

freedom first

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At The Post

WE have great pleasure in placing in the hands of our readers this hundredth issue of *Freedom First*. Eight years have passed since *Freedom First* took its place in the advance guard of the Indian Contingent of the worldwide forces of freedom and democracy. It continues to be at the post as devoted, as determined and as vigilant as ever.

During the period there have been many significant changes in the national and the international situation. It is no longer as unpopular and as heretical as it once was to assert the primacy of freedom, to insist on the preservation of the institutions and values of democracy and to expose the fallacies of the doctrine of neutralism. To criticise the actions and policies of Soviet Russia, the premier totalitarian state, and to publicise the brutal suppression of human rights and liberties which takes place in communist regimes is no longer regarded as synonymous with the advocacy of reaction or the *status quo*. *Freedom First* is happy at this change in the climate of opinion which has taken place and is proud of the role that it has played in bringing it about.

Freedom will not find a sound and sure foundation and will not expand unless there is an early and radical change in the *status quo*, more particularly in countries like ours where hunger and misery is the lot of the majority of the people. But those are false prophets who, in the name of changing the *status quo* and with alluring promises of bread, call upon the people to abjure freedom and subject themselves to the tyranny of a political party, a tyranny far more oppressive and far more all-embracing than any the world has ever known. *Freedom First* had all along warned against those false prophets and against their false, though alluring, promises. It has insisted that there is no contradiction between freedom and bread and that freedom alone can ensure the bread of honour in the sense of a rich and abundant life.

Our country is now embarked on the road of rapid industrialisation. That was the end that was kept in view while drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan, and the Third Plan which is now under discussion is likely to follow the same line. The national endeavour for securing all round economic development has the solid support of all sections. There are differences of opinion, however, about the rate and pace of industrialisation.

The question is asked: if in enthusiasm for the rapid development of industries, we are not, knowingly or unknowingly, following the Soviet Russian model? The compulsion of that economic policy, it is apprehended, may persuade our rulers, in spite of all their avowed intentions, to move in the direction of totalitarianism. The danger is ever present in a backward economy trying to outgrow its backwardness. The shortcuts which are available in a dictatorial regime are so tempting that without unflinching faith in democracy and passionate devotion to the cause of freedom it will not be possible to resist the temptation to resort to them and thus gradually slip into the modes and methods of totalitarianism. It will be the task of *Freedom First* to foster the development of that faith and devotion so that there may be no straying away into the paths of dictatorship and tyranny.

While trying to raise itself by its bootstraps from the depths of economic backwardness, the country is now faced with the danger of foreign invasion. The Himalayas have suddenly ceased to be the impenetrable bulwark of peace and protection that they were, and hostile forces have started infiltrating through them and endangering the integrity of the country. The danger is directly traceable to the criminal blunder that was committed ten years ago of gifting away to communist China the independence of Tibet. In spite of the treacherous conduct of one communist Power, illusions are still existing about the peaceful intentions of others. Those illusions influence our relations with those countries and render us incapable many a time to call a spade a spade and raise our voice against the perpetration of brutal crimes. That happened so very patently in the case of Hungary. *Freedom First* had, from time to time, to draw attention to such mistakes. It will be necessary to continue the task, howsoever unpleasant it may be, as though some lessons have been learnt in recent years, one cannot be too sure that there will be no repetition of similar mistakes.

In spite of these dangers and difficulties, the country is making rapid strides towards progress. But on the way there are many pitfalls, many dangerous turns and many blind alleys. It is the task of an independent journal like *Freedom First* to draw attention to them and to warn against the siren voices which may deflect the country from its chosen path. On the occasion of the publication of the hundredth issue, *Freedom First* assures its readers that it will never fail to discharge that duty.

Thoughts On Education

by J. B. H. Wadia

EDUKATION, in a sense, is as old as the hills. When the first primitive man began to make a creative use of his thumb, he started educating himself in the ways of life of which his descendants were to be inheritors through an excruciating process of a multimillennial evolutionary development. And in the drama of life on our planet, we are as yet hardly on the threshold of a beginning, biologically speaking, cosmologically thinking.

Just think for a moment. Although the primitive man did not have education as we understand it, there is a running thread of evolutionary contact between him and us. Such an approach—such a scientific approach if I may say so—opens up new horizons before us. We see the *raison d'être* of education in a new light. We see the place of education in human society in its proper perspective.

The primary definition of education according to Funk & Witzel is as follows: Education is "The process or the result of educating; the systematic development and cultivation of the normal powers of intellect, feeling and conduct so as to render them efficient in some particular form of living or for the life in general."

This means that education is not merely circumscribed within the narrow confines of instruction but embraces all the norms and all the forms of human experience. The very word "Education" is derived from its Latin root "educere" to lead, to draw out.

The spirit of inquiry is the source and fountain of all education. Alas! It is this spirit of inquiry which is lacking in our educational methods. Imperceptibly, but none the less actually, our country is going by default in this respect. We pay a lot of lip service to this inalienable concomitant of education. For example, we recall how in ancient India we used to encourage all schools of philosophy and all types of religion; how we used to have academic dissertations on the Nyaya, Vaisheshika and Sankhya as well as on the Yoga, Vedanta and Purva Mimamsa systems of philosophy. Monism and Dualism (Advaita and Dvaita) Theism and Atheism (Astika and Nastika) all, all had their places of prestige.

Just as Parnassus has many peaks on each of which dwells a presiding deity, the Himalayas too have many heights and once upon a time on each of them reigned supreme its venerated daiva.

To what extent is this catholicity adhered to in practice in the present day method of education? Very little, I am afraid. Mass communication and misinterpretation of democratisation has resulted in a curious anomaly in instruction. And this in turn has given rise to an unintended but nevertheless unhealthy intellectual regimentation.

Perhaps, you are expecting me to make some observations on the controversial, if not inflammatory, sub-

ject of the Indian film and education. I know that now I am treading on dangerous ground. If I say anything in defence of the Indian film I am likely to be accused of a partisan spirit. But I will risk it. Because if I do not do so, I will accuse myself of cowardice. And I have always been more sensitive of going down in my estimate of myself than that of others. This may be due to a streak of egoism in me. I cannot be the judge of my psychic make-up. But there is one quotation of philosopher Thomas Huxley which I am fond of reiterating and which I had come across somewhere in my college days. I have always done my best to be guided by the truth of Huxley's maxim. He has said to the effect that true education consists in doing a thing which must be done when it ought to be done whether you like it or not.

Accordingly, I have to make here a couple of observations about the so-called bad influence of the Indian film on the young mind. It is not my intention, nor is it relevant from this platform, to present a defence of the film industry. I would, therefore, only bring to the fore-front what Francis Bacon has termed as the Error of the Marketplace and do it as objectively as I can.

The Indian film has been a perennial target of adverse criticism from usual and unusual quarters in public life. The arrows are strengthened with all kinds of explosive munition, such as morality, sex, religion, custom, usage, violence, politics and crime. It seems that the Indian film has the amazing magic power of creating criminals, anti-social beings, schizophreniacs, sex perverts, even dacoits, if we are to believe Vinoba Bhave Saheb. But the crux of the problem is that the film makers also produce numberless religious films, devotional films, moralising films, purposeful films and artistic films. And I have not heard of a single public figure who has said that the Indian film has ever succeeded in creating a Tukaram or a Puran Bhagat or a Mirabai, leave aside a Gokhale or a Ranade. Everything that is bad in society can be pinpointed to the Indian film, but nothing that is good. It is the case of "Heads I win, tails you lose." I do not say that the film maker is a perfect specimen. If he were, he would be a monster. He has his shortcomings too. All that I ask for is that his shortcomings should be treated normally.

I do not say that there should be no criticism. The show business, like politics, thrives on bouquets and brickbats. But the least that one would expect from one's critic is that he has carried out the first canon of criticism, namely, that his criticism has been informed criticism. That is to say, the vociferous man in society or politics who pours out venom against the Indian film maker should also try to be a serious student of the film. Not necessarily on the technical

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World Communism Today

by Philip Spratt

THE spectre which a century ago haunted Europe has today become a very material danger to the whole world, and it has never seemed more menacing than in 1960. In the past few months its campaign of expansion has won a series of gains and has had to suffer very few reverses.

However, these events should be viewed in the perspective of a struggle which is likely to last for generations. In such a long view, communism can claim to march in step with history, in the sense that industrialism and the consequent vast increase in population push mankind powerfully towards regimentation and the subordination of the individual to society. Communism has set itself up—at least until the State begins to “wither away”—as the whole-hearted champion of this trend. It also gains from it the tactical advantages of a centralised organisation over scattered individuals.

Despite swelling populations, industrialism increases prosperity—at least it has done so hitherto—and therefore makes universal education possible; and this brings a trend towards social and economic equality. Communism has gained greatly by claiming to be the sole champion of this trend also, but there is increasing evidence that its claim is invalid. The world contains hundreds of different social systems, many of which are less egalitarian than communism, but the better specimens among the non-communist societies are more egalitarian than communism, and also freer.

It can be said, indeed, after forty years of experience, that the claim of communism to have solved all human problems is fairly definitely disproved. The system sets itself in many ways against human nature as we know it, and it has yet to show that it can remake human nature, as it claims to do, to suit its requirements. The system itself, on the other hand, is incapable of adaptation to human needs: it operates within a very narrow range of choices. In spite, therefore, of forty years of indoctrination, and recently of improved material conditions, there is much scepticism and dissatisfaction in Russia, especially among intellectuals.

Nor have the communist dogmas about man under non-communist systems stood the test of experience. They had a certain plausibility in past generations, but we now have before us unquestionably better systems, which appear to be stable and also capable of far-reaching adaptation to changing needs. The dramatic picture of the old society inexorably destined to self-destruction and in the process giving birth to the new is unrecognisable in the real world.

But all this does not alter the fact that communism has certain short-term advantages, which may well enable it to achieve its goal of world conquest. Power grows out of the barrel of a gun, says Mao Tse-tung. If the free countries as a group fail to

maintain military parity, nothing can compensate for its loss. The free countries, though probably still strong enough, seem to be losing ground, through the rapid advance of Russian military technology, the arming and drilling of the masses of China, and the weakening of the opposing alliances.

It is often said that the modern “absolute” weapons have made the old conceptions of national power out of date. This seems to be but a half-truth. Those weapons can be used only in the last resort, and it is quite doubtful if they will ever be used. Even the threat to use them has lost much of its force. Accordingly the power of a nation for many purposes is not so very different from what it was before the advent of the absolute weapons. Certainly the conventional arms have not lost all their political weight, nor have industrial capacity or population strength.

Evidently the Russo-Chinese bloc is a formidable force, even though for some time yet China will remain technologically backward. The existing alliances at scattered points round its periphery have seemed adequate to contain it only because of America's superiority in nuclear weapons. As that advantage diminishes, some more substantial force will be required. On the west this could be provided by an effective union of the free European states, which would have a population and industrial output greater than Russia's. Encouraged by America, they are moving towards union, though with much hesitation.

Unhappily no comparable development is in sight in the east. If India and Pakistan effected a military alliance and were linked with Japan, the three most powerful, other than China, of the Asian countries could form an adequate counterweight to China, and if supported by America would balance any likely development of her power. But for the present this is crying for the moon. India is strongly opposed—officially at least—to any plan of the kind, and Japan seems to be moving away from her defensive reliance on America.

As in the past, the communist countries keep up a world-wide propaganda campaign and undoubtedly spend a great deal on it. Much of their diplomatic, cultural and other activity is also intended mainly as propaganda. The effect of it all must be considerable, but mere propaganda, especially if it is largely false, passes through three phases. When a people are still primitive, propaganda of any kind has little effect on them. Then when they have developed political consciousness they swallow almost anything they are told. Finally, they acquire some sophistication, and the effectiveness of propaganda declines again. Not much of the world is now at the primitive level. Many of the backward and ex-colonial countries are still at the second level, the phase of maximum

gullibility. However, ours is a highly political age, and people are learning fast. Probably communist propaganda in general has now entered a phase of diminishing returns.

To achieve real impact, propaganda must be combined with diplomacy. Since Stalin's death Russian diplomacy has become more flexible, profiting by many differences among the free countries. In particular it has induced a number of the backward, colonial and ex-colonial, countries to support it or to be neutral. Latterly it has begun to give some of these countries economic aid.

However, whether by good luck or intelligent anticipation, this campaign has been partly neutralised by a great movement of withdrawal of the principal colonial powers from the colonies, and the beginning of systematic economic aid to them from the capitalist countries. Moreover, Russia has come up against a number of difficult choices, especially in her effort to penetrate the Middle East. Finally, China has begun to take independent action in accordance with a policy appreciably different from Russia's, and has reawakened suspicions which Russia's blandishments had largely dispelled.

An ounce of power is worth a ton of propaganda. Communists have always been concerned to make people believe that their triumph is inevitable, and have been far less worried whether it appears desirable. Now that they really wield very great power, their campaign of expansion consists more in threats than in promises. This was very much the case in Stalin's last years. Khrushchev has increased the element of enticement, and for some time Mao did so too, but latterly he has gone back to something like Stalin's methods.

Some have suspected that the difference in tactics between Russia and China is a mere show, covering an agreed division of labour in promoting the world revolution. If so, it has been worked out in a most artistic manner. Fairly outspoken diatribes have appeared in the press in both countries. Such a thing seems altogether too risky. It is a genuine difference of opinion, and there are important divergences on domestic affairs, too.

Some broad causes of this most gratifying dispute can be discerned. Since Stalin's death the Russian dictator has been in a comparatively weak position. He has had to restrain the terror and rule largely by humouring the public. The public for their part are now educated and probably impatient of being treated like children. Hence Khrushchev has had to allow substantial relaxations at home, and to put up at least a convincing show of a detente abroad, accompanied, however, by frequent claims of successes—in India, Iraq, Guinea, Cuba—to maintain the somewhat tepid enthusiasm of the public for world conquest. In China, on the other hand, the dictator is still triumphant and self-assertive and inclined to meet opposition, at home and abroad, by violence rather than conciliation. There is good reason to believe that the official claims of economic progress are greatly exaggerated, and that the people are suffering

intensely. But to a man in the mood of the Chinese dictator this supplies only an additional stimulus to militancy. He is opposed to any international relaxation, and behaves as a successful communist is naturally inclined to do, making little distinction between imperialists, social democrats and feudalists; America, India and Nepal. All enemies are to be buried.

The difference should not be exaggerated. Since 1955 at least, China's bellicosity has been exercised mainly at the expense of countries which are not America's allies, and always so as to avoid any great risk of American retaliation. Russia has claimed to want a detente, but has broken it repeatedly by warlike gestures; and when she has worked to "reduce tension", it has evidently been for the purpose of weakening the NATO alliance or inducing America to stop nuclear weapons tests. Still there was a difference between Russian and Chinese policies, and it remains even after the collapse of the "summit". In fact the dramatic change of Khrushchev's policy in the middle of May has amounted to little except louder denunciation of America.

The important difference is that Russia supports the attempts of communists abroad to attain power by peaceful means, whereas China opposes such attempts and supports revolution. The policy of occupying border areas in Indo-China, Burma, India and Nepal is carried out in pursuance of the policy of supporting revolution in those countries: it is intended to encourage the communists and intimidate their opponents.

The communist party of India has before it two possible policies. It may present itself as a respectable national party, allaying fears by carefully playing the parliamentary game, aiming to complete the work of modernisation and socialisation begun by the Congress, and destined, with its superior discipline and morale, to take the place of the Congress when the time comes. Or it may set about to exploit the numerous divisions, of class, caste, language, etc., which open so temptingly before it, and reduce the country to chaos in order to climb to power on the ruins. Either policy would have good prospects of success. It might even be the best way to pursue the one for some time and then go over to the other. But it is foolish to combine or alternate the two, at least for the present.

Happily, that is what the C.P.I. has done. Before 1949 Moscow compelled the party to combine or alternate incompatible policies. Now Moscow seems to have made up its mind in favour of respectability, but luckily for us all, Peking has appeared on the scene as the permanent champion of direct action. India is equidistant from the two communist capitals; Moscow is older, but Peking is Asian. The C.P.I. must be pulled with equal force in both directions. It is striking that the Chinese invasion has not greatly changed the situation in the party. Thus the old ambiguity of policy remains, and uncomfortable though it is when the party turns left, it is best in the long run that this alternation should continue, since it condemns the party to impotence.

India: Traditional Past & Western Future

by Edward Shils

THE modern intellectuals of India are unique among those of the new states in their long history, their large numbers, their professional diversity and the high quality of their best achievements. Academic and scientific institutions, privately and governmentally sustained, grew up in India earlier than in any other of the then colonial countries. Universities and colleges, some of quite distinguished quality, were established and staffed largely by Indians, among whom there were men of considerable learning and outstanding moral and pedagogical gifts. Their numbers have multiplied so that, at present, there are about 85,000 teachers in colleges, universities and higher technological institutions.

Even in fields in which India is still considered underdeveloped, such as industrial and agricultural technology and medicine, an indigenous modern intellectual class had taken shape by the beginning of the 20th century. Indian chemists, physicists, engineers, agronomists, and mathematicians were already active in academic and Government service 50 years ago, though their employment by industrial enterprise was negligible then, and is even now slight compared to more advanced countries.

The press, English and vernacular, was already flourishing by the turn of the century; a literary, technical and general periodical press was also developing. Journalism, as a moral and political cause and as an occupation, had a considerable body of practitioners throughout India. Today, journalism provides employment for at least 2,000 persons, the majority of whom work for the English-language press.

The vast administrative machinery of the British Raj provided berths for many of the graduates of the colleges and universities and employment in it became the most desired of the various occupations accessible to those with a modern higher education. Today, in the upper levels of the Civil Service there are probably 30,000, who by education, task and interest could be designated as intellectuals.

The legal profession today must have no less than 50,000 members. Embracing these specific professions in which persons of intellectual interests and obligations are usually found, but going beyond them, there are probably about 660,000 college and university graduates in India, of whom considerably more than 100,000 have taken advanced degrees.

In summary, the modern Indian intellectual class formed a large aggregate at the height of foreign rule. Now in the second decade of Indian independence, the intellectuals probably come to about 150,000 to 200,000 persons. There is, moreover, no major branch of intellectual activity, or of practical life requiring intellectual preparation, in which there is not a substantial representation.

The modern Indian intellectual, like the intellec-

tuals of all underdeveloped countries, performs intellectual activities which have not grown out of his own indigenous traditions and which are not integral to the traditional social structure of his country. At the same time, he lives in the midst of traditional institutions. Unlike most of the intellectuals of Black Africa, he is the heir of a profound and well-elaborated religious and philosophical culture, which has been the concern of systematic theologians and philosophers over many centuries. His modern culture—scientific, literary, technological, scholarly and political, and the institutions, universities, laboratories, reviews, the daily press, research institutes, etc., which sustain that culture—have not, however, grown out of their traditional matrix. They are the products of traditions which have grown up and been nurtured elsewhere and have come to his country, primarily under foreign sponsorship, only in the past few centuries.

Because of the exogenous origin of his modern culture, the Indian intellectual is very frequently accused of being rootless. British administrators and publicists, who preferred the Indian peasant to the Indian intellectual, were probably the originators of that accusation. Indian intellectuals have taken it up and it has become the most common coin of their criticism of themselves and of each other. Indian politicians, most of whom began their careers as intellectuals, like to charge those who have assimilated so much of modern culture and who do not go about in *dhotis* with being "out of touch" with the life and culture of the Indian "people." It is the cliché by which foreign observers write off the Indian intellectual. Many Indian intellectuals believe it of themselves. Perhaps there is a little truth in it—but not a very great deal.

It is true that Indian intellectuals do love an "abroad", of which Britain is the centre. They are eager to be in intellectual and personal contact with what goes on there. They love to go abroad for their studies and to prolong their sojourns as much as they can. It is also true that inside India, they take a special delight in reading Western journals and in being in touch with Western intellectuals. Moreover, many are also explicitly critical of the cultural and social traditions they have received.

Indian intellectuals are Indians, but they are modern Indians—despite the fact they shed their modern garments when they get home and in many parts of India do not even wear modern garments in public places, where they pursue their professions or seek their pleasures. They are extremely conscious of the fact that they are Indians, even that minority which blames itself for not being "really Indian," and their fundamental sensibility is Indian. Their conception of the good life; their pattern of relationships with the aged, with men and women, and with sub-

ordinates; their attraction by charismatic, and their distrust of impersonal and remote authority; their attitude toward work—all are very Indian, regardless of the avowed acceptance or rejection of Indian religious and social traditions. Their Indian religiosity is very much alive.

The depth of the Indian intellectual's permeation by Indian traditions is nowhere more visible than in his political orientations. In India, the most esteemed person is the saint, the "pure" person who has transcended the demands of his lower self and who lives in the possession of Brahma. This was the root of Gandhi's great ascendancy over his fellow countrymen.

This deeper response to the charismatic qualities of those who aspire to lead the country accounts also for the political dissatisfaction so widespread nowadays among Indian intellectuals. The routine, the compromises, and the small-scale patchwork which characterize party politics in any modern society are not to their taste. Something in the constitution of intellectuals everywhere makes them averse to everyday politics, but in India this intellectual disposition is furthered by specifically Indian orientations, which is the reason for the malaise descended on Indian intellectuals since independence.

Independence, initiated in the midst of grievous chaos, brought disappointment. Not that anyone has ever wanted restoration of British rule, but Indian self-government left those who had dreamed of it unhappy. Independence in India turned out to be a regime of politicians, of party organizers, of bosses, time-servers and placeholders, who delivered their votes in return for the benefits of a parliamentary seat. The mighty bureaucracy, before which Indian intellectuals had once stood in uncomfortable awe, now that it became entirely Indian and their own, remained awesome but less so, more resented, more criticized, charged with corruption and with lack of character—the latter charge being one of the most severe an Indian intellectual can utter against a public personality.

The Indian intellectual is in a sense anti-political, alienated from the order of civil government on the grand scale, alienated because his Indian traditions lead him to be distrustful of impersonal authority which rules by law rather than by charismatic emanation. The traditions of the independence struggle reinforce in him his admiration for spiritual heroism; the traditions of the modern intellectual, which he received from Western scientism, radicalism and socialism, keep alive in him the alienated oppositional mentality which was the characteristic political outlook of the struggle for independence.

The aspiration of Indian intellectuals remains what it has been for a long time, an aspiration toward an Indian modernity which has assimilated Indian traditions. The aspiration is inarticulate and the intellectual has not yet succeeded in giving it either formulation or procedure, but it is not a reflex of his xenophilia. Actually, his xenophilia probably derives from his yearning towards a freer, more individual exist-

ence and from his admiration for the advanced countries of the West, especially for Britain. And his appreciation of English and American literature grows out of his discovery in them of that freer, more individual life.

There is a polity which corresponds to that culture and literature; it is a liberal polity and it is attractive to Indian intellectuals. Yet this alone does not satisfy Indian intellectuals. It would deny their claim to self-respect to accept the teaching of the West without qualifications. Moreover, they see that what they have accepted from the West has not provided their political salvation, or that of other Asian countries, which is why, as so many of them say, they want it adapted to their "specifically Indian conditions and traditions."

Their motives are composite—they wish to see their country important and respected in the world, and they feel it cannot be so if it is materially and culturally poverty-stricken. They are mortified by their country's squalor and feel some compassion for their poor fellow countrymen. And finally they think that being modern is a good thing in itself. There are very few Indians with any advanced modern education who think that Indian society should become what it was once, or that it should remain as it is. There is widespread belief that improvements should be socialist in nature, and an almost equally widespread belief that the socialism should not be oligarchical, that the people should be alive and active in it. But no one knows how this is to be accomplished. The Indian intellectuals are, by and large, socialists opposed to the administrative machinery which any socialism not entirely anarchistic would require. Part of the Indian intellectual's malaise in politics today is a function of the malaise of liberal socialists everywhere. They no longer believe in the inherited recipes of socialism and they have not yet succeeded in reformulating its essential mood into new, practicable programmes.

The Indian intellectual today is not a happy man. He is ill at ease in society. The older generation looks back with disillusionment and nostalgia on the great days of the struggle for independence—toward the excitement of the great Civil Disobedience movements and the life of selfless consecration to a tremendous cause of transcendent worth. The college and university teachers, underpaid and overworked, are generally demoralized, without intellectual passions or the sober application to a task which holds their affections and their energies day in and day out. Most of the journalists are poor, lacking in self-confidence and incurious. They neither live for a cause nor do they prosper in a "causeless" business. Literary men and artists work in many occupations, mainly in teaching, and they suffer the contumely and miseries of that profession in India. The students are "rebels without a cause," undisciplined, explosively touchy and troubled by a future which offers so little prospect. Around all but the small groups at the peaks of Government, science, journalism and scholarship hangs the ubiquitous pall

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Conflict Of Principles

by M. R. Masani

IT appears to me that the tragedy is, like all real tragedies, not a clash between right and wrong, but between right and right. There are two kinds of right principles or logic which have come into collision on an occasion like this. On the one side, the Fundamental Rights in our Constitution give every citizen the right of freedom of association and the right to deny his labour. These are very sacred rights and any attempt to deny them must be very carefully considered and very carefully limited.

Similarly, the Directive Principles of our Constitution lay down certain economic policies like giving everyone a living wage. These are the principles — the right of freedom of association and the right to strike, which distinguish a free man from a bonded slave, and also the right to certain minimum standards.

On the other hand, there is another equally valid principle, and that principle is that of the normal functioning of a community. The British phrase has it, 'The King's Government must be carried on', and in our own country, the President's Government must proceed, and anything that disrupts the normal, ordered life of the community or of society has to be eschewed. From this, the corollary follows that our civil services and State employees — the civil services proper, and not industrial workers — must be immune from political influence or political affiliation. From that also follows a corollary that their associations and unions, when recognised, should be confined to those who belong to these vocations.

So here there are two principles or two logics coming on this occasion into violent conflict. We should try to understand each point of view and find out how much merit there is in those who espouse these respective points of view.

So far as the employees are concerned, their case is that their real incomes had been eroded by a constant process of a rise in prices. It cannot be denied that they had a valid claim to compensation to maintain their real incomes, not to ask for more money but at least to be safeguarded what they got in 1947 would be the real wages they would continue to get. What is the root cause of this difficulty?

The rise in prices followed from governmental policy. It followed from the pattern of planning to which this country has been led during the past decade. This pattern of planning has built in it, has inherent in it, inflation. This has been pointed out from the very beginning of the Second Plan by a number of people like Professor Shenoy who dissented from his colleagues in the Panel of Economists to point out that if this Plan was sought to be put through there would be a rise in prices and inflation. This warning was ignored by Government. By deficit financing, by excessive taxation, by the imposition of

excise duties on the necessities of life, by the obsession with capital incentive projects like steel plants to the neglect of the wants of the community, this Government has almost deliberately set in motion a process of inflation.

Similarly, who has created this enormous class of underpaid civil servants? It is alleged that three clerks today do the work one clerk could do perfectly satisfactorily in our Secretariat. On whom does the burden lie of creating this huge army of under-paid and under-worked people? If one clerk had been there, he could have been paid much more. You have today three under-paid and under-worked clerks. The entire responsibility for this enormous rise in civil expenditure, which one Finance Minister after another has been unable to control, this expansion of bureaucracy which far exceeds anything that Professor Parkinson ever dreamt about, is again the responsibility of the Government of the day. At long last, Government have agreed that in their disputes with their employees, where necessary, they will bow to the rule of law. Hitherto, they were arrogant enough to behave like Louis the XIV and say "*L'état c'est moi*", 'I am the State'. I have heard Ministers of this Government say that they would not go to arbitration because government itself is the law. That is perfectly all right when the Government is a judicial body. Certainly, it has the sovereignty of law. But, when Government becomes an employer, when the Government opens factories and runs railways, then, it ceases to be sovereign and it becomes like any other employer: somebody whose duty it is to conform to the norms of civilized society.

I have said what needed to be considered from the employees' point of view. Now, let me say a word from the other side. I think that, on the eve of the strike, when certain concessions were made which amounted, as far as I understand, to the linking of wages with prices in principle, 50 per cent neutralisation of the rise in the cost of living and an agreement to go to arbitration, as I understand it, in respect of the balance, I think, at that point, any strike became unjustifiable. The friends who led that strike did not at that moment reconsider the position and realise that the interests of the workers of the country would not benefit by imposing a strike on the country when so much had been gained and so little remained to be obtained. I believe, therefore, that the strike was thoroughly ill-advised and unjustified. I do feel this — that those who led that strike did not give enough weight to the enormity of the peril to the country and the problems it would create. I think, at that point, statesmanship and good leadership would have lain in resiling from the strike and progressing further with negotiations. After all, leadership consists in guiding followers right and not in doing what.

at the moment, might be popular with them. I do feel that the leaders of the strike, at that moment, resorted to that very well-known Leftist weakness of tailism, they followed the followers without correcting them and giving them a proper lead.

When the Ordinance was passed — and I agree that an Ordinance is a lawless law; we have been brought up on that phrase when the British Government passed its Ordinances — we had to bow to the rule of law. The duty of the strikers and their leaders at that point was to have called off the strike. In a democracy we have to bow to the law whether we like it or not, whether for the moment we believe it is fair or not. I do feel that the leaders of the strike failed in their duty at that point of time in not bowing to it, accepting it for the time being and trying to argue against it and trying to change it when Parliament met.

We were told by the Home Minister this morning that Government propose to ban strikes of government employees. Or, did he say civil services? It is an important thing to distinguish between different classes of government employees. One rule or one yardstick will not serve for different categories of government employees. There are civil servants proper who work in the Secretariat; they are one category. There are workers in essential enterprises, who are another. And, then, there are the normal common industrial employees of Government, and particularly of a Government that barges unnecessarily into producing things. These employees, the third category, are no different from any other private employees and no attempt should be made to distinguish between the ordinary industrial employees of government and those who work in other factories. But in the case of the first two, civil servants and the essential services, I think the Government would be entitled to come before us with a set of proposals distinguishing them from normal employees and limiting their rights but also defining the procedures by which alternative remedies could be given to them.

In regard to the recognition of associations or unions of the first two categories of people, Government would have every right to say that membership and

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of the unemployed, the neglected, the insulted and injured.

The situation of the Indian intellectual is not conducive to the politics of civility. The obstacles are not the rootlessness and ineffectiveness of a group pulled in opposing directions by attachments to the Indian past and a Westernized future. They are rather the products of an oppositionalism unable to accept responsibility, of a socialism which has lost its capacity to persuade, and of the failure thus far to assimilate the traditions of past and present to both of which they are so much attached.

—Condensed from The New Leader

leadership should be limited to the actual employees and that outsiders, whatever their political affiliation should not be allowed to lead them. That follows from what I said earlier — that civil servants must be immune from political affiliation or interference.

In regard to the banning of strikes, I would like to try to avoid a resort to such a ban. Once we ban strikes by all workers we become a totalitarian dictatorship and cease to be a free society. I do believe the Government have no such intention. Therefore, let us limit the truncating of the right to strike to essential services and civil servants proper. In regard to these, I would prefer Shri Jayaprakash Narayan's approach — trying to get an agreed formula for arbitration, if you like compulsory arbitration as in Australia, because we know compulsory arbitration automatically prevents a strike. There could no longer be a strike once compulsory arbitration or voluntary arbitration is agreed to.

I would suggest to all concerned, including those who led the Government employees, to agree to the principle that all disputes between them and the Government should be justiciable and should go to a tribunal of some kind chosen with the consent of both parties. Once it is done, it is obvious that the right to strike has been forsworn and abjured and therefore, a legal ban may or may not be necessary. If it is, let it be a formality but let it follow rather than precede the other remedies.

—Condensed from a speech in Parliament

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Crisis In Trade Union Movement

by S. R. Mohan Das

NOW that the all-India strike of the Central Government employees is over, the aftermath has raised certain basic questions of great import for serious consideration.

The first question that came up right at the start of the strike was this: Was the proposed strike a trade union struggle or was it a political or revolutionary action directed at the Government itself?

This question was perhaps the most important that needed a clear examination. Leaders of the Joint Council of Action, representing the Central Government employees, asserted with all sincerity that their contemplated action was purely a trade union action. They were pained and hurt when the Government of India and the Prime Minister characterised the proposed strike as amounting to a challenge to the Government itself. When the Prime Minister further implied that the proposed strike at this juncture, when we were faced with the Chinese aggression, would amount to anti-national activity, they were incensed. They pointed out with anger that the Chinese aggression against India which was being deliberately played down by the Government and the Prime Minister when it suited them, was being exploited only to smear the leaders of the Central Government employees. Many of the leaders bitterly remarked that if the Prime Minister and the Central Government had shown against the Chinese aggressors a fraction of the toughness they were showing against their own employees, the Chinese would have been thrown out of our soil!

The Government of India, on the other hand, asserted that proposed strike was a clear political and revolutionary action. For one thing, the Government argued, the issues were not of such a serious nature as to warrant an ultimatum of a strike. There was scope for fruitful negotiations without the threat of a strike. The Government accused the strike leaders of rigidity in their demands, converting the whole negotiating process into one of face-saving and prestige for the leadership. The refusal of the Prime Minister to grant an interview to the strike leaders was primarily based on reluctance to discuss the question with the leaders with a strike ultimatum posed against the Government. In short, the Government of India looked at the question *not as an employer, but as a Government*, whose "might was being challenged", so to say.

But what were the crucial facts of the situation?

All impartial observers have agreed that the issues raised as the cause of the strike were legitimate and genuine issues. All were agreed further that there was no question whatsoever of the leadership of the strike thinking in terms of challenging the constituted authority of the Government as such. To a great extent the difficulty arose on account of the incapacity

of the Government to distinguish between its two separate identities and characteristics, namely, one as an employer and the other as a Government.

On the other hand, a similar blurring of identities existed among the union leaders too. The Government could argue with equal effectiveness that the leaders of the Joint Council of Action, who were all political leaders, were claiming a trade union identity and trade union character as a piece of mere convenience. For one thing it was pointed out that the nature and character of the mandate the three leaders, Mr. S. M. Joshi, Mr. Nath Pai and Mr. Peter Alwares, had was such that the strike could never operate as primarily a trade union strike, whatever might have been the intentions of the leaders.

What was the nature of the mandate? It was revealed by many Railway union leaders at lower levels and employees that, until very recently, railway unions and employees had expressed their strong resentment at being bracketed with the other Central Government ministerial civil service employees. They had even passed resolutions opposing their grievances being referred to a Pay Commission. Instead, on the correct ground that the Railways represented an industry, they demanded the setting up of a wage board separately for them. In any event, the railway workers did not have such precipitate accumulation of grievances against their Government employer for a showdown through direct action of a strike. Then the question arose: What was the pressing reason for the railway unions to make this *volte face* and join in solidarity with the Central Government ministerial employees?

The same was more or less the case with the Posts and Telegraph employees. The setting up of the Joint Council of Action, in itself, was indicative of a radical departure from earlier mandates and attitudes reflecting the rank-and-file will. It is a fact that all the while, during the entire crisis, the mandate of the employees organisations rarely flowed from below, but came decisively from the top.

The next question that arose was the competence of the employees' organisations to keep the strike going as a trade union struggle without its becoming political and revolutionary. This question could be honestly answered only when we visualise hypothetically a Government handling the strike threat as an employer and not as a Government. Let us assume the Government had handled the strike threat as an employer and behaved as such. Two courses would have been open to the Government. One was to offer impartial arbitration of the dispute, or otherwise, face the trial of strength, without using its Governmental instruments for breaking the strike. To ensure the security of its property, a minimum amount of security steps would have been sufficient. Suppose

the Government had acted in this manner, viz, it had deployed enough force as any employer would do to protect its property, to protect itself against violence and such other measures. The question then arises: would the strike have remained a determined, responsible, effective and peaceful strike in terms of "concerted withdrawal of labour"? To answer this question, we have to go into the character and traditions of the Indian trade union movement, the competent organisational apparatus that the movement has shaped in terms of rank-and-file participation, in terms of facing the vast and complex problems that arise in a strike such as relief, keeping extremist and hot-headed elements under leash, and, above all, keeping alive certain pragmatic considerations that alone contribute to the welfare of the workers, which is always the supreme consideration in any action launched.

Does the trade union movement in India possess the requisites listed above?

It had been more or less assumed by the leaders of the strike that once they gave the call for a strike, the response from the workers would be impressive. This assumption was rather facile and based on the exclusive regional experience which the three leaders had in Maharashtra in the context of an entirely different type of movement. They did not develop reality perception on the basis of various factors and forces at work at all-India levels. Above all, even assuming that the strike would have been successful in the hypothetical situation cited above, they refused to look ahead regarding the question of the sustaining power of the strike. For instance, there was no calculation among the leaders as to the sustaining power of the strike in the most ideal conditions, let alone under the conditions of determined suppression of the strike, as was done by the Government.

In such conditions, how would the strike have been brought about? There was bound to be a major quantum of non-participation in the strike by employees, and to that extent considerable reduction of the vulnerability of the Government. In such a situation what measures could be adopted by the unions to keep the strike going? Obviously bolstering measures somehow to keep the strike going at least as a counter-measure to the Government's claim about its disastrous failure, were necessary. These bolstering measures could be found only in actions that could be characterised as revolutionary and by the use of "Aktivists" of the type Stalin and Lenin described. The use of revolutionary tactics and "Aktivists" became necessary not only in the present situation of Government suppression of the strike. This would have been necessary even in the most favourable conditions for a strike, because within a few days the momentum of the strike would have been lost, the sustaining power petered out, and similar bolstering up measures would have become necessary. This crucial fact is not being faced by the union leaders.

Around this focal fact revolves the question about the character of the strike. Readily conceding that the origin of the strike was essentially and basically

trade union, and further conceding that the strike itself would have started as a genuine trade union action, even under the most favourable circumstances for the strike, the question is: would it have continued as a trade union struggle? Experience of such struggles in Calcutta, in the State of Maharashtra, in Kerala and other places has clearly shown that this would not have been so. Within a very short time of its initiation, the strike would have converted itself into a political action.

Now there is absolutely nothing wrong in political action, but the leaders should then come out and frankly say so. The leaders must come out categorically with their new philosophy of trade unionism, that trade union action is a part and parcel of political action that is implicit in Marxist dogma.

A clarification of this crucial question is necessary before the current crisis in the Indian trade union movement can be faced. Within five days the strike fizzled out. Hundreds of employees are now facing mental and physical anguish. The overwhelming sentiment among the employees is that of helplessness, a sense of desperation in the midst of what they feel "inexorable forces" that surround them. Their morale has been blasted for many years to come.

In the trade union movement itself, dreaded polarisation has been further sharpened. Restrictions and contractions of choices, which contributes to the decay of democracy, have been brought about.

The employees and workers who have all the stakes in these processes have to realise the significance of these processes and take over control, instead of feeling helpless or desperate. If this one lesson is learnt by them, all the tribulations and trials will not be in vain.

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side (although that would be all the more advantageous) but in such social, intellectual and cultural by-paths along which he as a critic has chosen to travel.

I may recall here Mark Twain's famous observation when he was shown the obituary notice of his death. He said in his own inimitable way: "Well, the news is slightly exaggerated." That is the least I say to myself whenever I receive the news of the malevolent influence of the Indian film on the young mind.

Our investment in education is an investment in the future of our country. The dividends it will pay us cannot be measured merely in terms of monetary gain or loss. This is not to say that it has no bearing on the economics of our country. On the contrary, our economic prosperity, which is a quantitative assessment, will ultimately stand or fall in the ratio of our qualitative investment in education. Education has a spiritual value which lifts the atomised individual out of the tentacles of the collectivist ideology of communism or fascism and makes of him a truly democratic man living a full life in our 20th Century industrial civilisation.

End Of A Dogma

by Devadas Kini

1. Socialism has foundered on the rocks of dogma. Its diagnosis and remedy of the present society is simple but naive. Private property is the villain of the piece and the total nationalisation of the means of production and distribution is the panacea. This new "Open Sesame", they believe, will open the doors of plenty and prosperity. They have made a dogma and a doctrine out of this, forgetting in the process the aim of the movement—to reduce the intolerable inequality and to introduce equitable distribution.

2. Socialism is a reaction, a moral protest and revolt against the glaring inequality—an inequality that corrupts the rich and the poor alike, that denies health, education and the basic human necessities—and the consequent human indignity and degradation that obtained under the 19th century capitalism.

3. Now equitable distribution from a moral demand for social justice has become a necessity due to political and economic compulsions. Under the impact of strong trade unions, mass production and social legislation, capitalism has shed its teeth and claws. The well-organised and massive trade unions armed with the "ultimate" weapon of strike can now bargain with the employers on an equal footing, if not from a 'position of strength'. Mass production and mass consumption are inter-dependent and always go together. This explains the high standard of living of the workers of the U.S.A. If the Russian workers have automobile plants, the workers of the U.S.A. have cars, said an American labour leader once. There is no magic in this; this is the logic and economics of mass production, equitable distribution will be added unto it and the have-nots shall have more. All the economically developed and progressive countries have national minimum wages, unemployment insurance, old age pension and other social security measures providing a floor below which none will be allowed to sink. This also provides a minimum continuous effective demand which will act as a bulwark against depression. If the process is helped further it is bound to bridge the gulf between the haves and have-nots further. Every one is becoming a capitalist owning shares and having stake in the present society. Capitalism is threatening to become People's Capitalism. And the state has become the welfare state. Socialists have failed to realise the situation and meet the challenge of the changing world.

4. Socialists have always declared that a socialist state will be a workers' state and nationalisation will improve their condition. But this is what the authors of *The Twentieth Century Socialism* have to say on this matter :

"It is even more sorrier fate for the worker to be at the mercy of the state than to be the victim of the private capitalists, for the state — unlike the capitalists — is ubiquitous. If capitalism is

individualism run riot, then communism is collectivism run riot; the remedy is worse than the disease."

Our country is not yet a socialist country and the Congress tries to make it a socialistic pattern of society, but we know the lot of the workers in state undertakings such as the steel plants. There is even a proposal to ban the workers' right to strike. Fact of the matter is it makes no difference to the worker who owns the factory as long as his condition of service is the same.

5. Modern state has enough power in its hands and enough weapons in its armoury to give effect to equitable distribution. Taxation and the budget are the most powerful among them.

"Taxation...is just as effective as violence or outright confiscation and at the same time lacks their disadvantages", says Douglas Jay in *The Socialist Case*.

And this is what G.D.H. Cole of Guild Socialism fame says:

"Let the state control nation's industries and it need not care who owns them as long as it has the unfettered power of taxation in its hands."

6. Of course, dogmatic socialists will violently disagree with this and oppose it. They always looked at property from a distorted angle. For them it is the root of all the trouble — exploitation. They have conveniently ignored that it has also extended the frontiers of freedom. If it is private property that did the mischief of tilting the balance of bargaining power against the worker, the balance can be restored by social legislation and extending property to workers as is being done in Germany in recent years. To abolish private property for this would be like throwing the baby with the bath water or like cutting the head to get rid of the headache.

7. Socialists have poured much ridicule and scorn on the idea of trusteeship forgetting the fact that even in a socialist society those who are at the helm of affairs have to act as the trustees of society. And nationalised or socialised property is as much subject to abuse, if not more, as the private property. A powerful public opinion is the best guarantee, suggests H. J. Laski, against this abuse than all the checks and balances suggested by philosophers. But in the same breath he says impartial and honest news is a pre-requisite. Now, when all the springs of power, channels and sources which mould the public opinion like newspapers and books et cetera are owned by the state is it not too easy to manufacture public opinion as any other commodity to suit the taste of the powers-that-be? Any oligarchy which has entrenched itself in power can continue to be there in perpetuity. Even the best among the mankind finds it too difficult to resist the

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Effects Of Socialism

by Aristide

FREE Enterprise in India faces today a challenge which involves its very survival. In that challenge, it also finds an opportunity to promote the unity and prosperity of the nation within a democratic framework. Does this sound as an abnormal claim? Let us examine.

The introduction of socialism in this country has made things hot for free enterprise. The effect of socialism on the economy has been twofold.

In the first place, it has promoted politics into an industry. While the socialists are out to destroy the so-called "acquisitive society", they have promoted a "perquisitive society." Professional politicians and bureaucrats, safely ensconced in their unchallenged preserves, are accumulating perquisites. The nation has yet to realise how expensive these professional politicians and bureaucrats are proving. While they draw salaries which may appear to be reasonable and moderate — even this assertion is challenged by some — the various perquisites they enjoy cost the tax-payer a pretty penny. Free water, free electricity, vehicles for personal and private use are only some of the perquisites.

A recent report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General should open the eyes of the public as to how the Perquisitive Society is developing. He pointed out that a Cabinet Minister used three aircrafts, including one flown all the way from Jodhpur for the last stretch of the journey from Cannanore to Calicut, for a visit from Delhi to Calicut in 1958. It is significant to recall that a small news item appeared in the Press at that time disclosing that for the Defence Minister, Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon's visit to Calicut on a holiday, the airstrip at Calicut was repaired at a cost of Rs. 55,000. And, Mr. Menon is a good socialist! Apparently what he and other socialists object to is the "acquisitiveness" of others who are financially better-off while they themselves enjoy all perquisites at the cost of the poor people of this country. The disclosure of the Parliamentary Estimates Committee that out of the additional taxation of Rs. 1,044 crores raised in the name of the Plan during the Second Plan, only Rs. 438 crores have gone to planned development of the country is alarming. Apparently, the rest has, for the most part, gone to feed the ever-growing army of professional politicians and bureaucrats.

It is in this context of the development of a Perquisitive Society that one wistfully recalls the statement made by Acharya Vinoba Bhave during the tour of dacoit-infested areas of Madhya Pradesh. The Special Representative of "The Statesman" who was travelling with him wrote the following in an article (May 22, 1960):

"Acharya Vinoba Bhave extolled the bravery and courage of the dacoits during his mission to the badlands. They were 'men on the wrong path'. They

were honest, straightforward. In village after village he told the dacoits how good they were — except for choosing the wrong avocation. To present a foil, he pointed a finger at the 'dacoits' of Delhi — 'men who were invited to seats of honour'."

The tendency to evolve a Perquisitive Society in the name of Socialism is clearly seen all over the country. A few years ago it was reported that one of the state governments found stiff resistance from the bureaucrats when a proposal was made to withdraw several government vehicles from service as an economy measure. While perquisites are accumulated slowly and imperceptibly, any withdrawal of these is considered as a threat to the standard of living of the affected persons; a detraction which will result in fall of efficiency; and finally, an injustice to those who do "important service" to the nation.

The growth of perquisites does not stop with ministers and bureaucrats. Members of that august body, Parliament, are also found susceptible to this tendency.

There have been repeated attempts to get free air travel for M.P.s. One of the attempts was sponsored, among others, by a Communist Member of Parliament. 'What a concession to proletarian conscience in a decadent bourgeois society!'

While nobody would grudge our national legislators all reasonable amenities and comforts, one has also to view the general economic capacity of the country while new demands are made on the Exchequer of the Nation. A proper appreciation of the demand for free air travel can be had by glancing at the following benefits already enjoyed by M.P.s.

- i) Free first class travel on Indian Railways.
- ii) Priority in rail and air bookings.
- iii) Rs. 400/- per month salary.
- iv) Rs. 21/- per day, while attending the session.
- v) 1,800 free telephone calls.
- vi) Subsidised housing in New Delhi.
- vii) Subsidised furnishings.
- viii) Contributory medical health scheme.
- ix) Concession in flying club.

The tendency to accumulate perquisites is evident in state legislatures also. For instance, recently the Maharashtra Government announced plans for free travel for state legislators in State Transport buses.

Legislators in another state have been clamouring for free railway travel, a perquisite already enjoyed by M.P.s. It is this tendency of grabbing perquisites which perhaps led a frustrated citizen, some years ago, to write the caption, "Chor Mandali" (gang of thieves) under a photograph of state M.L.A.s in a museum.

It is generally assumed that perquisites are not to be paid for by anybody. It is conveniently forgotten that ultimately somebody or other has to pay for everything. That somebody is the mass of unorganised

citizens who pay excise duties and the ill-organised tax-payers.

Thus, we see that the evolution of the Perquisitive Society is one effect on the economy of the introduction of socialist ideology in India.

The second effect of socialism on the Indian economy has been on free enterprise. Those in private enterprise have had to endure a three-fold attack.

- (a) Prohibition of entry in major parts of the economy and displacement from existing position.
- (b) Excessive taxation.
- (c) Frustrating controls.

The first attack is designed to exterminate free enterprise in this country. So far as agriculture is concerned, illconceived land legislation making farming into an uneconomic proposition is but one way to drive out private enterprise from the field. The other is the importation of Soviet model collectives through the backdoor. They will come under the guise of joint-co-operative farms. Instances, such as the clauses of the Bombay Tenancy legislation, have been pointed out by experts as indicative of the element of coercion in the introduction of the so-called joint co-operatives. The noble and admirable principle of voluntary activity is totally absent in this straight-jacket of joint co-operatives. It has been freely admitted that the "crank" who comes in the way of pooling land for forming a joint co-operative will not be suffered. It has also been admitted that discrimination in the provision of fertilisers and other facilities will be applied in the case of farmers who stay out of co-operatives. That this is not an imaginary danger is amply proved by the plight of private units in the handloom sector of textiles. In Kerala State, for instance, the handloom textile units in the private sector are denied the benefit of handloom cess collected from cotton textile mills. But the so-called co-operatives formed at the instance of the state are given the benefit of the Handloom Cess. The usual scapegoat — the bloated capitalist — does not come into the picture here because the owners of private handloom units are mostly people of small resources. In Cannanore, I recently met some of them and gathered that many of them had started life as employees in other and eventually built up their own independent units. The discriminatory treatment meted out to these small entrepreneurs is certainly no consolation for the consumers of cotton textiles who when they buy mill-made cloth are penalised in order that the inefficiency of the so-called co-operative units in the handloom sector is subsidised.

Restriction of entry into many sectors of the economy is more evident in the case of industries. The Industrial Policy Resolution sees to it that free enterprise is denied entry into many fields. That is not all. Today, a new and formidable danger to existing units has emerged in the form of State industrial enterprises and the State Trading Corporation. They are progressively displacing established industries and trade by step-motherly treatment and direct intrusion. Incidentally, it is an irony of fate that while socialists argue against the "functionless rentier" in non-social-

ist economies, the State Trading Corporation should be no better than a "functionless rentier". In the case of cement trade, for instance, S.T.C. utilises the existing machinery of distribution of the cement factories, and, without setting its eye on a single bag of cement, collects a tidy sum for services "unrendered"!

It is unnecessary to write much on taxation. It is well known that an underdeveloped country like India, where habits of hard work, savings and investment should be encouraged, suffers from what is considered to be one of the heaviest tax burdens in the world.

The imposition of controls in a planned economy is not anything new. While there is general agreement that planning should be resorted to in India in order to promote maximum utilisation of available resources, the character that controls have assumed in India under Soviet model of planning are such that they are throttling initiative and enterprise. Instead of fulfilling their objective of promoting rapid economic development, these controls are frustrating that aim. A comprehensive survey of controls and their frustrating role in the economy is urgently called for to reveal to the public how the national objective of rapid and large-scale economic development is being hindered.

We have considered the twin effects of socialism; the development of politics as an industry and the gradual extinction of free enterprise. Having witnessed the fall of democracies in countries where free enterprise has been exterminated, can we not discover a way of retaining free enterprise in our own country to promote economic development within a democratic framework?

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temptation of abusing power and we know that it is a rarity to find the best of mankind among the politicians. Such being the case, it is difficult to imagine why socialists want to concentrate giant's power in the hands of the state and then expect it not to be used like a giant. Under these circumstances it is difficult not to misuse it. In such a state those who will not obey shall not eat, as Trotsky found it. And this is what Jayaprakash Narayan says:

"But, after all is said and done, the democratic socialist state remains a leviathan that will sit heavily on the freedoms of the people." And again, "Paper constitutions could hardly be expected to guarantee freedom and sovereignty to the citizen. The economic and political bureaucracy would be so strong and in occupation of such vantage points that the liberties and the rights of the people as their bread would be entirely at its mercy."

8. Socialists put nationalisation in the centre of their picture and made it the corner-stone of their arch. When the corner-stone came down to pieces, faith of many socialists came to pieces. Socialists all over the world are groping in the dark. For this they have to blame none but themselves. They have always claimed to be dynamic and progressive, but they could not keep pace with the events.

Prospect For Party Government In India

by Anand Mohan

IT might, perhaps, be stated as an objective fact that the party system of government, having functioned with a greater measure of success than in any other country of Asia, has come to stay in India. However, the subjective evaluations of this objective fact vary both in degree and kind. It would be profitable, therefore, to examine the attitudes of the political parties themselves to the party system of government, before we analyse the views of those who hold that the system should be abandoned in favour of one more suited to the genius of our people.

It would be difficult to find among the spokesmen of the Congress today anyone with an inclination to be occupied with the ultimate questions of political philosophy. They are too very occupied with the practical arts of governance to be concerned about the basis of government. They wear no more that lean and hungry look which Imperial Britain, no less than Julius Caesar, dreaded as the breeding ground of disaffected thought. And with the departure of the British, it was no longer possible to point to that something rotten in the State of Denmark which stirs the Hamlets of all ages and climes to passionate rethinking.

Invested with the aura of association with a martyred national hero, orbiting within the penumbra of the glory of having wrested freedom from the mightiest Empire of history, and basking in the noonday light of the leadership of a man beloved of the people, the Congress has had no difficulty in identifying itself with the party system. The spokesman of the Congress does not vouchsafe for the nation a party system of government; he bequeaths to it *the* party itself. Who, unless he is out of his mind, so he seems to say, would opt for any party except *the* party? The party which, even if the enemy wishes to alter the map of India, has put India itself on the map of the world. The party which, even at the risk of national disintegration, has given us the phrase, "emotional integration". The party which, no matter how mixed up the economy, has given us "a mixed economy". And the party which, despite pat-
ternising a paternalistic State, has given us the slogan, "socialistic pattern of society".

The Congress, to be sure, can adduce evidence to its genuineness in subscribing to the party system of government as an article of political faith. It can point to the two fair and free general elections held in the country since independence. It can also point to the fact that the communist party was in power in Kerala and that the President of the Republic, deeply solicitous of the future of the party system of government in India, had deemed fit to issue a testimonial to the integrity of character of the communist leadership.

The communists, no doubt, hold that the Congress

suffers no political opposition. Some at least in the Praja Socialist Party may share that view. As long as the Congress is in power, therefore, it would be difficult to ascertain what its attitude is to the party system as such. It is only when it becomes the opposition that, by the manner of its functioning, we can determine what its attitude to the party system is.

For a party which has had to contend seriously with the prospect of political oblivion, it is creditable that the PSP has genuinely subscribed to the party system of government. With slender resources, inadequate organisational skills, and a depleted leadership, it has, nonetheless, not only expressed itself in favour of the party system of government but also contributed, by its responsible opposition, to its fruitful functioning. As a party, thus, it is wedded to the party system of government.

The Amritsar thesis of the Communist Party ostensibly commits it to the adherence of the party system of government. The CPI has thought fit to eschew violence not because it subscribes to a philosophy of nonviolence but because it is violently determined to get into power. In the present context, it was possible for the party to capitalise on the ills, both real and imaginary, of the country and ride to power on the crest of a wave of dissatisfaction. It was surmised that the party's recent disaster in Kerala might compel it to modify its thesis, though, to date, no drastic alteration of its tactical moves has materialised. Be that as it may, we can only judge the CPI's attitude to the party system of government not from its pronouncements of convenience and expediency but from the fundamental tenets which govern its political philosophy. Communist thought glorifies the one-party State and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Like the Congress, though for entirely different reasons, the Communist Party believes that it is *the* party of deliverance. No other party, therefore, can find a place in the sun if the Communist Party comes into power at the centre.

The latest comer on the scene, the Swatantra Party, is devoted to the party system of government with a vengeance. It is as determined to displace the Congress as the Congress is determined to nip it in the bud. A prolonged one-party rule, whatever its effect on the nation's political health, is injurious to the institution of the party system itself. Though the Swatantra Party believes that the country is ripe for an ideological variant different from the one which the Congress has offered the country, it is also convinced, in the manner of Lord Acton, that a prolonged spell of power is good neither for the country nor for the Congress itself, since power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Having examined the attitudes of the major political parties in the country to the party system of govern-

ment, an investigation of some aspects of the party system becomes necessary. A classic definition of the parliamentary system of government, as it is understood in the United Kingdom, is that it works through the interaction of four essential factors—the principle of majority rule, the acceptance by the minority for the time being the principles of the majority, the existence of great political parties divided on broad issues of policy rather than of sectional interest, and the existence of a mobile body of public opinion owing no permanent allegiance to any political party but which, by its instinctive reaction against extravagant moves on the one side or the other, keeps the vessel of State on an even keel.

The greatest deterrent to the successful functioning of the party system in India is the absence of the last factor. Far from public opinion making itself felt on the party in power, it is the party in power that has the resources at its command to mould public opinion and bend it to its will. We still have masses of people, not bodies of citizens. A sturdy citizenry is supposed to contribute its instructed judgment to the public good. But our masses cannot instruct the party in power; they are in need of instruction themselves. A nation which is under the perpetual tutelage of its leaders, no matter how great, forfeits its right to democratic rule. The greatest asset to the Congress and the greatest liability to the party system is to be found at once in the intellectual poverty of our masses.

There is not much to gladden the heart of the student of the party system when he examines the state of our political parties. We have witnessed, during the past few years, a great deal of factionalism, not only inter-party but also intra-party, that is hardly conducive to the emergence of great political parties divided on broad issues of policy. The irony of the situation is that, excepting the Swatantra Party, the major political parties of the country have arrived at a near unanimity on precisely the broad issues of policy, while their articulation and vociferation are confined to inconsequentialities.

While the emphases may vary according to the stress of a given situation, there is fundamental agreement between the Congress, the PSP and the CPI on the bases of the two most important questions—foreign policy and socialism through a planned economy. But unending debates are conducted on issues like linguistic States and the language policy.

The *raison d'être* of the party system is that it provides an institutional framework through which the electorate is confronted with a choice between clearly defined alternatives. This is not to say that every political party must subscribe to a different foreign policy or advance different domestic policies. The foreign policy of any country is known to remain constant, regardless of changes in government. This is so, because the national interest itself, which is supposed to be subserved by foreign policy, also remains constant. But there certainly can be debate and disagreement on what a political party's conception is of the national interest. Similarly, while there cannot be two opinions on the desirability of fashion-

ing a Welfare State, there certainly can be argument and dissent on what constitutes welfare, whether it is best promoted by giving priority of development to one thing or the other, and the scale of values it embodies or destroys.

There are other benefits which a party system of government confers on the community. By representing a variety of interests, political parties actively promote the emergence of a pluralistic State. By subjecting each other's policies to a critical examination, they elevate the pragmatic method which compels the discarding of hypotheses that have failed of verification and rests the validity of a policy in the process of its validation. However, as observed above, these leavening influences lay dormant in post-Independent India because of the near unanimity of the major political parties of the country on issues of policy that vitally affect the community. It is to be hoped that the emergence of the Swatantra Party will contribute to their fermentation.

The second factor in the working of the party system, namely, the acceptance by the minority, for the time being, the principles of the majority, has been honoured more in the breach than in the observance. This impatience with the democratic process is attributable to two circumstances. The first is that the minority parties, in the present situation, are no match for the ruling party with its preponderant majority. The majority party has met with such great success in drugging the masses with its attractive slogans that the minority parties can hardly engage in disputing the ruling party's stand on the momentous issues of our times. They are, therefore, tempted to have recourse to the shorter cut of agitating on issues that can stir popular sentiment and mob passion.

The second circumstance which prevents the minority from accepting the decisions of the majority is linked with the first factor in the working of the parliamentary system of government, namely, the principle of majority rule. The tendency of the Congress to imagine that its majority is not merely a circumstance of the moment but a permanent fixture of the country's political scene emboldens it not only to abuse its numerical majority in the legislatures and Parliament to give legislative form to every whim and fancy of its theoreticians but also to tamper with the fundamental rights of the individual with impunity and re-write a Constitution that should have been given greater sacrosanctity.

Some of the defects in the working of the party system of government in India, which we discussed above, have prompted Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan to expound his thesis that the system is unsuited to our country and that one more conducive to bringing out the genius of our people ought to be devised. Of course, Mr. Narayan also links up this view with the larger question of the type of society that we should bring into being and argues the case for what he calls the communitarian theory of the State.

This is no place to enter into a detailed discussion of Mr. Narayan's overall view. We are confining our-

(Continued on page 17)

Linguistic Frenzy Or Bharatiyata?

by K. K. Sinha

THE recent tragic disturbances in Assam have given a rude shaking to many a thoughtful mind in our country. It is now being increasingly realised that the significance of what has happened there is meant for the whole country; it is, as it were, a shadow of coming events which may overtake us like an avalanche if we do not heed the rumblings. But are we really set athinking, or will this fresh impact again fade away when the dust settles down in the Brahmaputra Valley?

All the leaders of national stature belonging to the various parties have condemned the movement of loot, arson and vandalism in Assam in unequivocal words after the event; but each of the branches of these parties, be it the Congress, the Praja Socialist or the Communist, were split linguistically at the time of the week-long tempo of terror and devastation. The Assamese fractions of these parties, particularly at the district and lower levels, vied with each other in promoting the notorious "movement". None there at that time dared to raise its voice of protest, not to say of condemnation! This lays bare the true nature of the existing reality that has to be faced in Assam and of the potential one in other parts of India.

The implication and the meaning of this reality is that linguistic consciousness is increasingly becoming a living, a passionate reality in our body politic and the democratic parties which depend upon popular support and whose political conduct is accustomed to whipping up mass sentiments, have been caught up willy nilly in their own contradictory position. At the base in order to serve their own political interests and to win local popularity, they have no option but to fan linguistic antagonism, but as they do so they disrupt the unity of their own party. The all-India leaders, far removed from the actual theatre of operations of their lowest party units and long after the actual performance of the damaging activities, can afford to condemn the activities of the "hooligans" for which "their party" is not responsible. This clever political 'dishonesty' of parties, howsoever unintentional at the dishonest level of the top-leaders, would not really do. The problem *as such* has to be tackled as a matter of personal responsibility, as a citizen of the country. The fact is that all the parties are guilty, and it would be good if they began by owning their individual or joint guilt.

Carving of State boundaries on the chief criteria of language has been one of the major factors in promoting linguistic consciousness that is sweeping the country today. Let us recognise it. Practically every political group was committed to it and therefore it is no use now trying to apportion blame, if blame one takes it to be. (Of course, personally I had opposed it in 1954. But that does not count for much). It is also obvious that it is now too late in the day to

rectify the boundaries and make the States multi-lingual, even if it is generally accepted that linguistic demarcation has been a mistake. On the other hand, it is equally true that the increasing linguistic fever has considerably reduced the emotional value round the entity called "India". It is not only Assam's fault. The passion which a significant section of the people exhibit for Punjabi Suba, or for Maharashtra at a time when a part of the country has been coldly and calculatedly occupied by a foreign army is symptomatic. The value and emotional attachment to "India" is far less today than to one's own linguistic unit.

Possibly this is, for some, a more natural posture, historically and culturally. For them it is not such a serious problem. But for those who value 'India' as a modern, political, economic, cultural unit, as providing a wider and freer context for modern living under lesser psychological tension and cultural uniformity than would be available under homogeneous linguistic States—for them it is a major problem getting heightened in importance with time. This appeal is directed to them: that something has to be done about it and done possibly at two or more levels—on the popular, participating, symbolic level, and on the level of understanding, thinking and reflection.

Taking cognisance of the linguistic background, it is time we reflected a little more deeply into the nature and structure of Indian unity. Today we have a federal constitution, and with linguistic basis of demarcation of boundaries, the States enjoy quite a substantial degree of autonomy. But with the problem of economic development, technical and scientific man-power growth, rapid urbanisation and mobility of populations on a countrywide-scale, linguistic autonomy and socio-economic progress are coming in conflict at many points in each of the States. New linguistic minority conflicts are being added to the traditional ones. While thus there is the craving for cultural (linguistic) autonomy and economic autarky leading to increasing emphasis on State exclusiveness and control, there is also the contrary pull towards increasing Federal control and coordination to help countrywide planning and maintenance of a degree of uniformity on a national scale. In this confused, haphazard process the centrifugal tendencies appear to be gaining the upper hand in the long run. A time may come when one may begin seriously questioning: Is 'India' necessary? Is it not therefore better that we begin re-stating to ourselves why it is necessary and why we should strive to retain it? And again, if 'India' is necessary, will it just be a floating federal centre with no roots of its own, buffeted by the waves of linguistic moods of assertion or compromise between the constituent States?

"Unity in diversity" has been claimed as a special

feature of the Indian genius. It now appears that what is considered as our cultural heritage is being threatened under our very nose, nay, by ourselves. We have now to give a clearer shape and content to this hoary formulation. To the extent we can do this in terms of the experience and conduct of the people, only to that extent we shall succeed. Today it is a frail sentiment and a relatively unconscious reality. We have to strengthen its conscious base as well as its emotional moorings. But let us take note that time is against us and it would be fatal to be complacent.

The notion of Indian-ness or *Bharatiyata* can not simply be based on fleeting, chauvinistic sentiments. It is a delicate attitude of mind, an attitude that is open enough to absorb and integrate unto itself the best of values and traditions prevalent in any part of India or even outside. And even where it is not possible for it to absorb any, it would still appreciate the distinctive features and modes of thought or ways of life of the others and find inner joy at the resplendent variety of life. This breadth of outlook is essentially individualistic, is of the thoughtful type, and neither tribalistic nor passionate. But without this basic attitude, it is not possible to have a loosely unified texture of the many ways of life and cultures of our country. It is this outlook that "holds" the society together, as it were, the larger 'family' consisting of many cultures.

There is still another aspect of the problem—a more materialistic one. With the increasing tempo of economic development, of education of the broad masses of people, with the opening of new avenues of employment—in short with the growth of a new kind of consciousness and assertion of the people in the various regions of the country, who were in sleep as it were for centuries and are now rubbing their eyes open and appear to be in a hurry to 'win the race'—a keen competition all over the country for securing educational facilities, services, priority in establishment of industries, trade facilities, etc. has been growing. Competition as such is not harmful; rather healthy. But unfortunately in this race a groupish mentality is becoming predominant, so that in each State and even at the Centre it is this mentality which cares little for merit and capacity, and there is a vulgar haste in favouring one's own linguistic or religious community or caste. Linguistic consciousness has added fuel to this all-consuming fire. And thus we are enveloped in an atmosphere which is becoming narrow and debasing, dividing and degenerating, which engenders only distrust and corruption. It is corroding the very moral fabric of our everyday life.

This is an aspect which cannot be resolved in parts and State-wide. It has to be tackled as a whole on a country-wide basis. I had therefore suggested to the Congress Working Committee that some broad principles should be formulated in this regard and placed before the country. They were, as first tentative drafts, as follows:

(i) Employment, whether in government services or private, above a certain level should be based

completely on merit open to all citizens of India.

(ii) Establishment and operation of major trade and industry anywhere should be open to anybody in India. Trade practices discriminating in favour of particular communities should be prohibited.

(iii) Recruitment to services in the private sector should be restricted strictly on merit and adequate machinery should be created to guarantee the operation of this criteria.

(iv) Fullest freedom of movement and residence for all Indian citizens in any part of India. The local authority must be made responsible to see that this right is actually enjoyed by the people.

The point that I would like to emphasize in considering the above controversial proposals is that our progress in this country would be dependent on the rapid growth of a multifaceted elite in the economic-social-political spheres of our life—an elite which will grow from and operate on an all-India canvas primarily impelled by considerations of merit and open opportunity cutting across all parochial barriers. This character of 'all-Indianness' can never be achieved by a mere arithmetical summation of the most passionate endeavours within the introvert States and linguistic communities.

But it should be equally clearly understood that this in no way comes up against the fullest development of the various languages and literatures. Rather, such steps only break down the artificial mental barriers between them and enable a freer exchange and greater possibility of cross-fertilisation between them, each benefitting from all.

(Continued from page 15)

selves to an examination of the working of the party system in India. Assuming that, by and large, both the people of the country and the political parties themselves desire to work the party system (and the assumption is far from ill-founded) it should not be difficult to remedy its shortcomings. We live in a world of Nation-States that are highly centralised and it is difficult to see how we can escape from the necessity of organising our own State in a similar way. Even if it were desirable and possible for us to alter the organisational basis of our polity, it is not an easy thing for us to establish alternative institutions. Institutions are not like clothes that we can discard at will. They have an organic growth of their own.

This is not to say that it is not given to man to change his institutions. He may, and does, influence the growth of institutions as much as institutions do influence man. It is only to suggest that institutions are like tools which can be put to constructive or destructive uses as man wills. And even if we are to change the party system of government for something else, it by itself will be no safeguard against the abuse of men of ill will. Self-government is more than government by parties. It is, as Gandhiji put it, government of the self. And, in the felicitous phrase of Lord Moulton, it is in our capacity for obedience to the unenforceable that the hallmark of civilisation is to be found.

Soviet Union And Islam

by Adam Adil

EXCEPT for a brief period immediately after the October Revolution of 1917, when Lenin and his associates tried to woo the Muslims of Central Asia forming a part of the Russian Empire and of the Middle East communist policy towards Islam has been that of hostility and opposition. This hostility has been relaxed or intensified in accordance with the requirements of communist strategy at a particular time. One of the significant books, recently published, on Soviet Russia's policy towards Islam and the Muslim world is by Ivar Spector,* an associate professor of Russian civilisation and literature at the University of Washington. With his comprehensive knowledge of Russian as well as Arabic languages, Professor Spector gives a fund of information about what he calls "the three great Soviet drives for the conquest of the Muslim world of the Middle East: the first immediately following the revolution 1917-1921; the second from World War II to the Truman Doctrine 1941-1947 and the third, the drive for the Arab world, from the Bagdad Pact of 1955 to date". Quoting the first English translations of the *Documents of the Programme of the Communist Parties of the East*, (Turkey and Arab countries) published in 1934 by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the Central Committee of All-Russian Communist Party he shows how Soviet-Russia has used the local communist parties in the Middle East, to subvert their own governments in order to facilitate the conquest of the Muslim world by international communism.

On the eve of October Revolution of 1917 there were approximately twenty-five million Muslims of Turkish origin in Russia, divided as follows.

1. Eastern Muslims — Siberian Tartars, Chinese Uighurs;
2. Southern Muslims — Othmans, Azerbaijanians and Turkmenians and
3. Central Muslims — Tartars, Kirghis, Bashkirs and Nogai. Administratively the Muslim population was organised in sixteen provinces.

In spite of forming an important minority in the whole of Russia and a substantial majority in the Central Asian regions of the country, Russian Muslims at no time found adequate representation in Duma or in the Supreme Soviet. In the first Duma there were only twenty five Muslim deputies; in the second, their number increased to thirty five; but in the third Duma, Muslim representation dwindled to ten deputies, and in the fourth, it further dwindled to six. Even at present there is hardly any appreciable Muslim representation in the Supreme Soviet. The predominantly Muslim regions of Central Asia are more and more Russified by the migration of large numbers of non-Muslim Russians there from other parts of

the Soviet Union; and it is these non-Muslim emigrants who are made to represent the Muslim population in the Supreme Soviet. Thus, politically the Muslims of Russia are progressively emasculated. Most Muslims also, on their part, have stubbornly refused to submit themselves to the strait-laced regimentation of the communist regime.

When, after the overthrow of Kerensky, communists were trying to consolidate their political power, Lenin and Stalin made a bid to win over the Muslims of Central Asia. In an appeal dated November 22, 1917, they stated "Muslims of Russia, Tartars of Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, Chechens and Caucasian mountaineers — all you, whose mosques and shrines, whose faiths and customs have been violated by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia!

"Henceforth your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions are decreed free and inviolable! Build your national life freely and without hindrance. You have the right to do it. Know that your rights, like those of all the people of Russia, are being protected by all the might of the Revolution, and by its organs, the councils of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies. Therefore support this Revolution and its authorised government".

But soon, the Muslims were to realise that the promises made by the communist leaders were not meant to be kept but only to be violated the moment the communists were sure of their position.

Today, the Muslims of Russia are the most miserable lot in the country, both economically and culturally. It is true that some attempts are made to build up a few regions of Central Asia economically. But these attempts are negligible compared to those in other parts of Russia. Further, standard of life in these regions is not appreciably higher than that which prevailed couple of decades ago. Culturally, these Muslims are being uprooted from their past. Samarkhand and Bokhara — two of the greatest centres of Islamic civilisation and culture — which fall within these regions, have ceased to be their former selves. Their ancient Mosques, Madrassas and Mausoleums, which were once the pride of the Islamic world, are locked and sealed under communist orders to be opened only when dignitaries from Muslim countries visit these places. Arab script which the Muslims of these regions have adopted for centuries is replaced by Russian script in schools, and even the language is being Russified, with the result the rich literature which forms the heritage of the Islamic world is being officially denied to the younger generation of Russian Muslims.

Speaking about the real position of Islam in the USSR, Professor Raghieb Ehsan of Pakistan who visited Soviet Russia, in his address to the Pakistan Institute

* *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World 1917 — 1958*, by Ivar Spector: University of Washington Press.

of International Affairs in Karachi, stated: (1) there was not a single elementary school in the Soviet Union teaching the principles of Muslim religion, (2) Soviet Muslims were not allowed to issue elementary text books on religious questions or books dealing with Islam, its culture, history or tradition, (3) there was not a single free mosque or religious body in the Soviet Union (4) Soviet Muslims had no claim to the income from the property of a mosque, *madrassa* or mausoleum, which could have been used to provide teaching and sermons and (5) there were no teachers in the Soviet Union capable of teaching the fundamentals of Muslim religion. Professor Ehsan further said that very few Soviet Muslims were granted permission to make the pilgrimage to Mecca or Medina or to visit Muslim countries. The evidence of Prof. Ehsan has been corroborated by other Muslim scholars who had visited the Soviet Union along with him.

Relatively, the position of Muslims under the Tsars was better. Although the relations of Tsars with the neighbouring Muslim countries were not quite cordial, the Russian Muslims enjoyed considerable freedom in the performance of their religious functions and even to visit Islamic countries; and also Muslim scholars from outside could not only visit Central Asia but even teach at the Islamic Universities of Samarkand and Bokhara. Prior to communist take over in 1917, about 50,000 — 60,000 pilgrims left Russia for Mecca; the figure has not exceeded 22 since the Soviets came to power. This fact has been borne out by no other person than the son of the Mufti of the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan in his conversation with one of the North African delegations to Russia couple of years ago. The North African delegates were told, as an instance, that in 1946 the Mufti received 200 applications from Turkestan Muslims for permission to make the journey to Mecca. Ultimately only 17 applicants were permitted by Moscow to go on pilgrimage.

In order to keep up a facade of religious freedom in Central Asian Republics, the Soviet Government has appointed its own stooges and henchmen as the Muftis and the Imams, who, however, have no freedom of their own. The subservience of these Muftis and Imams to communists will be gauged from the following instances. When Stalin died, the Mufti of the European USSR and Siberia sent a telegramme stating that the Russians of Muslim faith "grieved on the death of our brilliant leader and the teacher of the whole world, of our dear father Stalin." And the Mufti of Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan, Isham Babakhan, exhorted the Muslims of the world to support the Stockholm appeal of the communist-engineered international peace movement. When Babakhan died recently, communist papers listed the services he had rendered to the Soviet Government. The obituaries were conspicuous by the absence of a mention of any service he had done for Islam. It was obvious that he performed no service for Islam.

Any reference, however, to the absence of religious freedom for Muslims in Russia, is sought to be dismissed by the Soviet authorities as a figment of

Western imagination. In his address to the First All-Union Conference of Orientalists held in Tashkent in 1957, Mukhitdinov, a Central Asian of Muslim origin to occupy an important place in the Soviet hierarchy, stated that American and British newspapers were responsible for dissemination of "slandorous rumours about the suppression of the Muslim religion here and about the destruction of the monuments of the past". He quoted as examples the "Middle-East Journal" and the "Islamic Review" claiming that during 1955 and 1956, these journals published dozens of articles containing "nothing else than fiction on the persecution of the Muslim religion and national culture in the Soviet Central Asian States". He accused United States of America in particular of spreading "rumours" that there was no religious freedom in Russia. He referred to the Article of the Soviet Constitution and said that all these rumours were false. Yet, while proceeding, he admitted "we communists have never hid our materialistic philosophy from anyone. Moreover we are proud of it and are profoundly convinced that the Marxist materialistic philosophy, proclaimed more than hundred years ago, is the only correct one and that it will undoubtedly emerge victorious throughout the world in the struggle with idealism and obscurantism". What he failed to admit was the fact that communism in its opposition to Islam is backed by all the coercive powers of the Soviet state.

Shortly after Mukhitdinov had spoken, numerous anti-Islamic articles appeared in the Central Asian press, for example in *Qizil Uzbekistan*, *Pravda Vostoka*, and *Bakinsky Rabochy*. These papers have largest circulation in the predominantly Muslim republics of the Soviet Union. *Bakinsky Rabochy* stated that "the teachings of Islam were nothing but a reactionary theory, a weapon in the hands of the parasitic classes and the ideology in the service of the Arab, Turkish and Persian Conquerors". *Qizil Uzbekistan* wrote that "the religion of Islam, which once served the rich, the emirs and the officials, has now begun to serve Anglo-American imperialism."

In spite of persistent anti-Islamic propaganda indulged in by the communist front organisations and the press, Islam is a formidable force in the Central Asian republics. This fact was noted by the Second Central Asian Conference of Archaeologists and Ethnographers held in Stalinabad at the end of 1956 and also later by many communist functionaries working in those areas. In a report called "Survivals of Religion in the Philosophy and Daily Life of the People's of Central Asia and their Role in Modern Life" published recently in the *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, it is stated that Islam continues to live in the hearts of the Central Asians. This explains the reason why the communists in Central Asia have recently stepped up their anti-religious propaganda and the Soviet ethnographers have been called upon to prepare the way for "practical scientific atheistic propaganda" in these regions. This explains also why the Soviet authorities have neglected the economic development of the Central Asian Republics.

With Many Voices

"The deep
Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world."

—Tennyson.

There are many people not far from here (Delhi) who speak of peace, truth and goodwill. They are constantly lecturing others about this. They make promises in the name of peace and goodwill, yet when the time comes to keep those promises they are always broken. This is as great a danger as aggressive militarism, in a different way.

—Dalai Lama, as quoted in *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, August 18.

It would be safe to predict that at the 1962 elections the Congress would lose in at least half a dozen states, even though it might yet scrape through at the Centre with a modest majority, that the communists might succeed in capturing power in at least four States and that the Swatantra Party might be able to assume office, either by itself or in conjunction with another group, in at least one State.

—D. R. Mankekar, *Indian Express*, August 10.

Whether Nehru has discovered India or not, India has discovered Nehru. He has made a mess of the nation's affairs.... By every test of common sense, the Nehru leadership has failed to justify itself.

—*Swarajya*, August 6.

To the Editor,
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A growing impatience with democracy and a corresponding admiration for the efficiency of totalitarianism are a disturbing feature of any political discussion among Indians these days.

—D. R. Mankekar, *Indian Express*, August 24.

You cannot make Soviet economy co-exist with parliamentary democracy.

—M. R. Masani, M.P., *Indian Express*, August 25.

The Soviet Union is the best model for the transformation of Indian agriculture.

—Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh, Minister for Food and Agriculture, *Indian Express*, August 2.

We are not having a welfare state and we will not have it. What we are having now is an ill-fare State.

—Acharya Vinoba Bhave, *Hindustan Times*, August 3.

We are, in fact, now in the position of being appellants at the court of Mao, seeking its verdict on the justice of our claim.

—"S.M", *Hindustan Times*, August 3.

I now realise that to have one's books published in Russian is not quite the compliment I thought it was. It does not necessarily mean that there is any merit in them. It means one thing only: that their tendency is, or is expected to be, to buttress Soviet propaganda about the West.

—John Wain, *The Observer*, London, August 7.

The difference between the United States and the Soviet Union is that we shoot their planes with cameras. They shoot ours with guns and rockets and kill or imprison our crew—even though not one man, woman or child in Russia has ever been injured by one of our planes, not one.

—Henry Cabot Lodge, *Thought*, August 6.

In the 20th century, political ideas grow obsolescent with the speed of motor cars and guided missiles.

—Mark Bonham Carter, *Encounter*, August.

It (Sino-Soviet alliance) is likely to be increasingly a marriage of convenience rather than a love match. If a divorce is inconceivable, a judicial separation is not.

—Malcolm Muggeridge, *New Statesman*, August 20.