secure its vital national interests in the best possible manner under a given set of circumstances. But, very often, the concept as to what constitutes national interests is moulded by past experiences and prevailing passions and prejudices of the people. If the premises on which the policy is based simply reflect or articulate the popular predilections, the policy may gain popular acceptance but would not necessarily serve its objective. On the other hand, the premises underlying the policy may be sound and grounded in hard geo-political realities facing the country, and yet in its actual formulation the policy may acquire ideological overtones and lose touch with reality owing to its obsession with facts of a generation ago. Non-alignment, as a policy, has suffered distortion on both these counts.

Any attempt to assess the role of non-alignment must first try to disentangle its myth from reality and professions from practice. For, non-alignment has become at once a policy and a creed and has been used to cover all shades of meanings and cover up all shades of alignments. For example, Sukarno's regime in Indonesia, which is heavily dependent on the communist support internally and the communist bloc's military aid externally, as well as Castro's regime in Cuba, which is more or less a Soviet satellite, and Tito's nationalist communist regime in Yugoslavia which has recently joined the COMECON — all of them profess to be non-aligned and would participate in the forthcoming non-aligned nations' conference, along with India and other non-aligned countries. The only characteristic they all share in common is that none of them has yet formally joined any military pact formed by either of the super-powers.

In his attempt to find out the "major meanings and

significance" of neutralism, Mr. Peter Lyons traces the mainsprings of the neutralist attitude and affirms that the neutralist doctrine is not "an integrated body of theory", but "rather a constellation of concepts". He discovers five main assumptions underlying the neutralist stand. They are: (i) a refusal to take sides in the cold war, (ii) a claim to moral superiority on behalf of non-alignment, (iii) an insistence on following an independent foreign policy, (iv) an opposition to all forms of colonialism, and (v) a demand that foreign aid must be given without strings. To be sure, there was nothing much original in these assumptions as the traditional neutralists had also based their stand on precisely similar grounds. The only new element was the claim to moral superiority which was not only arrogant, but also blatantly absurd.

The neutralist attitude towards the cold war is based on a partial understanding of the origin and the nature of the conflict. The cold war arose in the aftermath of the Second World War from a conflict of interests, operating on two different levels, between the West and the Soviet Union. On the level of traditional power politics, it has been a struggle for the control of Europe and, in particular, Germany. But the conflict is also, and predominantly, ideological in content. It is a struggle between competing philosophies and social and political systems and the issue is the control of the world. In other words, it is a struggle against the communist expansionist ambitions and activities. While one may not take sides in the traditional power struggle between the Western European countries led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, one cannot adopt a neutralist stance so far as the ideological content of the cold war is concerned. In the latter case, neutralism is palpably untenable as the communist creed does not permit neutrality and there is the communist fifth column working against the existing government in every

non-communist country. By choosing to ignore these implications of the Cold War, the neutralists are driven towards moral neutralism and tend to adopt a double standard of value-judgement, "an exacting one for the parliamentary democracies and a complaisant one for the totalitarian dictatorships". This is evident in the neutralist failure to recognise the fact of Soviet and Chinese Communist colonialism which is far more menacing than Western colonialism which is already fading out. It is noteworthy that Mr. Nehru stubbornly refused, until 1958, to describe the Chinese expansionism as imperialism.

Non-alignment in the beginning was essentially a policy of avoiding military pacts. As such it was a wise policy dictated by the geo-political and economic circumstances in which many of the Asian countries were placed. But a policy may be right or wrong according to circumstances and has to be altered or adjusted whenever the circumstances change. Non-alignment, in the sense of non-involvement in military pacts, did enable the neutralists initially to play a limited but important mediatory role between the two rival cold war groupings of power and invested them with influence and stature disproportionate to their military or economic strength. But this, in turn, engendered the illusion that non-alignment was morally superior and encouraged its adherents to elevate it to the ideological level. Gradually, to stay non-aligned in the conflict between a communist and a non-communist power became more important than the issues involved in the conflict. In fact, it became an end in itself. This was tragically made clear to India when, two years ago, the "Colombo powers" scrupulously avoided condemning the Chinese Communist Government for its aggression on Indian territory and insisted on playing a mediatory role.

This confusion between the ends and the means has bedevilled the foreign policy of many neutralist

countries. Non-alignment has failed to safeguard the national interests of many Asian countries precisely because it became a dogma and failed to comprehend the true nature of the Cold War. As a result, today, India is paying the penalty for its myopic policies, and in Ceylon, Burma and many other South-East Asian countries the Chinese communist influence predominates. The only regimes that benefitted from non-alignment were Sukarno's in Indonesia and Nasser's in Egypt. Nationalism in these countries is fiercely aggressive and expansionist or, as Mr. Lyons puts it, these regimes have pieces of "unfinished business". The irredentist nationalist passions here have been encouraged by the international communist forces as the short-term aims of both have proved to be common in these areas. But while Nasser has taken care to ban the communist party and hold the communist influence in check in his country, Sukarno has become a prisoner of the Indonesian Communists. Tito, of course, has no fundamental differences with the aims and methods of the international communist movement. He has been able to maintain his independence by working with the Soviet bloc without sacrificing the identity of his own regime.

In the ultimate analysis, neutralism or non-alignment is a manifestation of resurgent Afro-Asian nationalism which, because it was shackled until recently, is fierce in its assertion of independence and has developed a bias against the West. This anti-West attitude has vitiated non-alignment from the beginning and has made it blind to the communist danger. Besides, this nationalism is generally authoritarian in its outlook and has very little appreciation of democratic values. It has therefore been able to align with communist forces. In fact, today the communists are exploiting the excessive and barren nationalism in many Afro-Asian countries for their own ends and are posing as real champions of the nationalist cause. It is therefore no wonder that the communists are today the most vociferous adherents of non-alignment in most of these countries.

Mr. Lyons unfortunately does not analyse the character of Afro-Asian nationalism though, of course, he traces the origins of non-alignment in the nationalist passions and prejudices. It would have also enhanced the value of this book if he had discussed the role of non-alignment in the present era when the world is no longer bi-polar. The Sino-Soviet conflict has placed many regimes, like Sukarno's, in a difficult position. They would like to, but cannot, remain non-aligned in this conflict because they are essentially dependent on the backing of the local communist parties which have opted for the Chinese communist side. By forcing them to align with the Chinese communists against their own wishes, non-alignment has had them hoist with their own petards.

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
China's Territorial Claims

MAO Tse-tung had declared in the Constitution of the Kiangsi Soviet Republic drawn up in 1931 that: "The Soviet Government of China recognises the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China and to the formation of an independent state for each minority. All Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans and others living on the territory of China shall enjoy the full right to self-determination, i.e. they may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer." (*The China Quarterly*, Jan.-March 1960 No. 1, P. 32) But this, of course, did not prevent Mao from sending his army to "liberate" Tibet. According to the Communists, Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, NEFA and Bhutan form the five fingers of Tibet. It is no wonder that the Communist China should try to "liberate" these areas too.

Mao Tse-tung had said in 1939 in his book "Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party":—"In defeating China in war, the imperialist powers took many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores Islands, and Port Arthur. England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong. France occupied Annam; and even an insignificant country like Portugal took Macao."

Same thing was repeated by *People's Daily* in 1963 when it declared that China wants to annul the so-called "unequal treaties" imposed on China.

"In the hundred years or so prior to the victory of the Chinese Revolution, the imperialist and colonial powers—the United States, Britain, France, Tsarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal—carried out unbridled aggression against China. They compelled the governments of old China to sign a large number of unequal treaties—the treaty of Nanking of 1842, the treaty of Aigun of 1858, the treaty of Tientsin of 1858, the treaty of Peking of 1860, the treaty of Ili of 1881, the protocol of Lisbon of 1887, the convention of 1898 for the extension of (the lease on) Hong Kong, the treaty of 1901, and so on. By virtue of these unequal treaties, they annexed Chinese territory in the north, south, east, and west, and held leased territories on the seaboard and in the hinterland of China. . . . At the time the People's Republic of China was inaugurated, our government declared that it would examine the treaties concluded by previous Chinese governments with foreign governments, treaties that had been left over by history, and would recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them according to their respective contents.



The extent of China's territorial claims and ambitions is indicated on this map, which is reproduced from a Chinese history textbook published in Peking in 1954.

The countries numbered on the map are as follows:

1. Eastern Turkestan, comprising parts of the Soviet Republics of Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, and Kazakhstan.
2. Ladakh. This Indian region has been partially occupied by the Chinese since 1962.
3. Nepal.
4. Sikkim.
5. Bhutan.
6. NEFA. (North-East Frontier Agency) and the Assam Plain, both parts of India.
7. Burma.
8. Andaman Islands, belonging to India.
9. Malaya and Singapore, now Malaysia.
10. Thailand.
11. Indochina, (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam).
12. Formosa.
13. Sulu Islands, a Philippine archipelago.
14. Sino-Burmese Frontier, an area acceded to China through a frontier adjustment in 1962.
15. Ryukyu Islands, formerly Japanese, now under U. S. mandate (the Okinawa base).
16. Korea.
17. Left bank of the Amur River, part of Russia since 1858.
18. Right bank of the Amur River, with the port of Vladivostok, part of Russia since 1860.
19. Sakhalin, an island divided between Japan and the Soviet Union before the last war, wholly Soviet since 1945.

(Continued on page 12)

With Many Voices

"The deep
Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world."
—Tennyson.

These activities of yours are nothing to be afraid of. How can ants topple the giant tree?

—Chinese Communist Party in a letter to Soviet Union on Soviet decision to call international Communist Conference. —*The New York Times, Weekly Review*, September 6.

India's external relations and foreign policies cry for overhaul to render her frontiers and her boundaries less vulnerable.

—Pothan Joseph, *Swarajya*, September 12.

Instead of establishing that the king can do no wrong, we make sure that the king will do us no wrong.

—S. N., *Janata*, September 13.

I am a Communist, religious and nationalist as well.

—President Sukarno, *The Indian Express*, September 15.

Kripalani was critical of the Food Minister's "super-cilious attitude" and his imputation of motives against the Opposition instead of owning up failure on the food front. "They consult astrologers and come to know our motives", he said.

—*Times of India*, September 16.

Today, we are performing the function of the old Congress Opposition and they are functioning as the old imperialist Government.

—J. B. Kripalani, *Times of India*, September 16.

We are not more divided than the Congress.

—S. A. Dange, *Times of India*, September 17.

(Continued from page 11)

.....With regard to outstanding issues which are a legacy from the past, we have always held that when conditions are ripe these issues should be settled peacefully through negotiations, and that pending a settlement the status quo should be maintained...."

(Editorial in *People's Daily*, Peking, March 8, 1963) Of course, 'when conditions are ripe' means when China is ready to impose her will on her neighbours.

This has found expression in the Chinese map published in a Chinese textbook in Peking in 1954.

The wheels of the Government grind, but they grind slowly.

—T. T. Krishnamachari, *Times of India*, September 17.

Such cliches as "socialism" were in history most ominous and deceptive.

—Pothan Joseph, *Swarajya*, September 19.

The Fourth Plan of Rs. 22,000 crores is the nation's biggest enemy.

—C. Rajagopalachari, *Swarajya*, September 19

The Chinese leadership has gone steadily forward on the path of chauvinism till now its entire policies are unmasked before the Communist of the whole world as arising from the most fanatical great power desire for world domination.

—Resolution: The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India, *New Age*, September 20.

As individuals a larger proportion of the Opposition members can claim more ability and talent than the majority of Congressmen can.

—Ariel, *The Sunday Standard*, September 20.

The catchword is now "heavy industrialisation at all cost." One might pertinently ask: At whose cost?

—Frank Moraes, *Indian Express*, September 21.

Over the years I have met an amazing variety of sports personalities from all over the world. I have invariably met two types: the one, who has only one string to his conversational violin, namely, himself; and the other, who is vaccinated with a phonograph needle.

—A. C. Pereira, *Times of India*, September 22.

The last thing for the right and left faction Communists to do is for one to take the hammer and the other the sickle.

—C. Rajagopalachari, *The Hindustan Times*, September 23.